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I. The Appointment of the Duke of Medina Sidonia to the Command of the Spanish Armada

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

I. A. A. Thompson
I. A. A. Thompson
Affiliation:
University of Keele
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Extract

The death of the marquis of Santa Cruz (9 February 1588) left the Spanish Armada leaderless. On 14 February, for reasons that have never seemed remotely satisfactory, Philip II named Don Alonso Perez de Guzman el Bueno, 7th duke of Medina Sidonia, to take his place. Medina Sidonia has been universally regarded rather like a rabbit pulled mystifyingly out of a hat by the king to the amazement of rabbit, spectators, and historians alike. Attempts to explain the appointment have been half-hearted and, until some recent revaluations of the duke's administrative abilities, have concentrated overwhelmingly on his character and social position. Portrayed as an amiable poltroon, loyal, unassuming, and characterless, utterly devoid of military experience but not too proud to be guided entirely by his expert advisers, he was just the man to do what he was told without questioning the instructions of the real admiral of the Armada in the Escorial, or cavilling at his subordination to the supreme commander of the invasion forces, the duke of Parma—issues which had already embittered relations between the king and the marquis of Santa Cruz. At the same time, personal jealousies among Santa Cruz's leading lieutenants, the refusal of the military to accept seamen on equal terms, and the presence in the Armada of a large number of titled and class-conscious gentlemen-adventurers all meant that the new commander had to be an outsider, a landsman, and a nobleman so illustrious that nobody need be ashamed to obey him or take precedence behind him. As the premier duke in Spain, Medina Sidonia's social qualifications were impeccable.1 Some historians have pointed to the duke's religious devoutness as a further recommendation, others have wondered whether his promotion were not a sentimental memento of an extinct romance between Philip and the duke's mother-in-law.

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Articles
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The Historical Journal , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , June 1969 , pp. 197 - 216
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1969

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References

1 These, views are to be found in all the major works on the Armada from Fernández Duro to Mattingly, and beyond. There is little point in cluttering the notes with bibliographical references most of which are already sufficiently well known, or which have no value except as expressions of attitudes. Bibliographical information may be found via Mattingly, Garrett, The Defeat of the Spanish Armada (1959).Google Scholar I have used the Penguin edition (1962), from which subsequent references have been taken.

2 Maura, Duque de, El designio de Felipe II (Madrid, 1957), p. 278.Google Scholar

3 E.g. Altamira, R., Felipe II. Hombre de Estado (Mexico, 1950), pp. 112–13;Google ScholarMarañón, G., Antonio Pérez (4th ed.Madrid, 1952), I, 45, 47;Google ScholarCadoux, C.J., Philip of Spain and the Netherlands (1947), p. 114.Google Scholar

4 Froude, J.A., The Spanish story of the Armada (1892), p. 22;Google ScholarLoth, David, Philip II of Spain (1932), p. 251;Google ScholarMerriman, R.B., The rise of the Spanish Empire, (New York, 1934), IV, 528;Google Scholar Marandn, op. cit. I, 198 (repeated by Bleye, P. Aguado, Manual de historia de España 9th ed.Madrid, 1964, n, 648);Google ScholarWoodrooffe, Thomas, The Enterprise of England (1958), p. 221.Google Scholar

5 For details of Medina Sidonia's career see Maura op. cit. and Duro, C. Fernández, La Armada Invencible (Madrid, 1884), I, 219–36.Google Scholar

6 See below, p. 209.

7 de Retana, Luis Fernández y Fernández, España en tiempo de Felipe II (1556–1598) (Madrid, 1958), n, 259.Google Scholar

8 Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, MS. 1761 fol. 101.

9 C[alendar of] S[tate] P[apers] Venetian VIII, 148, 159.

10 Ibid., p. 273.

11 Ibid. p. 307.

12 Ibid. pp. 339, 340; C.S.P. Foreign XXI, 533, 569, 572.

13 A better rendering than the translation in C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 339.

14 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 340.

15 Ibid. p. 327.

16 Ibid. p. 148. Parma also expressed his approval of the appointment (C.S.P. Spanish IV, 237), and Madrid's reply to Medina Sidonia, 20 Feb. 1588, claimed ‘ha sido por extremo loada la eleçion…’ (Oria, E. Herrera, ed., La Armada Invencible, Archivo Histdrico Español, II, Valladolid, 1929, p. 148).Google Scholar

17 Even Mattingly accepts it at face value, op. cit. p. 222.

18 One consequence of this has been the exaggerated importance given to the execution of Mary Queen of Scots as the essential precondition of the expedition. But the political objectives of the Armada did not depend on the deposition of Elizabeth.

19 Oppenheim, M., Introduction to Book I of Monson's Tracts, Navy Records Society, XXII (1902), 25,Google Scholar ‘For Philip, then, the subjugation of England was always the objective.’ Marcus, G.J., A Naval History of England (1961), I, 92,Google Scholar ‘In order to arrive at a proper understanding of the course of the Armada campaign it is necessary to bear in mind that the true object of Spanish strategy in 1588 was the military conquest of England…’

20 It is too often forgotten that the invasion of England was only one of many invasion plans (De Lamar Jensen notes 15 between January 1586 and July 1588, ‘Franco-Spanish Diplomacy and the Armada’, in From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation. Essays in Honor of Garrett Mattingly, ed. by Charles Carter, H., New York, 1965, p. 210)Google Scholar most of which concentrated on seizing a foothold in some peripheral area to establish a permanent diversion and possible stepping-stone from which to threaten England itself. (See Mendoza's cogent arguments in favour of supporting a rising from Scotland, well set out in Elder, J.R., Spanish Influences in Scottish History, Glasgow, 1920, pp. 134–6.)Google Scholar Ireland was considered the best prospect and the one that Philip himself seems to have preferred (C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 192), and as late as theautumn of 1587 it was Ireland where the first blow was to have been struck (Maura, op. cit. pp. 167, 169, 171; Naish, G.P.B., Documents illustrating the history of the Spanish Armada, The Naval Miscellany, IV, Navy Records Society, XCII, 1952, 8).Google Scholar

21 Philip II certainly did not want England for himself and knew he could not possibly govern it personally (Naish, op. cit. p. 3). the candidacy of his daughter Isabella might have provided one solution, and undoubtedly the re-Catholicizing of England would have been very welcome, both on religious grounds and as a moral justification which could also win Papal support and funds and shame the Catholic French king into non-intervention. But faced with the much more immediate problems of heresy in the Netherlands and in France Philip had consistently resisted all pressures to start crusading in England. Now, as then, any attempt to annex England was obviously foolhardy. Militarily it was likely to open for Spain another ulcer like the one in the Netherlands; diplomatically no French king could ever accept it. theideal policy was to loose upon England insurrection. If the Catholics deposed Elizabeth, all to the good; if they did not, with small injections of Spanish encouragement England would be neutralized by a prolonged civil war just as France had been. For Granvelle's lucid statement of this position see Hume, Martin, ‘The Evolution of the Spanish Armada', in The Year after the Armada (1896), pp. 187–8.Google Scholar

22 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 224.

23 Ibid. p. 338; Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 210.

24 C.S.P. Foreign xx, 609; C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 182, 224.

25 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 172, 242, 238, 192.

26 Ibid. pp. 309, 313.

27 Neither side believed the other was sincere in its desire for peace. For English attitudes to the peace negotiations with Parma see Read, Conyres, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth(New York, 1960), pp. 396–407.Google Scholar

28 Lippomano reported that it was thought likely that Drake, on Elizabeth's orders, would refuse battle, and Spain would then claim the honours and at the same time secure the safety of the fleet, her coasts, the Azores, and the Canaries. C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 281.

29 Fernández Duro, op. cit. I, 452, 473, 496; Mattingly, op. cit. pp. 264–5. The implications were fully spelled out by Philip in the sealed letter Medina Sidonia was to deliver to Parma, ‘Si lo que Dios no permita, el suceso no fuese tan próspero que las armas lo puedan allanar, ni tan contrario que frente al enemigo de cuidado (lo cual, mediante Dios, no será) y se contrapesen las cosas de manera que se vea que no desconviene la paz, en este caso, procurando ayudaros de la reputacion de la Armada y lo que mas pudieredes, advertid que fuera de las condiciones ordinarias … han de ser tres las principales en que se ha de poner la mira…’, Quoted in Ibero, Carlos Ibáñez de, ‘Algunas consideraciones sobre polftica naval de España y organización de sus Armadas en la segunda mitad del siglo XVI’, Anales de la Academia de ciencias morales y politicas (Madrid, 1955), p. 332Google Scholar n. 60.

30 Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 120; C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 334.

31 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 209, 338. Did these lost opportunities also include the million gold ducats the Pope had promised if the expedition was carried out in 1587?—see the terms of the agreement of 29 July 1587, printed as appendix 20 to Meyer, A.O., England and the Catholic Church under Queen Elizabeth (1967 edition).Google Scholar

32 C.S.P. Spanish IV, 200 no. 209; C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 329, 348. Nobody seemed to realize that delay might hurt Elizabeth also.

33 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 313 and Naish, op. cit. p. 8. On William Harborne's mission in Constantinople see Pears, Edwin, ‘The Spanish Armada and the Ottoman Porte’, English Historical Review, VIII (1893), 439–66,CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Rawlinson, H.G., ‘The Embassy of William Harborne to Constantinople 1583–8’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th series, V (1922), 1–27;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and on the attempt to involve Morocco in an anti-Spanish alliance Alvarez, M. Fernández, Felipe II, Isabel de Inglaterra y Marruecos (Institute de Estudios Africanos, Madrid, 1951).Google Scholar

34 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 334. French involvement in the Armada has been dealt with by Jensen, De Lamar in ‘Franco-Spanish Diplomacy and the Armada’ and in Diplomacy and Dogmatism. Bernardino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League (Cambridge, Mass., 1964).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 329. See also J.R. Elder, Spanish Influences in Scottish history and C.S.P. Spanish IV.

36 According to the President of the Council of Finance, C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 336.

37 , H. and Chaunu, P., Séville et I' Atlantique (Paris 1959), VIII, 2, i, 754–60,Google Scholar ‘La grande zone de silence de 1587 doit être considerée comme un des grands événements négatifs d'un siècle et demi d'histoire de I'Atlantique des Ibériques…’ (p. 755).

38 Again the President of the Council of Finance, C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 312.

39 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 182.

40 For at least the last two years, the enterprise was being put increasingly in terms of ‘dignity’ and ‘reputation’ by the king's ministers, and regarded with increasing scepticism by his subjects, C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 144, 147, 189, 209, 218, 224, 272, 277.

41 The expression was the Pope's, ibid. p. 345.

42 Ibid. p. 210.

43 Ibid. p. 329; Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 120.

44 Herrera Oria, op. cit. pp. 35, 45.

45 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 190, ‘the King cannot do less than punish the Queen, if he desires to preserve his reputation and his possessions’. And p. 272, ‘these injuries inflicted by Drake will raise many considerations in the minds of other Princes, and also of the King's own subjects’.

46 Ibid. pp. 144, 166, 331.

47 Ibid. pp. 145, 295.

48 Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 102; C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 334.

49 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 329.

50 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 331.

51 Ibid. p. 332. Armstrong, E., ‘Venetian despatches on the Armada and its results’, English Historical Review, XII (1897), 674CrossRefGoogle Scholar lists the plots reported by the Venetian ambassadors since 1581. Armstrong considers ‘the ever-present danger of an English invasion in favour of Don Antonio was one of the chief causes of the Armada’ (p. 673).

52 Parma to Philip II, 31 Jan. 1588, ‘This delay is causing the total ruin of the province of Flanders, and is hardly less disastrous to the rest’, C.S.P. Spanish IV, 201.

53 Philip II to Medina Sidonia, 1 July 1588, Herrera Oria, op. cit. pp. 210–12.

54 It was thought favourable winds would be met only in April or August, but August was dangerous because with the onset of autumn could be expected high tides and northeasterly winds, C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 224.

55 Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 37 (14 Sept. 1587); Olivares to Philip II, 30 Nov. 1587, in Froude, J.A., History of England (1872 edition), XII, 322 n. 2.Google Scholar Mattingly, op. cit. p. 219, notes the change in Philip II from patience to urgency but does not explain it. The document in Naish, op. cit. p. 8 provides a good summary of some of ‘the considerations which have led his Majesty to decide that success in this enterprise depends on the assembling of his forces with great speed and dissimulation; and on their speedy employment, to extirpate this evil thing at its roots’ (14 Sept. 1587).

56 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 334.

57 Ibid. p. 338: ‘he believes that by rapid action it is still possible to remedy the mischief caused by previous delays’ (13 Feb. 1588); Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 151, Philip II to Medina Sidonia, 20 Feb. 1588, ‘de lo que en Lisboa se ha de hazer vos teneys muy probada la intencion en la diligencia y cuydado y, pues nunca tanto fue menester lo uno y lo otro como agora…’.

58 See Mattingly, op. cit. p. 223.

59 Lynch, J., Spain under the Habsburgs, (Oxford, 1964) I, 321.Google Scholar

60 Juan Martinez de Recalde.

61 See Fasano-Guarini, E., ‘Au XVIe siècle: comment naviguent les galères’, Annales E.S.C. (1961), pp. 279–96.Google Scholar

62 Don Juan de Cardona, who was sent to Santander in 1588 for this purpose, had from 1565 to 1585 been captain–general of the galleys of Sicily and Naples, B.M. Additional ms. 28,373 fol. 57; Asis, V. Fernandez, Epistolario de Felipe II sobre asuntos de mar (Madrid, 1943), nos. 811, 820–2.Google Scholar

63 Herrera Oria, op. cit. pp. 90, 93.

64 This was exactly what was feared of Santa Cruz, who always advocated a direct attack on the English fleet.

65 Printed in Fernández Duro, op. cit. n, 5–13, ‘Esto del combatir se entiende, si de otra manera no se puede asegurar al Duque de Parma, mi sobrino, el tránsito para Inglaterra; que, pudiédose sin pelear asegurar este paso al de Parma, por desviarse el enemigo, o de otra manera, será bien que hagáis el mismo efecto conservando las fuerzas enteras’ (p. 10); and Medina Sidonia to Parma, 10 June 1588, the king ‘has ordered me not to turn aside, and even if I am impeded, simply to clear the way and proceed to join hands with you…’, quoted in Oppenheim's introduction to Book I of Monson's Tracts, p. 55. Oppenheim's view, which contradicts mine, ignores the passage from Medina Sidonia's instructions cited above; nor does he appreciate that the Spaniards thought the Armada could not be destroyed and, even if it could not destroy the English fleet, it could mask it while the troops crossed, and continue in being as a cover or a diversion.

66 Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 36. The same document is printed in an English translation in Naish, op. cit. pp. 7–11 and C.S.P. Spanish IV, 187, no. 193.

67 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 213, 281.

68 Ibid. p. 336 (Don Alonso de Leyva, 6 Feb. 1588); C.S.P. Domestic 1581–90, p. 483 (Antone de Taso, ?18 May 1588); Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 196 (Philip II, 21 May 1588); C.S.P. Spanish IV, 194, no. 203, 204, 215 (Don Bernardino de Mendoza, 16 Jan. and 7 Feb. 1588).

69 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 331, 351; C.S.P. Domestic 1581–90, p. 497; Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 99.

70 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 213.

71 Philip II to Medina Sidonia, 1 July 1588, Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 209. It was an opinion snared by the majority of Englishmen also, see Oppenheim, op. cit. p. 171 n. 10, and Conyers Read, op. cit. p. 411.

72 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 191 (6 Aug. 1586).

73 Memorial of Francisco de Estrada (c. 13 Apr. 1586), García, C. Riba y, Correspondencia privada de Felipe II con su secretario Mateo Vázquez 1567–91 (Madrid, 1959), I, 383.Google Scholar

74 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 191, 276.

75 C.S.P. Foreign XXI, pt. I, p. 572 (opinion of the duke of Terranova, governor of Milan).

76 The details are to be found in the previously cited works of Maura, Fernández Asis, and Fernández Duro, and in Inclán, J. Suárez, Guerra de anexión en Portugal du ante el reinado de Don Felipe II (Madrid, 1897), I,Google Scholar ch. 9.

77 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 272, 273, 307.

78 Maura, op. cit. p. 88; Archivo General de Indias, Contratación legajo 5,014, Philip II to Casa de Contratación, 12 Aug. 1586.

79 ‘ Discurso en que se condena al Govierno de los Reyes de las Españas Phelipes segundo y tercero el año de 1599', Haushof und Staats Archiv, Vienna, Spanien Varia fasz. 2 (1599), fol. 347V, ‘El Duque de Medina Sidonia, siendo tan platico de las Indias que desde que tiene uso de raçon no entiende en San Lucar en otra cosa sino en despachar flotas, armadas y navios de aviso y que no ay alia Presidente ni oydor que no conozca ni sepa como procede y importando tanto las Indias y el conçierto de las flotas, que tan desconçertadas andan, y que no tenemos ninguno que sepa nada desta materia sino el Duque…”

80 See the documents printed by Maura, Fernández Duro, and Fernández Asis.

81 Maura, op. cit. pp. 149, 219, 237; C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 159; Fernández Duro, op. cit. I, 385.

82 Maura, op. cit. p. 103.

83 Maura, op. cit. pp. 147, 135, 151, 29, 167, 173, 169; Fernández Duro, op. cit. I, 345; A[rchivo] G[eneral de] S[imancas], Guerra Antigua legajo 81, fol. 91.

84 Maura, op. cit. pp. 172, 176.

85 Ibid. pp. 169–71.

86 Ibid. p. 126.

87 Ibid. p. 218 and Fernández Duro, op. cit. 1, 34s—at the time of the raid on Cadiz, May 1587; Philip II to Medina Sidonia, 25 June 1587, thanking him for his successful recruiting efforts in Andalusia, ‘y todo esto se debe atribuir á vuestro mucho cuidado y diligencia, por lo cual os doy muchas gracias’;, ibid. I, 368. As early as 1573, the Venetian ambassador reported that he was the only one of the Castilian nobility who had responded with any enthusiasm at the time of the Alpujarran revolt, Albèri, E., Le relazioni degli ambasciatoriveneti (Florence, 1839, etc.), series I, VI, 397.Google Scholar Medina Sidonia's appointment to the governorship of Milan and captaincy-general of the army of Lombardy and Piedmont, a post as Granvelle described it, ‘a la verdad importantlsimo y de muy gran confianza, pues es adonde ordinariamente baten las cosas de la guerra’ (C.O.D.O.I.N. XXIV, 522), was quite expressly a reward for the duke's outstanding services in the pacification of the Algarve and the surrender of Portugal's North African possessions in 1580 (see the commission of appointment, 18 May 1581, B.M. Additional ms. 16,176 fols., 280–3), and an expression of ‘la opinion que S.M. ha concebido de la persona de V.E. como quien muy bien conosce sus cualidades y lafeccion que como Principe valeroso tiene las armas…’ (C.O.D.O.I.N. XXIV, 551).

88 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 148, 307.

89 Only Muro, in his life of the princess of Eboli (1877), has appreciated the military importance of the duchy of Medina Sidonia; reference in Fernández Duro, op. cit. I, 226.

90 A.G.S. Guerra Antigua legajo 78, fol. 59; or as the duke put it himself, ‘que se entienda alla quanto subiran de punto las galeras estando a mi cargo y quan hartas y bien proveidas andaran assi de bastimentos y municiones como de soldados y cavalleros deudos y criados mios para poder emprender qualquiera cosa…’, Guerra Antigua leg. 175, fol. 14.

91 A.G.S. Guerra Antigua leg. 78, fol. 97.

92 A.G.S. Guerra Antigua leg. 80, fol. 145.

93 Herrera Oria, op. cit. pp. 112, 124, 125, 136; Fernández Duro, op. cit. I, 519.

94 The duke of Alba claimed to have spent over 80,000 ducats on the Portuguese campaign, Alba, Duquesa de Berwick y de, Documentos escogidos del archivo de la casa de Alba (Madrid, 1891), p. 146;Google Scholar and the marquis of Santa Cruz more than 40,000 ‘assi en ospedar y regalar los cavalleros que venian a servir a V.Md. en ella como en dar de comer a mas de 150 soldados cada dia de los necessitados mas de 5 meses despues de llegados a esta cuidad …’, A.G.S. Guerra Antigua leg. 109, fol. 334.

95 Count of Fuentes to Philip II, Lisbon, 4 Feb. 1588, ‘ …de la tierra no se puede haver sin pagarse luego’, Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 136.

96 Braudel, F., La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen a l'époque de Philippe II (2nd ed.Paris, 1966), II, 58.Google Scholar

97 Michael Lewis, The Spanish Armada (Pan Books), p. 50, says nearly 9 million, but Martin Hume, on the basis of a reference in C.O.D.O.I.N. XIV, and the marquis del Saltillo, ‘El Duque de Medina Sidonia y la jornada a Inglaterra en 1588’, Bol. de la Biblioteca de Menéndez Pelayo, XVI, no. I (1934), p. 168, both agree on 7,827,358.Google Scholar

98 Maura, op. cit. pp. 165, 219, 221; Fernández Duro, op. cit. I, 447, 453, 475, 477, 412, II, 135.

99 As duke of Medina Sidonia and count of Niebla he was lord of Medina Sidonia, Vejer, Chiclana, Conil, Jimena, and Sanlúcar de Barrameda in the province of Cadiz, and of about half the present province of Huelva, quite apart from the influence he had in the lands of his close relative, the marquis of Ayamonte, Ortiz, A. Dominguez, ‘ La conspiración del duque de Medina Sidonia y el marqués de Ayamonte’, separate of Archivo Hispalense, 2nd epoch, no. 106 (1961), p. 2.Google Scholar

100 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 340.

101 Fernández Duro, op. cit. I, 425 (wine); Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 304 (provisioning centre); Maura, op. cit. p. 237 (troops); A.G.S. Guerra Antigua leg. 499, Council of War, 10 Sept. 1597, Andalusia and Extremadura ‘que ordinariamente han sido granero y posito para las provisiones de las Armadas’.

102 Maura, op. cit. p. 237; Fernández Duro, op. cit. I, 412. See also Maura, op. cit. p. 125, 19 Nov. 1582, when the king refused Medina Sidonia permission to come to Madrid because the men and ships assembled for the expedition to Larache would disperse, ‘siendo muy claro que lo uno y lo otro se entretiene principalmente con vuestra presencia y autoridad’.

103 Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 145.

104 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 312.

105 Ibid. p. 144.

106 Fernández y Fernández de Retana op. cit. I, 182–7; Maura, op. cit. p. 37.

107 Maura, op. cit. p. 37.

108 Saltillo, op. cit. p. 172.

109 He apparently had previous successes to his credit, see Fernández Duro, op. cit. I, 353.

110 The duke's family had granted Englishmen trading privileges in Sanlúcar de Barrameda for nearly 300 years, and he was himself continuing the policy, Connell-Smith, Gordon, Forerunners of Drake (1954), pp. 8 and 82, and p. 213 below.Google Scholar

111 A.G.S. Guerra Antigua, leg. 81, fols. 94, 97, 100 (Oct. to Dec. 1576).

112 Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Salisbury MSS. pt. 2, p. 535.

113 The letter is printed in Fernández Duro, op. cit. I, 414–17, and Maura, op. cit. pp. 241–4, and in a shortened English version in C.S.P. Spanish IV, 207–8.

114 Naish, op, cit. p. 12; Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 150.

115 He was probably in Madrid from mid October to mid December 1587, Maura, op. cit. p. 238; C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 327, 319.

116 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 319.

117 Ibid. p. 340.

118 Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 148.

119 Ibid. p. 152; C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 319.

120 Fernández Duro, op. cit. II, 135.

121 In 1582 it was estimated that Sanlúcar was worth 80,000 ducats a year to him; A.G.S. Guerra Antigua leg. 109, fol. 428.

122 Connell-Smith, op. cit. pp. 8, 81–2, 90.

123 Braudel, op. cit. I, 575–6.

124 Fernández Duro, op. cit. I, 225.

125 Ibid. II, 190.

126 In December 1583, he was still owed money he had spent succouring Ceuta and other African garrisons the previous January; Maura, op. cit. pp. 130, 140.

127 Maura, op. cit. p. 12.

128 Ibid. pp. 111–12, 117.

129 Ibid. p. 115.

130 Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 148.

131 Delgado, Pedro Barbadillo, Historia de la ciudad de San Lúcar de Barrameda (Cadiz, 1942), p. 155.Google Scholar

132 B.M. Add. MS. 28,366, fol. 205.

133 A.G.S. Guerra Antigua leg. 109, fol. 428.

134 C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 340.

135 Ibid. p. 187 (Savoy), p. 290 (Tuscany).

136 For these suggestions see Miguel de Oquendo to Philip II, 9 Feb. 1588, Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 366; memorial of Francisco de Estrada, c. 13 Apr. 1586, Riba y Garcia, op. cit. p. 383; Medina Sidonia to Don Juan de Idiáquez, 16 Feb. 1588, Fernández Duro, op. cit. I, 416; Juan Martinez de Recalde to Philip II, 13 Feb. 1588, Herrera Oria, op. cit. p. 367; Fernández Asis, op. cit. no. 1159.

137 Philip II to Medina Sidonia, 1 July 1588, and Oquendo to Philip II, Corunna, 15 July 1588, Herrera Oria, op. cit. pp. 213, 248.

138 Mattingly, Garrett, The ‘Invincible’ Armada and Elizabethan England, Folger Booklets on Tudor and Stuart Civilization (CornellUniversity Press, 1963), p. 10.Google Scholar

139 See Mattingly, Defeat of the Spanish Armada, p. 286.

140 C.S.P. Foreign XXI, pt. 4, p. 516.

141 Harleian Miscellany, I, 124.

142 Armstrong, op. cit. pp. 662, 667; C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 182, 191–2, 321, 338, 348, 354; Naish, op. cit. p. 4; Stone, Lawrence, An Elizabethan: Sir Horatio Palavicino (Oxford, 1956), p. 22;Google Scholar C.S.P. Foreign XXI, pt. I, p. 578.

143 ‘The Duke of Medina Sidonia has received no commission as yet, and one does not see how he can accept one, as his presence is incompatible with that of the Marquis of Santa Cruz, who wherever he may be, or wherever engaged, would always take rank as commander in chief in virtue of his earlier commission’, C.S.P. Venetian VIII, 159 (1 May 1586); ‘ …but if he goes into England, many say he will not acknowledge the Duke of Parma as his superior…’, C.S.P. Foreign XXI, pt. I, p. 572.

144 Lewis, op. cit. p. 48.