1 The actual title was Consultation among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation. Memorandum of the United States Government (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946)Google Scholar.

2 For this characterization of Argentine policy see McGann, Thomas F., Argentina: The Divided Land (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1966), p. 84Google Scholar; Scobie, James R., Argentina: A City and a Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 185Google Scholar; Bemis, Samuel Flagg, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), p. 380Google Scholar; and, in a more guarded fashion, Whitaker, Arthur P., The United States and Argentina (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For an extremely critical description of Argentina's attitude see Lloyd Mecham, J., The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), pp. 185-200Google Scholar.

3 Hilton, Stanley E., “Argentine Neutrality, September, 1939-June, 1940: A Re-examination,” The Americas 22, no. 3 (January 1966): 227-257.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 I am indebted to Dr. Arthur G. Kogan, chief of the Research Guidance and Review Division, Historical Office, Department of State, and the staff of the Diplomatic, Legal and Fiscal Records Division, National Archives for facilitating my research in the United States diplomatic documents.

5 Armour's telegram to the secretary of state, April 19, 1940, printed in Foreign Relations of the United States 1940, 5 vols., (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959-1961), 1: 743-744. This collection of documents is cited hereafter as FRUS, with the appropriate year and volume.

6 Memorandum of Conversation by the Under Secretary of State (Welles), April 22, 1940, FRUS 1940, 1: 745-748. The sequence of events is reconstructed from the American documents, Hilton, “Argentine Neutrality,” pp. 227-257, and Adolfo Scilingo, “Doctrina de la neutralidad a la no beligerancia: el aislacionismo norteamericano y una iniciativa argentina en la Segunda Guerra Mundial,” Jurisprudencia Argentina, Afioxxviii, No. 2590 (July 12,1966).

7 Enclosed in the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Armour), April 24, 1940, FRUS 1940, 1: 752-754.

8 Armour to Hull, April 25,1940, FRUS 1940,1: 754.

9 Included in Armour to Hull, May 7,1940, FRUS 1940,1: 758-759.

10 The Ambassador in Brazil (Jefferson Caffery) to Hull, May 15, 1940, FRUS 1940,1:767-768.

11 S. Pinckney Tuck to the secretary of state, February 19, 1940, National Archives, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Decimal File 835.00/838. Hereafter, these records are referred to by the appropriate file number. For details on the growing split in the Conservative coalition see the dispatches dated January 2, February 23, March 12, and June 6, 1940, filed as 835.00/836, 839, 846, and 851. On the interventions in the provinces, see The New York Times, February 18, 1940, 27:3; February 26, 1940, 3:6; and La Prensa (Buenos Aires), March 3, 1940, 7:7-8. On political factions and contacts with the military, see Robert A. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945, Yrigoyen to Perón (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 104-113.

12 Armour to the secretary of state, July 5, 1940, 835.001 Ortiz, Roberto M./103, and July 10, 1940, 835.00/870V4. Actually, Castillo was far more conservative and nationalistic than Justo; see Potash, Army and Politics in Argentina, pp. 141-147.

13 This estimate, hy a high-ranking ofüciai in live foreign, ministry * is inchided in tomoni s desoatah. oVlva” \A, \940,%tó ÜQ / %«>.

14 The standard authorities on fiáis period oi Argentine history are convinced that a majority of Argentine public opinion was pro-Ally. The analysis offered here might account for the fact that the majority was not able to control Argentine policy. For example, see Rennie, Ysabel F., The Argentine Republic (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), pp. 270 ff.Google Scholar The same view of public opinion is in Armour's dispatch, June 7, 1940, 835.00/856. Potash (pp. 104-140) thinks a higher percentage of the army was pro-Axis.

15 For the historical origins of Argentina's policy, see McGann, Thomas F., Argentina, The United States and the Inter-American System, 1880-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957)Google Scholar. For a summary of the issues at the end of the 1930s, see the dispatch from Ambassador Alexander W. Weddell to the secretary of state, March 5, 1938, 835.001 Ortiz, Roberto M./88. In his dispatch, Weddell warned that the Argentine economy was shakey and any adverse situation would precipitate a serious crisis. The commercial negotiations are in FRUS 1937, 5: 213-234; 1938, 5: 272-313; 1939, 5: 227-302; 1940, 5: 460-503, 508-512.

16 Quoted in Langer, William L. and Everett Gleason, S., The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 133.Google Scholar

17 On the imperative need for economic aid before Argentines would accept a policy of cooperation with the United States, see Armour's dispatch, June 7, 1940, 810.20 Defense/2014; La Prensa, June 13, 1940, 11:5-7 and 12:1-2. On the foreign exchange problems see Armour's dispatches on February 27 and March 11, 1940, 835.51/1271 and 1274; The New York Times, February 1, 1940, 35:3, April 12, 1940, 35:1. On the commodity export problem, see Armour's telegram, May 22, 1940, 641.1115/40. On the Bolivian petroleum problem, 1940, see the file 724.35; and, for more general background, Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 168-202.

18 Armour's dispatch of March 11, 1940, 611.0031/4925, enclosing an editorial from La Prensa. The Department of State was very much put out by this dispatch and put together a formal reply dated April 9, 1940, intended to convince the embassy staff and the Argentine government. Armour's letter reached Secretary Hull's desk and the latter was involved in the reply. This, in itself, demonstrates the importance the department attributed to the issue. On Argentine nationalism see Whitaker, Arthur P. and Jordan, David C., Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 53-66Google Scholar; Potash, pp. 79-140.

19 Welles, Sumner, The Time for Decision (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), p. 214Google Scholar. For the Argentine instructions and other information on Argentine activities at the Panama and Havana conferences, see Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Division de Asuntos Jurídicos, Reuniones de consulta entre ministros de relaciones exteriores de las Repúblicas Americanas, Panama .. . 1939, la Habana … 1940. Participación Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1941). See also, Peterson, Harold F., Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960 (New York: State University of New York, 1964), pp. 400-402Google Scholar. The New York Times, September 29, 1939; 9:1, reported that “Argentina and the United States stood together” in discussion of contraband regulations.

20 The official correspondence on this incident is in FRUS 1939, 5:95-127. For reaction in the press, see The New York Times, December 14, 1939, 1:8, 4:1; December 15, 1939, 4:2; December 16, 1939, 2:2; December 17, 1939, IV, 4:4; December 19,1939, 5:1; December 21, 1939, 22:1; January 3, 1940,6:2.

21 The Uruguayan government gave the Germans forty-eight hours to make the necessary repairs and leave port, or suffer internment. Unable to repair the ship within the allotted time, the Germans took it outside the harbor and scuttled it. This was a violation of international law.

22 Armour's telegram, December 20, 1939, 740.0011, European War, 1939/ 1361; The New York Times, December 17, 1939, 1:6.

23 Statement in the government newspaper, El Diario, reported in Ambassador Wilson's dispatch, January 19, 1940, 740.00111A.R./952.

24 Quoted in The New York Times, January 19, 1940, 11:1. Cantilo disputed the British contention that nothing in international law gives neutrals the right to apply sanctions against belligerents who violate a safety zone. He said, “The very name ‘safety zone’ indicates that what is desired is that there be removed from American coasts all danger to all interference with navigation caused by the continuous presence of belligerent warships.” The United States refused to respond publicly to the British note. See The New York Times, January 17, 1940, 2:2.

25 For statements of Argentine disenchantment see FRUS 1940, 1:719, 748- 751. Note that the Department of State agreed with Argentine criticisms of unsupported protests, see secretary of state to Armour, April 15, 1940, FRUS 1940, 1:720. There had been indications earlier that other countries in the hemisphere were unhappy with passive neutrality. For such a comment concerning Peru, see the dispatch by Charge Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., November 16, 1939, 740.0011, European War 1939/1077.

26 The memoranda were drafted between January 29 and February 1, 1940, and are filed in 740.00111 A.R./915 and 960VS.

27 Armour to the secretary of state, February 27, 1940, 835.51/1271. The embassy staff had picked up this information in conversations with members of the business community in Buenos Aires.

28 Armour's telegram, April 2,1940,835.51/1282.

29 The New York Times, February 25, 1940, 35: 2-3; February 26, 1940, 3:6; March 8, 1940, 9:3; La Prensa, February 27, 1940, 12:1-2; March 3, 1940, 11:1; March 8, 1940, 7:7-8, 12:3-7; March 9, 1940, 11:6; March 10, 1940, 13:3-8; March 11, 1940, 11: 7-8. The cabinet crisis is discussed in La Prensa, March 9, 1940,11:2-5.

30 On the leak see the memorandum by Assistant Secretary Adolph A. Berle, May 11, 1940, 740.00111A.R./1079. For reports on the proposal see The New York Times, May 13, 1940, 1:3 and 4:8; May 14, 1940, 12:3; Boston Evening Transcript, May 13, 1940, 11:4; La Prensa, May 13, 1940, 1:5-6; Washington Post, May 13, 1940,1:6.

31 On the favorable press for the Argentine proposal and other indications of support see The New York Times, May 14, 1940, 12:3; May 15, 1940, 1:3; La Prensa, May 14,1940; Washington Post, May 12,1940, B8:3.

32 The New York Times, May 19,1940, 25:4. Late in May, from France word reached the Department of State that a pro-Nazi coup in Argentina was imminent. This was passed on to Armour. See Ambassador William Bullitt's telegram, May 24, 1940,835.00N/48.

33 Socialists, labor unionists, student groups, National Democrats, ultranationalists and Radicals spoke against the so-called Public Order law. The Argentine press was hostile toward it. The minister of the interior defended it by pointing to the “evident” public unrest and confusion, to rumors rampant in the country. The president's secretary went on the radio June 12 to deny rumors of a cabinet crisis and arrests of military officials. See La Prensa, June 7, 1940, 11:4 and 12:1-3; June 8, 1940, 10:1 and 10:2-5; June 9, 1940, 10:6-8; June 10, 1940, 10: 3-4; June 11, 1940, 9:3-6; June 13, 1940, 11:4; June 26, 1940, 11:6-8 and 12:3; June 28, 1940, 10:7-8; June 29, 1940, 11:4. After a dissentious debate that lasted three weeks, the Congress passed a watered down version of the bill and dumped the issue back in the executive's lap, asking the president to take steps necessary to prevent teaching of antidemocratic ideas in Argentine schools. The political situation is described in Armour's telegram of June 7, 1940, FRUS 1940, 5: 465; May 24, 1940, 740.00111A.R./1178; May 26, 1940, 835.00N/50. The Public Order bill is discussed in his telegrams of June 6, 7, and 18, 1940, 835.00/851, 856, and 857, and in his dispatch of June 11, 1940, 835.00N/75. In the June 17 telegram, Armour said the Argentine government was faced “with a situation that might conceivably get out of hand.” In his May 26 telegram, he noted that the Nazis were taking advantage of the domestic political situation.

34 Quoted in Armour's telegram of June 17, 1940, FRUS 1940, 5: 463-464. The earlier leaks are reported in Armour's telegrams of June 11 and 14, 835.00N/65 and 71; La Prensa, June 11, 1940, 11:5-7 and 12: 1-2; June 14, 1940, 12:4 and 12:4-6; June 15,1940,6:7-8.

35 Reported in the embassy's dispatch of June 18,1940, 835.00/861.

36 FRUS 1940, 5: 468-469; 611.3531/1549.

37 FRUS 1940, 5: 465-466, 468-469. Armour's suggestions were broader than the ones submitted by Prebisch, but were sympathetic to the objectives of President Ortiz’ policy. He urged three steps: (1) that steps be taken to remove doubt with regard to the ability and determination of the United States to defend the Western Hemisphere; (2) that emergency powers be requested from Congress to enable the United States to counteract the forceful methods of the totalitarian states, such as authority to suspend or augment imports … ; and (3) that as an immediate step to check the present trend the government purchase under the program to build up war stocks of essential supplies for war purchases certain Argentine products… .

38 Both leaks were to the Associated Press in Buenos Aires. One, by Prebisch, concerning the need for a loan is in Armour's telegram of May 8, 1940, 835.51/ 1290. The other, by Cantilo, is discussed above, p. 587. The president had urged adoption of his proposal in a speech before the National Academy of History, April 29, 1940, reported in Armour's telegram of that date, 740.00111 A.R./1021. The August leak is in Department of State memorandum, August 17, 1940, 835.51/314.

39 Interview with Ambassador Adolfo Scilingo, June 12, 1968. Ambassador Scilingo was a member of the staff of the Argentine embassy in Washington at the time. Subsequently, he was president of the Argentine delegation at the Preparatory Commission talks in London, 1945, and then Argentine delegate to the first, fifteenth, and sixteenth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. He retired from the diplomatic service with the rank of ambassador. From 1958 to 1962 he was foreign policy adviser to President Arturo Frondizi. In addition to the article cited, Scilingo is the author of El Tratado Antartico: defensa de la soberanía y la proscripción nuclear (Buenos Aires: Librería Hachette, S.A., 1965). Scilingo used the word subestimativa to describe the attitude of Hull, Roosevelt, and to a lesser extent, Welles in response to the Argentine proposal. Scilingo is convinced this played a large part in the Department of State's rejection of the proposal.

40 The telegram in question is published in FRUS 1940, 5: 468-469. The office memoranda complaining of the delay in circulating the telegram are filed in 611.3531/1549. The files of the department attest to the bulk of material coming into Washington at this time. For a general statement of the situation, see Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, pp. 419-429. In this context, Langer and Gleason refer to the Argentine proposal as “premature” (p. 610). They allude to the discussion of hemispheric problems that went on at this time, but that discussion was general and not connected with the specific problems bothering the Argentines (pp.607-608).

41 Quoted in Scilingo, “Doctrina de la neutralidad” (see note 6 before) 3:2-3. This view is shared by two Argentine scholars who have had access to some of the relevant Argentine documents; see Conil Paz, Alberto and Ferrari, Gustavo, La política exterior de Argentina, 1930-1960 (Buenos Aires: Huemul, 1965), pp. 69-70Google Scholar. There is even some evidence for this view in the American documents; see the undated inter-office memorandum (probably written at the end of September) by the Economic Advisor, 835.51/1342.

42 For a specific formulation of this objection to the Argentine proposal see the memorandum by Assistant Secretary Berle, for the secretary and undersecretary, May 14, 1940, 740.00111 A.R./1126.

43 A typical case is the department's response, June 15, 1940, 740.00111 A.R./ 1215, to Armour's personal letter to Sumner Welles explaining the difficulties Cantilo was having holding the line for the pro-Ally forces against the pro-Nazi group. FRUS 1940,1:739-740.

44 For a general discussion of distinguishing between irrelevant information (noise) and critical warnings (signals), see Wohlstetter, Roberta, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962)Google Scholar. The department's justification of United States tariff policy is in Hull to Armour, April 9,1940, 611.0031/4925. The use of empty rhetoric is shown in Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 609; The New York Times, May 14, 1940, 12:3. Armour's warnings are in his dispatch of April 26, 1940, 740.00111 A.R./1028, and his telegram, November 22, 1940, 835.51/1371. On the department's attention to detail and its propensity for delay, see the memoranda of April 11, 1940, 835.51/1282; My 5, 1940, 611.3531/1547V4; September 28, 1940, 835.51/1368; October 2, 1940, 835.51/1342. Fear of interfering with the Havana Conference slowed things up in July, FRUS 1940, 5: 470-474. Argentine impatience was reported with brutal clarity in The New York Times, September 22, 1940, 30:2; and November 8, 1940, 6:2. Welles’ attempt to combine commercial and military considerations is in 810.20 Defense/ 20VS.

45 On the administrative shuffling before the war, see Janeway, Eliot, The Struggle for Survival, 2nd ed. (N.Y.: Waybright and Talley, Inc., 1968)Google Scholar; Welles, Sumner, Time for Decision, p. 217CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Langer, and Gleason, , The Challenge to Isolation, pp. 278-279, 630.Google Scholar

46 Janeway, p. 67. Officials in the Department of State were not more adventuresome. They opposed governmental loans to Argentina and, while they wanted to wean Argentina away from dependence upon Great Britain, they were unwilling to try any of the schemes put forward. See 835.51/1274,1282, 1285.

47 The department's reaction is in FRUS 1940, 5:466-467, with supporting materials, not published, in 835.51/1300. Most of the important documents concerning the financial negotiations are in FRUS 1940, 5: 460-483.

48 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 615-616, 630-634; FRUS 1940, 5: 490. The corn negotiations with Argentina are in FRUS 1946, 5: 484-504. Argentine frustration is brought out in The New York Times, October 3, 1940, 9:1; October 19, 1940, 23:4; negotiations with Brazil for the Volta Redonda loans are in FRUS 1940, 5:600-615; and Lloyd Mecham, J., A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 450-452.Google Scholar

49 In addition to the documents published in FRUS 1940, 5: 460-483, see 835.51/1366, 1368, 1342, 1343, 1402, 1404 for evidence of the organizational rivalry within the United States government and the repeated frustration of Argentine efforts because of conflicts with broader United States policies. For discussion of the Pierson mission, the Prebisch mission, and Argentine needs, see The New York Times, September 22, 1940, 30:2; September 25, 1940, 6:2; October 3, 1940, 9:1; November 8, 1940, 6:2; November 13, 1940, 1:5, 12:3, and 12:6; La Prensa, June 13, 1940, 11:5-7 and 12:1-2; June 14, 1940, 12:4-6; June 15, 1940; 6:7-8; September 24, 1940, 11:5; September 25, 1940, 12:5; November 8, 1940, 12:8. The loan and stabilization agreements are in The New York Times, December 12, 1940, 7:3; December 24, 1940, 27:6; December 28, 1940, 6:2; Washington Post, December 24, 1940, 2:1; December 28, 1940, 1:7; La Prensa, December 12, 1940, 13:1-2; December 24,1940, 9:2-3; December 28, 1940, 9:6-8.

50 On the Chilean situation, see Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 276; Ambassador Claude G. Bowers to the secretary of state, May 15, 1940, 740.00111 A.R./1104; and, more generally, FRUS 1940, 5: 52-57, 670-694.

51 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 611-614, and Undeclared War, pp. 153-156; FRUS 1940, 5: 162-174, 1147-1166; and the telegrams of Ambassador Edwin C. Wilson, June 19 and 28, 1940, 810.20 Defense/19 1/4 and 19 2/14.

52 The Argentines did become disagreeable and the Brazilians enjoyed the fruits of close friendship with the United States during the war. Ambassador Scilingo points out that Aranha was close to Sumner Welles. He feels this is part of the explanation for Brazil's behavior in this situation. Interview with the author, June 12, 1968. See, also, Ambassador Jefferson Caffery's communications of May 1, 12 and 14, 1940, 740.00111A.R./1026, 1042, and 1060. Similar telegrams are published in FRUS 1940,1: 757-758, 760-761, 762-763, 765-768.

53 Peterson, , Argentina and the United States, p. 410.Google Scholar Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 616-617, and Undeclared War, pp. 598-600, 621-623.

54 On the basic disagreements between the two nations over the kinds of economic arrangements which would satisfy their needs, see FRUS 1940, 5: 460-483, 484-504; file 641.1115/40-44; file 724.35/73-79; and Armour's dispatch of July 12,1940, 835.001 Ortiz, Roberto M./104.

55 FRUS 1940, 1: 769; Armour's dispatch of May 24, 1940, 740.00111 A.R./1178; Armour's dispatch of July 12, 1940, 835.00/868; Scilingo, “Doctrina de la neutralidad,” 4:1. This was at a time when the Argentine press and public were outspoken in condemnation of German aggression. See Armour's dispatch of May 11, 1940, 740.0011 European War 1939/2863. On Ortiz's reaction to Uruguayan crisis, see Armour to the secretary of state, July 12, 1940, 835.001 Ortiz, RoGerberto M./105; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 611-617, 621-622. Cantilo's pride was discussed in the author's interview with Ambassador Adolfo Scilingo, June 12, 1968; Armour's dispatches of April 26 and May 24, 1940, 740.00111A.R./1028,1178, and July 26,1940,835.00/880.

56 Peterson, , Argentina and the United States, p. 403.Google Scholar Armour's June 7, 1940, 835.00N/61VS. The cabinet meeting is described in Armour's June 14, 1940, 740.00111A.R./1220. The effects of this split are reflected in the Congressional debate on the Public Order law and the weakened version passed by the Congress. See above, pp. 585-587.

57 Armour's dispatches of July 12 and 13, 1940, 835.001 Ortiz, Roberto M/104 and 102; the memorandum of July 19, 1940, 835.00/873; and Armour's dispatch of July 26,1940, summarizing the drift toward isolationism, 835.00/880.

58 The land scandal, Ortiz’ resignation, the proposal to land American planes in Uruguay, and the cabinet crisis of September 1940 are in the telegrams and dispatches of Charge Tuck, 835.00/885-926. The land scandal may have been rigged by Justo or the ultranationalist Juan Bautista Molina. It implicated General Carlos Márquez, the war minister and leading pro-Ally figure in the military hierarchy. See Potash, pp. 131-137. A mass rally by labor in August is noted in Samuel L. Baily, Labor Nationalism and Politics in Argentina (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967), p. 65. Pinedo continued to try to save the situation. He prodded the United States to make meaningful concessions. At the same time, understanding that the United States could not or would not help, he opened negotiations with Brazil for a commodity exchange more suited to Argentina's needs. Brazil was cared for in the United States and would not cooperate with Argentina. See 835.51/1320 1/2 and 1342; La Prensa, September 24, 1940, 11:5 and September 25, 1940, 12:5. Pinedo resigned in January, having been burned for meddling in politics. See Armour's telegram January 15, 1941, 835.00/939.

59 Peterson, Argentina and the United States, pp. 407-408, 415; Tuck's telegrams of June 24, 26, and 28, 1941, 740.00111 A.R./1330, 1334, 1348. Ironically, at the time of his appointment, the Germans considered Ruiz Guiñazú an antitotalitarian. See Potash, p. 152.

60 Welles, Time for Decision, pp. 220, 225 ff. Potash, pp. 163-167, credits Castillo with a more positive role in policy-making.

61 The recent study by Conil Paz and Ferari (p. 70) glosses over this in referring to the Argentine proposal: “Este lúcido intento de nuestra cancillería no tuvo éxito en su momento, pero los acontecimientos posteriores se encargaron de atestiguar su oportunidad profética. Por desgracia, los próximos cambios en los equipos gobernantes argentinos, no sólo impedirían que esta línea fuera mantenida, sino que estancarían al país en un neutralismo cada vez más comprometido y anacrónico.” See Potash, pp. 141-181.

62 For example, see Robert A. Devine, The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962); Scilingo, “Doctrina de la neutralidad,” 3:2-3; The New York Times, May 13, 1940, 4:8, Washington Post, May 12, 1940, B8:3.

63 Scilingo feels that the United States made a great mistake in rejecting the proposal and attributes the mistake to what he calls the snobbery of Hull, Welles, and Roosevelt in not wanting to give Argentina too much influence in the hemisphere. Interview with the author, June 12, 1968. He is convinced that “United States acceptance of the Argentine proposal would have assured fruitful cooperation between the two countries and inter-American unity at a crucial period. Furthermore, that in all probability it would have determined a different course of history in Argentina at the time and in the days immediately ahead.” Letter to the author, February 5,1969.