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Corruption, Quasi-Rents, and the Regulation of Electric Utilities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2008

JOHN L. NEUFELD
JOHN L. NEUFELD*
Affiliation:
Professor, Department of Economics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Box 26165, Greensboro, NC 27402. E-mail: [email protected].
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Abstract

Was the adoption of state utility regulation the result of a negative-sum competition among special interest groups vying for the monopoly rents created by regulation or a positive-sum elimination of corruption arising from appropriable quasi-rents? Previous empirical studies of the adoption of regulation have assumed the former. Using discrete hazard analysis, this study considers the latter and finds the data more consistent with the positive-sum protection of quasi-rents than the negative-sum creation and appropriation of monopoly rents.

Type
ARTICLES
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 68 , Issue 4 , December 2008 , pp. 1059 - 1097
Copyright
Copyright © The Economic History Association 2008

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