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The Calais Conference of December 1915

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

D. J. Dutton
D. J. Dutton
Affiliation:
University of Liverpool
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Extract

The Allies' conduct of the Great War has frequently been castigated by historians as inept and amateurish. But it is perhaps the conduct of their diplomacy which most merits this description. Until the creation of the Supreme War Council at the end of 1917 there existed, apart from a number of liaison officers, no machinery to synchronise the strategy and diplomacy of Great Britain and France other than the periodic meetings of the politicans and generals of the two countries. Yet, as David Lloyd George came to realize, these were not really conferences at all, but rather meetings of men with pre-conceived ideas who desired only to find a formula which could obscure the underlying differences of opinion from the general view. They were really nothing but a ‘tailoring’ operation at which different plans were stitched together. What was required was the construction of an inter-Allied General Staff, designed to examine and give advice on the changing military situation. Obviously no government could abdicate its right to issue orders, but if the Central Powers were to be defeated the Allies needed to concede that there was far more to participation in a coalition than the mere lip-service to unity involved in the periodic gatherings of soldiers and statesmen. An examination of the Calais Conference of December 1915, called at a time when Allied operations on all fronts were showing a marked lack of success, will illustrate many of the failings and dangers of this primitive form of war diplomacy.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , March 1978 , pp. 143 - 156
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1978

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References

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