^{page 86 note 1} Zumpt, A. W., Das Criminalrecht der römischen Republik, Berlin, 1868. Vol. ii, p. 1 ff.Google Scholar; Mommsen, Th., Römisches Strafrecht, Leipzig, 1899, p. 175 ff., 705 ff.Google Scholar; Greenidge, A. H. J., The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time, Oxford, 1901, p. 415 ff.Google Scholar; Strachan-Davidson, J. L., Problems of the Roman Criminal Law, Oxford, 1912, vol. i, p. 223 ff.Google Scholar; vol. ii, p. 1 ff.

^{page 86 note 2} Hitzig, H. F., Die Herkunft des Schwurgerichts im römischen Strafprozess, Zürich, 1909, p. 6Google Scholar.

^{page 86 note 3} The comments of historians, always brief and often just, usually touch only on one aspect of the Lex. Pelham, H., Outlines of Roman History, p. 182: ‘It (the court) was, until 122 B.C., composed of senators, that is, of men who either had been or were looking forward to being themselves governors of provinces, and who as Romans and nobles were more in sympathy with the accused than with the accusers’; cf. Arnold, W. T., The Roman System of Provincial Administration, p. 78; Drumann-Groebe, , Geschichte Roms, ii, p. 67Google Scholar: ‘Sein Strafgesetz zeugt von einem edlen Unwillen über die Vergehen seiner Standesgenossen, aber er mochte auch ebensowenig Eingriffe in ihre Rechte dulden’; Heitland, W. E., The Roman Republic, ii, p. 215Google Scholar: ‘It can hardly have been a move of the senatorial majority’; Botsford, G. W., The Roman Assemblies, p. 358: ‘His motive was undoubtedly a sincere desire to protect Italy and the provinces from official rapacity’; Lécrivain, Ch., Daremberg et Saglio, s.v. iudicium publicum, p. 650: ‘Ce sont les abus de pouvoir et les exactions des gouverneurs de provinces qui amenèrent la création des tribunaux criminels permanents, des quaestiones perpetuae’; Niebuhr, B. G., Lectures on Roman History, ii, p. 302Google Scholar: The judges ‘were always senators and this was a powerful means of strengthening the authority of the Senate.’ See also Reid, J. S., p. 96 infra, and Boak, A. E. R., History of Rome, p. 114.

^{page 86 note 4} Plut., Tib. Gracch. 16.

^{page 86 note 5} In marginal notes to this article. I owe it to his kindness that I am permitted to quote from them here and elsewhere.

^{page 87 note 1} C. Gracch., 5.

^{page 87 note 2} Meyer, , Eduard, , Kleine Schrtften, Halle, 1910, p. 381 ff.Google Scholar; Kornemann, E., ‘Zur Geschichte der Gracchenzeit’ Klio, Beiheft i. 1903Google Scholar; Pöhlmann, R., Sitzungsber. der bayr. Akademie, phil. hist. Cl., 1907, p. 443 ff.; von Stern, E., Hermes, lvi, 1921, P. 229 ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 87 note 3} xxxvii. 9.

^{page 87 note 4} Civil War, i, 22 (Loeb Class. Libr. Trans.). Into the question as to whether or not senators were eligible for some kinds of jury service after 123–22 B.C. we do not need to go, since it is undisputed that thenceforward they were ineligible for service on the Court of Extortion. Appian clearly thought that they were eliminated from all the courts; yet he motives their removal in dissatisfaction with decisions rendered by them in cases that had come before the Court of Extortion alone. The specific ground for dissatisfaction alleged is that in these cases the senatorial jurors had been bribed to acquit their peers. But this was merely a pretext, as is shown by the fact that the equestrian jurors were legally exempted, under the Gracchan system, from the jurisdiction of the court dealing with bribery. Charges of bribery were at that time the cover for all kinds of opposition.

The Lex Acilia (Girard, F., Textes de droit romain ³ 6; Bruns, c. G., Fontes Iuris Romani Antiqui ⁷, Tubingen, 1909, 10; Hardy, E. G., Roman Laws and Charters, Oxford, 1912 p. 10 ffGoogle Scholar. discloses the fact that it was class sympathy, based on office-holding, kinship, and association in clubs or by clientage, from which the legislator sought to keep magistrates from profiting when they were accused of extortion.

Obviously the contemporary advocacy of the lex judictaria had to centre in its avowed object of protecting peregrini against extortion, and any jurors may honestly have been thought better than senators, while equites, whose knowledge of conditions abroad was unrivalled, were specially designated by their very knowledge for this purpose. See p. 88, n. 2. The best treatment of this whole subject is to be found in Greenidge, A. H. J., History of Rome, New York, 1905, p. 210 ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 87 note 5} Apud Nonium s.v. bicipitem, 454. For the proof that it is C. Gracchus that Varro had in mind here, see Florus, ii, 5 (iii, 17); Mommsen, , Juristische Schriften, iii, p. 343, n. 14Google Scholar; Strachan-Davidson, op. cit., ii, p. 78, n. 3Google Scholar.

^{page 88 note 1} Verr. ii, 71, 175; pro Plancio, 9, 23.

^{page 88 note 2} The publicani were important in government circles much earlier than the negotiators; and when, after 149 B.C., and especially after 123 B.C., the latter multiplied in numbers, wealth, and influence, the former retained their leadership among them, shared in their profits, and gained correspondingly in political power. They were the heads of the non-senatorial equites at the time of the Gracchi. The land owners registered for cavalry service prior to 129–123 B.C. were either senators' sons and senators, or upper middle class farmers too widely scattered and either too indifferent politically or too little conscious of separate interests to play a part in public life commensurate with their numbers and the aggregate value of their property. So far as these farmers came individually to the knowledge of the censors and were thought by them to be fit candidates for a public horse and registration in the 18 centuries, they seem, after 123 B.C., at least, to have played publican rather than senatorial politics. Of course there were always ‘good’ knights (Appian, , Civil War, i, 100Google Scholar; 59). But that the Court of Extortion after 123 B.C. was manned by jurors ordinarily hostile to defendants is clear from many utterances of Cicero: Verr. i, 9, 26Google Scholar: qua lege [Acilia] multi semel accusati, semel dicta causa, semel auditis testibus condemnati sunt; lex atrox; pro Plancio, 15, 36; 37: acerbum genus iudicii; Verr. Actio Prima, i, 17, 51Google Scholar: severissimi indices. See Hitzig, op. cit. p. 16.

‘That there was a certain sympathy with the provincials spread abroad among the mass of the cives seems indicated by the ease with which every fresh lex repetundarum after Gracchus was passed. Enmity for the Senate will not account for this’: Professor Reid. Granted; but the animus of the equites was something special.

^{page 88 note 3} Cic. de Oratore, i, 52, 225Google Scholar, translated by Strachan-Davidson, op. cit. ii, p. 80Google Scholar.

^{page 88 note 4} Appian, , Civil War, i, 22Google Scholar.

^{page 89 note 1} Diod. xxxvii, 9.

^{page 89 note 2} Diod. xxxiv, 27.

^{page 89 note 3} For the fact that it was so reserved see Plut. Tib. Gracch. 16; Cassius Dio, xxiv, frg. 83; Appian, , Civil War, i, 22Google Scholar; cf. Mommsen, , Juristische Schriften, iii, p. 340Google Scholar; Staatsrecht, iii, p. 530, n. 1.

^{page 89 note 4} The passages relating to the Lex Calpurnia come mostly from the works of Cicero. They are collected by Orelli in the Index legum to his edition of this author as follows: Brutus, 27, 106: quaestiones perpetuae—constitutae sunt, quae antea nullae fuerunt; L. enim Piso tr. pl. legem primus de pecuniis repetundis Censorino et Manilio cos. tulit; de Off. 2, 21, 75 (44 B.C.): nondum centum et decem anni sunt cum de pecuniis a L. Pisone lata lex est, nulla antea cum fuisset; at vero postea tot leges et proxima quaeque duriores, tot rei, tot damnati; Verr. iii, 84, 195: Si, quod L. Piso ille Frugi, qui legem de pecuniis repetundis primus tulit, cum emisses quanti esset, quod superaret pecuniae retulisses; ibid. iv, 25, 56: filius enim L. Pisonis erat, eius qui primus de pecuniis repetundis legem tulit; Schol. Bob. in orat, pro Flacco, p. 233: primus hoc (cognomentum frugalitatis) meruit L. Piso qui legem de pecuniis repetundis tulit et fuit C. Graccho capitalis inimicus; Divinat. 5, 17: quasi vero dubium sit, quin tota lex de pecuniis repetundis sociorum causa constituta sit; ibid. 20, 65: lex ipsa de pecuniis repetundis sociorum atque amicorum populi Romani patrona; Verr. ii, 6, 15: vos in hac quaestione de pecuniis repetundis, quae sociorum causa constituta est, lege iudicioque sociali sociorum quaerimonias audire oportet.

The passages relating to the Law derived from other sources than Cicero are: Tac. Ann. xv, 20Google Scholar: usu probatum est, patres conscripti, leges egregias, exempla honesta apud bonos ex delictis aliorum gigni. Sic oratorum licentia Cinciam rogationem, candidatorum ambitus Iulias leges, magistratuum avaritia Calpurnia scita pepererunt; Val. Max. vi, 9, 10: L. Lentulus consularis lege Caecilia (sic !) repetundarum crimine oppressus, censor cum L. Censorino creatus est; Lucilius, xx: Calpurni saeva lege in Pisonis reprendi Eduxique animam in primori[s fauc]ibus naris; Polybius, vi, 17: τὸ δὲ μέγιστον · ἐκ ταύτης ἀποδίδονται κριταὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν συναλλαγμάτων, ὅσα μέγεθος ἔχει τῶν ἐγκλημάτων. (That Polybius had in mind chiefly cases of extortion in making service as jurors the greatest of senatorial prerogatives is a shrewd observation of Mommsen, , Staatsrecht, iii, p. 529, n. 3Google Scholar); Lex Acilia, 23: [aut quod cum eo lege Calpu]rnia aut lege Iunia Sacramento actum siet; ibid. 74 (81): [quibusquom ioud]icium fuit fueritve ex lege quam L. Calpurnius L.f. tribunus plebei rogavit, exve lege quam M. Iunius D.f. tr. pl. rogavit.

^{page 90 note 1} The tribunes could approach the comitia tributa directly, the comitia centuriata only through the intermediary of a praetor; Mommsen, Röm. Strafrecht, p. 168, n. 5. Political cases were taken up by the tribunes as a matter of course.

^{page 90 note 2} Zumpt (op. cit. ii, p. 6.ff.Google Scholar) goes too far in this direction when he gives to the Senate prior to 149 B.C. the legal rights which the Court of Extortion exercised later. The records he has brought together are satisfied by the view taken in the text, that the Senate intervened not as a court but to have a court appointed, and that, in order to have a case handled judicially, it was obliged to resort to one of the three methods enumerated above. Naturally there was nothing to prevent the Senate from intervening after 149 B.C. to ensure that a case was brought to trial. Hence the inferences made by Zumpt from the Senate's activity in the case of D. Silanus (ca. 141 B.C. Livy, Epit. liv.; Val. Max. v. 8, 3), that a court of extortion did not then exist and that Piso defined by his law the crimen repetundarum and did not establish a quaestio perpetua, are without value.

Moreover, after 149 B.C. nothing could prevent tribunes, at any rate if they acted at the behest of the Senate, from creating further quaestiones extraordinariae by rogationes privilegii similes, though as a matter of fact we know of only one such creation prior to the time of the Gracchi, that dealing with the notorious case of L. Hostilius Tubulus in 141 B.C. (Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. in vol. viii, 2, p. 2514 f.Google Scholar; Mommsen, Strafrecht, p. 197). Mommsen holds the opinion that all these special laws were unconstitutional; Strachan-Davidson (op. cit. i, p. 230)Google Scholar rightly dissents.

^{page 90 note 3} The question whence Piso got his procedure is a thorny one. The view taken in the text does not accord precisely with that of Zumpt, Mommsen, Hitzig, Lécrivain (Daremberg et Saglio, s.v. indicium publicum), or Strachan-Davidson, though it has benefited by the discussions of all these scholars. It differs least from that of Mommsen (Strafrecht, p. 190, n. 4: Das Hauptmoment, eben die Combination der magistratischen Leitung mit dem Geschwornenverfahren, ist zweifellos das Werk Pisos), from which it varies chiefly in the importance it attaches to the cases of Popilius and Galba, the novel character of which Mommsen however was himself the first to perceive (Strafrecht, p. 172, n. 2; 197, n. 1), though it was lelt to Strachan-Davidson really to disengage them (by silence mainly, cf. i, pages 227 and 237) from the miscellany of cases brought by Mommsen, Lecrivain and others under the heading iudicium publicum. When Strachan-Davidson, in dealing with his second category of cases (i, p. 237 f.), which apparently includes those of Popilius and Galba, says: ‘These cases all belong to the last age of the Republic, when these quaestiones perpetuae were beginning to be recognized as the proper machinery for ordinary criminal justice,’ he implicitly makes the Popilius-Galba cases anticipations of trials under the Lex Calpurnia. Their political importance for the policy expressed in the law of 149 B.C. he fails to note.

^{page 91 note 1} The activity of the Senate is attested in all these cases, and that they had a sequel in the quaestiones perpetuae has been frequently observed. Cf. e.g., Leonhard in Pauly-Wissowa, xviii, s.v. iudicium publicum, p. 2502.

^{page 91 note 2} Livy, xlii, 1, 7.

^{page 91 note 3} Livy, xliii, 7, 5.

^{page 91 note 4} Livy, xliii, 1, 5.

^{page 91 note 5} Livy, xlii, 8.

^{page 91 note 6} Livy, xlii, 21.

^{page 92 note 1} Livy, xlii, 22.

^{page 92 note 2} Strafrecht, p. 193, n. 3; 196, n. 2.

^{page 92 note 3} Op. cit. i, p. 229. In an ordinary quaestio the findings of the magistrate were subject to appeal and a comitial trial ensued: in an extraordinary, the people registered its judgment, in advance of the verdict, in the lex itself by which the quaestio was instituted. There are several cases recorded prior to 172 B.C. where a senatus consultum evoked a quaestio, and those of 186 B.C., when the Bacchanalian conspiracy was discovered, and of 180 B.C., when an epidemic of poisoning appeared among Roman matrons, may be regarded well authenticated; but while the result was the same—magisterial trials without appeal—a different principle of law was involved, and neither these cases nor others less well attested can be connected in any way on the score either of political motive or legal form with the Lex Calpurnia. They fall accordingly into groups 1 or 3 of Strachan-Davidson's classification, whereas privilegia belong to group 2.

^{page 92 note 4} Livy, xliii, 2.

^{page 92 note 5} Mommsen, , Staatsrecht, iii, p. 601Google Scholar; Greenidge, Legal Procedure, p. 47; Phillipson, C., The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, London, 1911, Vol. ii, p. 83 ff.Google Scholar; Strachan-Davidson, op. cit. i, p. 211 ff.Google Scholar; Pauly-Wissowa, 2te Reihe, i, s.v. Reciperatio.

^{page 92 note 6} The question has been raised and pretty thoroughly examined by Strachan-Davidson (ii, p. 1 ff.). In the litis aestumatio many different things, some of them purely political or administrative, and better suited to a Court of High Treason than to a Court of Extortion, were taken into account. See also Mommsen, Strafrecht, p. 719 ff. The quaestio de repetundis was after all the perpetuation of privilegia as well as of actiones before recuperatores.

^{page 93 note 1} Livy, xliii, 2.

^{page 93 note 2} Livy, xliii, 8.

^{page 93 note 3} Livy, xliii, 17; Cic. pro Flacco, 12.

^{page 93 note 4} Epit. xlvii.

^{page 93 note 5} Mommsen (Strafrecht, p. 708, n. 2) remarks: Hätte der Senat nicht auch diese Prozesse veranlasst, so wären sie nicht in die Annalen gekommen. True, but the Senate may have instigated them even if the comitia tried them. Cf. the case of C. Lucretius above, p. 5. where the intervention of the Senate is shown by Livy, xliii, 8.

^{page 93 note 6} Livy, Epit. xlix; Heitland, ii, p. 176 f.; Mommsen, Strafrecht, p. 172, n. 2; Strachan-Davidson, i, p. 227.

^{page 94 note 1} Cicero (Brutus, 23, 89) speaks of a rogationem privilegii similem. With this accords the view taken in the text. In Livy, Epit. xlix. Cato addresses the people in suasione rogationis Scriboniae. The rogatio failed to pass. It required the making of restitution to the Lusitanians. In another place (xxxix, 40, 12) Livy speaks as if Cato had himself brought Galba for trial before the comitia: nonagesimo anno Ser. Galbam ad populi adduxerit iudicium. This seems to have been a misunderstanding on Livy's part. Cf. also Plut. Cato, 15, 4.

^{page 94 note 2} Appian, Iber. 60.

^{page 94 note 3} As concerns Piso himself, ‘from all that is recorded of him one may guess that one of his motives was moral reform, and the mending of a breach in the ideal ancient morals of the Roman. This idea may receive confirmation from the fact that, apart from his own lex, he was much interested in legislation and the administration of justice: ipse etiam Piso et causas egit et multarum legum aut auctor aut dissuasor fuit (Cic. Brut. 106). These words of Cicero remind us a good deal of old Cato's career. Compare fragment 40 in Peter's collection’: Professor Reid.

^{page 94 note 4} Mommsen, , Staatsrecht, i, p. 319Google Scholar; Hitzig, op. cit. p. 16.

^{page 94 note 5} The questions whether between 149 and 123 B.C. the Senate was an album iudicum whence iudices (Cic. pro Font. 11, 23: sapientissimi iudices), to the number possibly of 50, as later, were drawn by some process or other analogous to that prescribed in the Lex Acilia, or whether senators to the number of perhaps five, like the recuperatores of 171 B.C., were designated by the praetor peregrinus when authorized so to do by the Senate on a suitable case arising; and whether the praetor's task consisted in presiding over a court as under the Lex Acilia, or ended when the recuperatores were designated, or involved his participation in the deliberations as if in the presence of his consilium (Asconius, in Milonianam, 40, as interpreted by Strachan-Davidson, op. cit. i, p. 227, n. 6Google Scholar), cannot be settled definitely with our existing records; cf. Girard, P., Mélanges de droit romain, Paris, 1912, p. 104, n. 3Google Scholar. Hitzig argues that the jury in the later, and any ordinary, sense of the term was transplanted from Greece by C. Gracchus. Whether a jury, or a consilium, or a board of ‘recoverers,’ was involved does not affect our argument: its members were admittedly senators and their verdict was final.

^{page 95 note 1} ‘The law was really suggested by the civil process for regaining money of which a plaintiff had been improperly deprived. In strictness, as passed by Piso, it was not a criminal statute at all. It only became so by subsequent developments’: Professor Reid. I cannot help feeling, however, that the magisterial Leitung was original and that this belongs to the sphere of criminal procedure. See p. 92, n. 6.

The Lex Acilia (line 59) uses the words captum coactum ablatum avorsum conciliatumve. See Dig. i, 18. 18: plebi scito conlinetur uti nequis praesidum munus domum caperet nisi esculentum potulentumve quod intra dies proximos prodigatur. Which plebiscitum is here meant is unknown. In 112 B.C. a suit could not be entertained where the damages alleged were 4,000 sesterces or less. Later the minimum was 10,000 sesterces (Mommsen, Stratrecht, p. 709, n. 4; p. 715, n. 3).

^{page 95 note 2} Zumpt, op. cit. ii, p. 15Google Scholar; Mommsen, Strafrecht, p. 178. Greenidge, Legal Procedure, p. 266; Girard, F., Manuel élémentaire de droit romain, paris, 1911, p. 1009, n. 4Google Scholar; Pauly-Wissowa, 2te Reihe, i, p. 430.

^{page 95 note 3} Mommsen, Strafrecht, p.235; Staatsrecht, iii, p. 528, n.3.

^{page 95 note 4} Strachan-Davidson, op. cit. ii, p. 50Google Scholar. Zumpt, however, thinks that in early days the choice of any but senators is unthinkable (Der Criminalprocess der römischen Republik, Leipzig, 1871, p. 14Google Scholar).

^{page 95 note 5} Heitland, , Roman Republic, ii, p. 215Google Scholar.

^{page 96 note 1} Infra, p. 98.

^{page 96 note 2} The real size of the world at that time may be, gauged by the fact that it took a fortnight for envoys despatched post haste to cover the distance from Pydna to Rome (Livy, xlv, I, II; 2, 2). A whole army could be lost to the Senate in the in the environs of Aquiieia (Livy, xliii, 1, 5). A praetor thought by the Senate to be absent in Greece as admiral of the fleet was actually at Antium on his estates, tum adeo vicina inexplorata erant (Livy, xliii, 4, 6).

^{page 96 note 3} History of Rome (Eng. Trans.), ii, p. 403.

^{page 96 note 4} ‘The Roman Constitution’ in A Companion to Latin Studies edited by Sandys, J. E., Cambridge, 1913, p. 265Google Scholar.

^{page 96 note 5} Other devices employed at this time by the Senate to keep the higher magistrates in hand have been noted by G. de Sanctis in Book iv, part 1, PP. 503 ff., of his Storia dei Romani. which has appeared since this article was set up. I am glad to note that the distinguished Italian historian agrees with me as to the real nature of the problem to which the Senate addressed itself when it sanctioned the proposal of Calpurnius; and that he too emphasizes the reservation of the court of 149 B.C., to senators as the essential part of the legislation (pp. 524 f.).

^{page 97 note 1} Niese, B., Gesch. d. griech. u. maked. Staaten, iii, p. 331 ff.Google Scholar; Kornemann, E., ‘Die neue Livius-Epitome aus Oxyrhynchus,’ Klio, Beiheft, 2, p. 23; Frank, Roman Imperialism, p. 224.

^{page 97 note 2} Böckh, A., in C.I.G. 1970; Marquardt, J., Röm. Staatsverw.² i, p. 318Google Scholar.

^{page 97 note 3} Arch. epigr. Mitt. xlii, p. 120 ff.; cf. Pauly-Wissowa, i, s.v. Aera, p. 636Google Scholar.

^{page 97 note 4} De aeris quae ab imperio Caesaris Octaviani constituto initium duxerunt, Leipzig, 1890, p. 43 ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 97 note 5} Beitr. z. griech. Inschriftenkunde, Wien, 1909, pp. 114, 312Google Scholar.

^{page 97 note 6} Hermes, xlix, p. 589; cf. Klaffenbach, G., Hermes, li, p. 476Google Scholar, and Pomtow, H., in Dittenberger, Sylloge,³ 704, n. 44.

^{page 97 note 7} ‘The Macedonian Era,’ pp. 206–217. Cuntz, O. (Hermes, liii, p. 102 ff.Google Scholar) on the basis of a less complete review of the facts reached the same conclusion as Tod.

^{page 97 note 8} In Books xlix, and xl, of the Epitome of Livy, in which the career of Andriscus is sketched and the reconquest of Macedon is noted, there is no mention of the Lex Calpurnia. If, however, the scanty remains of line 109 of the new epitome, first published in the Oxyrhynchus Papyri, iv, n. 668, have been correctly guessed at by Kornemann (see supra, n. 1), there was an entry there devoted to the establishment of the court. A. better reading of this fragment, however, is that made by Luterbacher, according to which the reference is to a Lex Atinia de tribunis. See de Sanctis, loc. cit., p. 514, n. 63.

^{page 98 note 1} Appian, Iber. 51; 59.

^{page 98 note 2} Appian, Iber. 59.

^{page 98 note 3} Appian, Lib. 94; cf. Kahrstedt, U. (Meltzer), Gesch. d. Karthager, iii, p. 610, 615Google Scholar ff., 642; Gsell, S., Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du no d, iii, Paris, 1918, p. 313, 329, 353Google Scholar.

^{page 99 note 1} Zonaras, 9, 26.

^{page 100 note 1} vi, 9, 10; cf. supra, p. 89, n. 3. It is commonly supposed that Valerius Maximus simply made a mistake and wrote Caecilia in place of Calpurnia. Strachan-Davidson, , however (op. cit. ii, p. 13Google Scholar), suggests that there may have been a Lex Caecilia, of which we have otherwise no knowledge, passed to institute proceedings against Lentulus shortly after he had been consul in 156 B.C. But the re-election of Lentulus is odd, whether it was before a quaestio extraordinaria or a quaestio perpetua that he was condemned. Hence nothing is gained by inventing a lex Caecilia, and it is simpler to assume a slip on the part of Valerius Maximus.

^{page 100 note 2} The controversy that occurred on the arrival of Eudemos in Rome with word that Attalos III had made the Romans his heir was not whether the legacy should be accepted or no, but whether the matter should be handled by the Senate or, as Tib. Gracchus desired, by the comitia. After the death of Gracchus, or, to be more precise, between Sept. and Dec. 133 B.C., the senatus consultum, published in Dittenberger, , O.G.I.S. ii, no. 435Google Scholar, was passed, in which the acta of the dynasty were validated. See for the chronology Cardinali, G., in Saggi di Storia Antica e di Archeologia offerti a Giulio Beloch, Roma, 1910, p. 293Google Scholar. The province, doubtless contemplated in 133, was not organized till 129–127 B.C.

^{page 100 note 3} Frank, Roman Imperialism, p. 254 ff.