^* The Honorable Jose A. Cabranes, of the United States District Court for the District ofConnecticut, sitting by designation.

¹ In No. 82-7121, which was consolidated for argument with No. 82-7181, Sperry appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,John M. Cannella,Judge, vacating an order of attachment obtained by Sperry in New York State Supreme Court on the proceeds of a letter of credit then held by Citibank, N.A., for Israel's account. Argument before Judge Cannella on Israel's motion to vacate the attachment took place prior to argument on Sperry's motion before Judge Pollack for confirmation of the arbitration award. In argument before Judge Cannella, Sperry conceded that if the arbitration award were confirmed, the attachment would become “essentially moot and unnecessary.” (Transcript at 3.) Under New York law a party seeking maintenance of an attachment order has the burden of proving, inter alia, “the need for continuing the levy.” N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 6223(b). Since we affirm the confirmation of the arbitration award, which places the letter of credit proceeds in escrow, there is no need for the attachment order with respect to them.

² The Award provided, in relevant part, as follows: Upon the motion of [Sperry], in an arbitration before this Tribunal commenced by a Demand for Arbitration dated August 3, 1981 (as amended), for injunctive relief with respect to a Letter of Credit (no. WCG-150297) purchased by [Sperry] from Citibank, N.A., or the proceeds thereof, and for other relief, and upon hearing and considering the arguments presented and the large number of documents submitted (directly or, during the month prior to the hearing, through the American Arbitration Association) on behalf of [Sperry] and [Israel] in favor of and in opposition to such injunctive and other relief; Now, upon due consideration, the arbitrators order as follows:

^1. The proceeds of said Letter of Credit shall be paid into an escrow account (“Escrow Account“) in the joint names of [Sperry] and [Israel] with such bank or other entity in the United States of America as shall be agreed upon in writing by [Sperry] and [Israel] prior to the release of such proceeds by Citibank, N.A. or, in default of such agreement, with Citibank, N.A.

^2. [Sperry] and [Israel] shall maintain the Escrow Account in their joint names as aforesaid and the moneys or other investments standing to the credit thereof, including all interest or other income which may be earned thereon, shall not be withdrawn or transferred until (and then only in such manner, on such terms and in such amount, whether as to the whole or in part, as) [Sperry] and [Israel] shall so agree in writing or, in default of such agreement, this Tribunal or a Court in the State of New York or Federal Court in the United States of America shall finally so determine.

^3. [Sperry] and [Israel] shall not permit the Escrow Account to become subject to any lien or incumbrance without the leave of this Tribunal or of a Court in the State of New York or Federal Court in the United States of America.

^6. Any dispute or difference with respect to the terms of this order shall be promptly referred to this Tribunal for decision by the arbitrators.

^7. This Tribunal reserves for further consideration upon the application of either party all other claims and issues arising under or in connection with [Sperry's] motion.

^8. This order shall constitute an Award of the arbitrators and either party is at liberty to apply forthwith to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for confirmation and/or enforcement thereof.

³ Israel also contended that the Award was an interim decision not ripe for confirmation, Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411, 413-15 (2d Cir. 1980), and that the Award was tantamount to a prejudgment attachment of Israel's property which is made immune from attachment by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA“), 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (1976). On this appeal Israel has abandoned its prematurity argument, which had been rejected by Judge Pollack because (a) the Award itself stated that either party could seek confirmation, see note 2, supra, 1 8, indicating that it was a final decision as to the severable issues regarding the letter of credit, see Moyer v. Van-Dye-Way Corp., 126 F.2d 339, 341 (3d Cir. 1942); Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority v. Star Lines Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 368, 372-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), and (b) the Contract provides that any arbitration award “shall be deemed final and may be enforced” (Contract 1 45). Israel renews before us its FSIA contentions, which Judge Pollack had rejected on the grounds that the FSIA does not apply to an attachment obtained for a purpose other than securing jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign, and that in any event Israel had contractually waived any such FSIA protection. We reject Israel's FSIA argument for the reasons stated in note 6, infra.

⁴ On March 16, 1982, a panel of this Court granted Israel's motion for a stay of the district court's order on the condition that, pending disposition of the appeal, Israel hold the proceeds of the letter of credit in a certificate of deposit at Citibank.

⁵ Section 11 permits the court to modify or correct an award under certain circumstances. Neither party to the present case seeks to have the Award modified or corrected.

⁶ Paragraph 45 of the Contract requires the arbitrators to “interpret the contract in accordance with the substantive laws of the State of New York,” and 1 62 provides that the Contract “shall be interpreted, and the legal rights of the parties … shall be determined, in accordance with the laws [of the State of New York].” Under New York law the power of a court to vacate an arbitrator's award is no greater than the power of a federal court under 9 U.S.C. §§ 9 and 10. Section 7511(b)(1) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules provides as follows: ;, (b) Grounds for vacating.

^1. The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who either participated in the arbitration or was served with a notice of intention to arbitrate if the court finds that the rights of that party were prejudiced by: (i) corruption, fraud or misconduct in procuring the award; or (ii) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, except where the award was by confession; or (iii) an arbitrator, or agency or person making the award exceeded his power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; or (iv) failure to follow the procedure of this article, unless the party applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice of the defect and without objection.

⁷ Israel's contention that the Award showed a manifest disregard for the law because it constituted a prejudgment attachment of Israel's property, from which Israel is immune under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1609, is also untenable, because the arbitrators' award is an in personam order, not an attachment order of the sort forbidden by § 1609.

^* [Reproduced from 532 Federal Supplement 901-10 (1982).]