(1) “Verleihung des Friedenspreises an Fritz Stern: ‘Was blühen kann in der Berliner Republik – Auszüge aus der Rede des amerikanischen Historikers,‘” DER TAGESSPIEGEL (October 18, 1999) (visited November 6, 2001) http://www2.tagesspiegel.de/archiv/1999/10/17/ak-ku-de-16569.html.Google Scholar

(2) Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany, BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY – PREAMBLE, 39 (Christian Tomuschat and David P. Currie trans.) (1998).Google Scholar

(3) Grosser, Alfred, DEUTSCHLANDBILANZ: GESCHICHTE DEUTSCHLANDS SEIT 1945 143 (1970).Google Scholar

(4) Casper, Gerhard, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 190 (1997).Google Scholar

(5) At Yale Law School I had the privilege to study Constitutional Law under the recently deceased Charles L. Black, Jr. (CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974); IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK (1974)).Google Scholar

(6) Laun, Rudolf, DAS GRUNDGESETZ WESTDEUTSCHLANDS – ANSPRACHE GEHALTEN IM AUFTRAGE DER UNIVERSITÄT HAMBURG AN DIE STUDENTEN DER UNIVERSITÄT HAMBURG AM 24. MAI 1949, 5 (2. Auflage, 1951).Google Scholar

(7) Paras. 7–25 Verfassungsurkunde für das Großherzogtum Baden 1818, 1 DOKUMENTE ZUR DEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE 157–159 (Ernst Rudolf Huber ed., 1961) (Including, inter alia,: Para. 7 – Equal rights for all citizents; Para. 13 – Property rights and personal liberty; Para. 15 – Principle of legality in criminal matters; and Para. 17 – Freedom of the press).Google Scholar

(8) Para. 64 Verfassungsurkunde für das Großherzogtum Baden 1818, id., at 165.Google Scholar

(9) Para. 7 Verfassungsurkunde für das Großherzogtum Baden 1818, id., at 157.Google Scholar

(10) Verfahren seit 7. September 1951 bis 31. Dezember 2000 (Visited November 7, 2001) http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/cgi-bin/link.pl?aktuell.Google Scholar

(11) Id.Google Scholar

(12) 2000 Year-end Report of the Federal Judiciary (Visited November 7, 2001) http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2000year-endreport.html.Google Scholar

(13) Author's private correspondence with the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach.Google Scholar

(14) Id.Google Scholar

(15) Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Thomas Petersen, ALLENSBACHER JAHRBUCH DER DEMOSKOPIE – 1993–1997, 752 (1997).Google Scholar

(16) Id.Google Scholar

(17) JUGEND UND DEMOKRATIE IN DEUTSCHLAND – DJI JUGENDSURVEY (Ursula Hoffmann-Lange ed.) 258, 259-60 (1995).Google Scholar

(18) Hardin, Russell, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 134 (1999).Google Scholar

(19) Hesse, Konrad, “Die Normative Kraft der Verfassung – Freiburger Antrittsvorlesung,” 222 RECHT UND STAAT IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART 13–14 (1959) (Trans.).Google Scholar

(20) DIE KARLSRUHER REPUBLIK (Gary S. Schaal, Sabine Friedel and Andreas Endler eds., 2000).Google Scholar

(21) A good overview of the forms of judicial review in use around the world can be found at the web-site of the Slovenian Constitutional Court, which contains a number of useful comparative charts and graphics, including a world map with the states color-coded according to the nature of their system of constitutional review. The web-site identifies more than 50 Constitutional Courts based on the European model. Arne Mavcic, A Tabular Presentation of Constitutional/Judicial Review Around the World (visited November 7, 2000) http://www.us-rs.com/review/enie/tab1emps.php?stat=1&srt=0.Google Scholar

(22) See, e.g., Alix Jean Carmichele v. The Minister of Safety and Security, CCT 48/00, Para. 54 (August 16, 2001), http://www.concourt.gov.za/cases/2001/carmichelesum.shtml. (“Our Constitution is not merely a formal document regulating public power. It also describes, like the German Constitution, an objective, normative value system. As was stated by the German Federal Constitutional Court: ‘The jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court is consistently to the effect that the basic right norms contain not only defensive subjective rights for the individual but embody at the same time an objective value system which, as a fundamental constitutional value for all areas of the law, acts as a guiding principle and stimulus for the legislature, executive and judiciary.‘ BVerfGE 39, 1(41).”).Google Scholar

(23) BVerfGE 7, 198; 2 DECISIONS OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT) FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1 (Trans., 1998); Donald Kommers, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 368, 370 (Trans., 1989).Google Scholar

(24) Id.Google Scholar

(25) Article 5 of the Basic Law provides: (1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing, and pictures and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. (2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honor. (3) Art and scholarship, research, and teaching shall be free. The freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the constitution. Press and Information Office of the Federal Government of Germany, BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY –ARTICLE 5, 41 (Christian Tomuschat and David P. Currie trans.) (1998).Google Scholar

(26) BVerfGE 7, 198 (205) (citations omitted); 2 DECISIONS OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT) FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1, 5 (Trans., 1998) (citations omitted); Donald Kommers, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 368, 370 (Trans., 1989) (citations omitted).Google Scholar

(27) Grimm, Dieter, DIE ZUKUNFT DER VERFASSUNG 408–409 (1991).Google Scholar

(28) BVerfGE 7, 198 (205) (citations omitted); 2 DECISIONS OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT) FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1, 5 (Trans., 1998) (citations omitted); Donald Kommers, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 368, 370 (Trans., 1989) (citations omitted).Google Scholar

(29) BVerfGE 89, 214.Google Scholar

(30) BVerfGE 89, 214 (232) (Trans.).Google Scholar

(31) BVerfGE 18, 85 (92 ff.).Google Scholar

(32) BVerfGE 39, 1 (71–72) (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Rupp-v. Brünneck and Justice Simon) (citation omitted); Donald Kommers, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 348, 357-58 (Trans., 1989) (citation omitted).Google Scholar

(33) Limbach, Jutta, “IM NAMEN DES VOLKES” 164 (1999).Google Scholar

(34) Bundesministerium der Justiz, Bericht der Kommission zur Entlastung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, at Para. 3.A(1) (1997).Google Scholar

(35) Gerhard Casper and Richard A. Posner, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 92 (1976). (“There is no compelling quantitative (or, we might add, qualitative) evidence either that this increase in time pressure has interfered significantly with the ability of the Court to discharge its various responsibilities or that the Court is denying review in cases where Supreme Court review would serve an important function.”).Google Scholar

(36) Concerning the process for admitting a constitutional complaint for consideration by the Federal Constitutional Court, see, Para. 93a Abs.2 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (BVerfGG – Federal Constitutional Court Act) (“(2) It shall be accepted, a) in so far as it has fundamental constitutional significance, b) if this is indicated in order to enforce the rights referred to in Article 90(1) above; this can also be the case if the complainant suffers especially grave disavantages as a result of refusal to decide on the complaint.”). Concerning the process for admitting a case for review by the United States Supreme Court, see, Rules of the Supreme Court, Part III, Rule 10. (“Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.”).Google Scholar

(37) BVerfGE 7, 198 (205-06); 2 DECISIONS OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT) FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 1, 6–7 (Trans., 1998); Donald Kommers, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 368, 371-72 (Trans., 1989).Google Scholar

(38) Hennis, Wilhelm, “Verfassung und Verfassungswirklichkeit: Ein deutsches Problem,” 373/374 RECHT UND STAAT IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART 15 (1968) (Trans.).Google Scholar

(39) Casper, Gerhard, “Redefreiheit und Ehrenschutz,” 104 JURISTISCHE STUDIENGESELLSCHAFT KARLSRUHE 36 (1971) (Quoting the Spiegel Case decided by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1966: “Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist eine Demokratie, die von ihren Bürgern eine Verteidigung der freiheitlichen Ordnung erwartet und einen Mißbrauch der Grundrechte zum Kampf gegen diese Ordnung nicht hinnimmt… Dieses Prinzip der streitbaren Demokratie gilt auch für die innere Ordnung der Bundeswehr.” BVerfGE 20, 162). For a translation of the case, see, 2 DECISIONS OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT) FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 71 (1998) (citations omitted); Donald Kommers, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 397 (Trans., 1989) (citations omitted).Google Scholar

(40) In 1995, the Federal Constitutional Court issued its decision in the case that has come to be known as the “Soldaten sind Mörder” (“Soldiers are Murderers”) Case. BVerfGE 93, 266. The Court overturned the defamation convictions of a number of pacifists who had, inter alia, made use of the slogan, in various forms, “soldiers are murderers,” which had been coined by the German poet Kurt Tucholsky. The Court concluded, in part, that the lower courts had failed to adequately weigh the defendants' constitutionally secured free speech interests against soldiers' constitutionally secured interests in human dignity and the free development of one's personality. For a translation of the case, see, 2 DECISIONS OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT) FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 659 (1998). As an example of the criticism of the Federal Constitutional Court's decision in the “Soldiers are Murderers” Case, see, Georgios Gounalakis, “Soldaten sind Mörder,” 49 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 481 (1996) (“[The decision] is, in its result, correct; but the basis for the decision is not convincing.”) (Trans.).Google Scholar

(41) BVerfGE 102, 370. See, Federal Constitutional Court Hears Arguments in Church/State Case: should the Jehovah's Witnesses be Granted Status as a Quasi-Pulbic Entity?, 1 GERMAN L. J. 1 (October 15, 2000) www.germanlawjournal.com; From the Outside Looking In: The Jehovah's Witnesses' Struggle for Quasi-Public Status under Germany's Incorporation Law, 2 GERMAN L. J. 1 (January 15, 2001) www.germanlawjournal.com.Google Scholar

(42) Id.Google Scholar

(43) Hardin, Russell, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 154 (1999).Google Scholar

(44) BVerfGE 89, 155.Google Scholar

(45) BVerfGE 89, 155 (185-86) (Trans.).Google Scholar

(46) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Nice, December 7, 2000, C 364 – 18/12/2000 OFFICIAL JOURNAL 1 – 22, (last visited November 9, 2001) http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=32000Y1218(01)& model=guichett.Google Scholar

(47) U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8.Google Scholar

(48) See, id.: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States; To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States; To establish Post Offices and post Roads; To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries; To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations; To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings;–And To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”Google Scholar