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³⁶ For the purposes of this research, I assume that voters are voting sincerely, rather than strategically or expressively. While this point is heavily debated in the literature, it appears reasonable to assume sincere voting in many West European states, where proportional representation systems allow government access to small parties, making a protest or strategic vote potentially costly. For further discussion of this topic, see Koepke, Jason and Ringe, Nils, ‘The Second Order Election Model in an Enlarged Europe’, European Union Politics, 7: 3 (2006), pp. 321–346.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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³⁸ The decision was made to calculate a permissive consensus score that includes both the ‘good’ and ‘neither good nor bad’ percentages in order to maintain consistency with the use of this data in past works on the permissive consensus. For example, see Hix, Simon, The Political System of the European Union, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1999.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁹ The Appendix containing the space maps is supplied online as additional supporting information.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ A number of member states, including Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are not included in this table. In the cases of Ireland, Portugal and Spain, these states do not have a radical right party that fits the definition used here. It should be noted that neo-fascist parties exist in Spain and Portugal (see Carter, The Extreme Right in Western Europe) but these do not exhibit the racist or culturalist characteristics essential to the radical right parties and as such are not included in the analysis. In the cases of Finland and Greece, radical right parties have emerged recently, but too recently to include more than one election in the matrix (thus limiting the ability to detect changes in popular support over time). The True Finns first ran for election to the Finnish Parliament in 1999, while the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally first made the attempt in 2004. The positions of these parties are included in the political opportunity space and subsequent analysis.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Where an election fell between two Chapel Hill surveys, the scores from the survey held immediately prior to the election were used to determine both mainstream party positions (to determine convergence or divergence) and radical right party positions.Google Scholar

⁴² PC score is coded as ‘AVG’ (average) if it falls within 1 percentage point of the average for that state from 1992 to 2006.Google Scholar

⁴³ Vote is coded ‘same’ if it falls within 1 percentage point of the total gained in the previous election.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Chapel Hill surveys did not include the Republicans in their 2002 surveys. However, scores from 1999 indicate that the Republicans were still squarely in the anti-integration area of the opportunity space.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Chapel Hill surveys did not include this party, therefore an actual score is not available. However, other sources (for example, see Mudde, , Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, or the British National Party's 2005 manifesto) show strong evidence that this party is very anti-integration, and as such it is treated that way in this research.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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⁴⁸ PC score is coded as ‘AVG’ (average) if it falls within 1 percentage point of the average for that state from 1992 to 2006.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Chapel Hill surveys included scores for the KPO in the early to mid-1990s, but did not include the party in the surveys from 1999 and 2002. Nonetheless, the early scores indicate that the KPO was vehemently anti-integration, thus it is scored as such in this analysis.Google Scholar

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⁶² These parties are included in the opportunity space maps, but not the matrices. Their exclusion from the matrices is due to the very recent formation of these parties and the resultant lack of data for use in the matrix.Google Scholar