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Who is Afraid of the European Council? The Court of Justice’s Cautious Approach to the Independence of Domestic Judges

ECJ 25 July 2018, Case C-216/18 PPU, The Minister for Justice and Equality v LM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 November 2018

Michał Krajewski
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Case Notes
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European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , December 2018 , pp. 792 - 813
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© 2018 The Authors 

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Footnotes

*

PhD Researcher at the European University Institute in Florence.

References

1 ECJ 25 July 2018, Case C-216/18 PPU, The Minister for Justice and Equality v LM.

2 W. Sadurski, ‘How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding’, Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research Paper (2018).

3 European Commission, ‘Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland’, 20 December 2017, COM(2017) 835 final.

4 ECJ 5 April 2016, Case C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru.

5 P. Bárd and W. van Ballegooij, ‘Judicial Independence as a Precondition for Mutual Trust’, Verfassungsblog, 10 April 2018, <verfassungsblog.de/judicial-independence-as-a-precondition-for-mutual-trust>, visited 27 October 2018.

6 Statement of observations submitted by Poland in Case C-216/18 PPU, The Minister for Justice and Equality v LM, 7 May 2018, published by the Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights, <www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/uwagi-Polski.pdf>, visited 27 October 2018; A. Dori, ‘Hic Rhodus, hic salta: The ECJ Hearing of the Landmark “Celmer” Case’, Vefassungsblog, 6 June 2018, <verfassungsblog.de/hic-rhodus-hic-salta-the-ecj-hearing-of-the-landmark-celmer-case/>, visited 27 October 2018.

7 ECJ 27 February 2018, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas (ASJP).

8 Similar arguments have been presented by M. Wendel, ‘Afraid of Their Own Courage? Some Preliminary Reflections on LM’, Verfassungsblog, 26 July 2018, <verfassungsblog.de/afraid-of-their-own-courage-some-preliminary-reflections-on-lm/>, visited 27 October 2018.

9 M. Ovádek, ‘Has the CJEU just Reconfigured the EU Constitutional Order?’, Verfassungsblog, 28 February 2018, <verfassungsblog.de/has-the-cjeu-just-reconfigured-the-eu-constitutional-order/>, visited 27 October 2018.

10 Opinion of AG Tanchev in ECJ 28 June 2018, Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister of Justice and Equality v LM.

11 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, supra n. 4.

12 LM, supra n. 1, para. 59.

13 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, OJ L 190 of 18.7.2002, p. 1-20, as amended.

14 LM, supra n. 1, paras. 44-45.

15 The former appears in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and seems to suggest a very strict approach to the possibility of non-surrender. See AG Tanchev, Minister of Justice and Equality v LM, paras. 72, 76, 81-85. Notably, according to AG Tanchev the breach of the right to an independent judge does not seem to always amount to a flagrant denial of justice. See, ibid, para. 90.

16 P. Bárd and W. van Ballegooij, ‘The AG Opinion in the Celmer Case: Why Lack of Judicial Independence Should Have Been Framed as a Rule of Law Issue’, Verfassungsblog, 2 July 2018, <verfassungsblog.de/the-ag-opinion-in-the-celmer-case-why-lack-of-judicial-independence-should-have-been-framed-as-a-rule-of-law-issue/>, visited 27 October 2018.

17 P. Sonnevend, ‘A Clever Compromise or a Tectonic Shift? The LM Judgment of the CJEU’, Verfassungsblog, 27 July 2018, <verfassungsblog.de/a-clever-compromise-or-a-tectonic-shift-the-lm-jugment-of-the-cjeu/>, visited 27 October 2018.

18 Request for preliminary ruling by the High Court of Ireland in Minister for Justice and Equality v LM, 25 March 2018, para. 27, published by the Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights, <www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/wniosek-prejudycjalny.pdf>, visited 27 October 2018.

19 Ibid., para. 28.

20 LM, supra n. 1, paras. 62-68.

21 Ibid., para. 61 (emphasis added).

22 Opinion of AG Tanchev, supra n. 10, para. 113.

23 LM, supra n. 1, para. 74.

24 Ibid., paras. 76-77.

25 Ibid., para. 52.

26 Request for preliminary ruling, supra n. 18, para. 51.

27 Opinion of AG Tanchev, supra n. 10, paras. 38-45.

28 LM, supra n. 1, para. 70.

29 Ibid., para. 72.

30 A. Frąckowiak-Adamska, ‘Drawing Red Lines With No (Significant) Bite – Why an Individual Test Is Not Appropriate in the LM Case’, Verfassungsblog, 30 July 2018, <verfassungsblog.de/drawing-red-lines-with-no-significant-bite-why-an-individual-test-is-not-appropriate-in-the-lm-case/>, visited 27 October 2018. The author noted, for instance, the clear preference expressed by the Polish Minister of Justice regarding how Polish courts should apply Council Regulation 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, OJ L 338, 23.12.2003, p. 1–29.

31 D. Kosař, ‘The CJEU Has Spoken Out, But the Show Must Go On’, Verfassungsblog, 2 August 2018, <verfassungsblog.de/the-cjeu-has-spoken-out-but-the-show-must-go-on/>, visited 27 October 2018.

32 M. Bonelli, ‘The Deficiencies Judgment: Postponing the Constitutional Moment’, Verfassungsblog, 27 July 2018, <verfassungsblog.de/the-deficiencies-judgment-postponing-the-constitutional-moment/>, visited 27 October 2018.

33 Barents, R., ‘EU Procedural Law and Effective Legal Protection’, 51 Common Market Law Review (2014) p. 1437Google Scholar at p. 1455.

34 Formally, the Court provides an interpretation of the applicable EU norms, whereas the referring court applies this interpretation to the main case. However, in practice this distinction is blurred. It has been observed that the Court has been moving towards a more concrete style of interpretation, firmly embedded in the facts of the case, which is tantamount to law application: Broberg, M. and Fender, N., ‘Preliminary References’, in R. Schütze and T. Tridimas (eds), Oxford Principles of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2018) p. 981 at p. 1007Google Scholar; Lenaerts, K. et al., EU Procedural Law (Oxford University Press 2014) p. 231Google Scholar.

35 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, supra n. 4. See also ECJ 25 July 2018, Case C-220/18 PPU, ML, where in paras. 67-71, the Court explicitly refused to ascertain the facts regarding prison overcrowding in Hungary.

36 ECJ 21 December 2011, Case C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. et al. v Secretary of State for the Home Department et al., para. 89.

37 Ibid., paras. 64-66.

38 The examples chosen by Kosař, supra n. 31.

39 S. Gilhooly, ‘The Peter Principles’, The Parchment, Autumn 2012, p. 29 at p. 30.

40 Statement of Poland, supra n. 6, para. 29.

41 Arts. 179 and 187 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997, Dz.U. 1997, Nr 78 poz. 483.

42 Art. 13 of the Irish Court and Court Officers Act of 1995.

43 Arts. 61, 62, 80 and 96 of the ECJ Rules of Procedure of 25 September 2012, OJ L 265, 29.9.2012, as amended.

44 Fair trial, in turn, is inherent to the concepts of effective judicial review and the rule of law and forms the basis for mutual trust. LM, supra n. 1, paras. 49, 51, 56-58.

45 Brkan, M., ‘The Concept of Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal Order: Peeling the Onion to Its Core’, 14(2) EuConst (2018) p. 332 at p. 367Google Scholar. For the criticism of such an absolutist theory of essence see Alexy, R., Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press 2010) p. 192–196Google Scholar.

46 An idea expressed by the formula: ‘justice must not only be done, but also seen to be done’. See, for instance, ECtHR 9 June 1998, Case No. 41/1997/825/1031, Incal v Turkey, para. 71; ECtHR 30 November 2010, Case No. 23614/08, Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban v Poland, paras. 45-46 and the previously cited case law.

47 Gillaux, P., Droit(s) européen(s) à un procès équitable (Bruylant 2012) p. 15Google Scholar.

48 LM, supra n. 1, para. 66.

49 I am grateful to Maciej Taborowski for this last point.

50 LM, supra n. 1, para. 61.

51 Statement of Poland, supra n. 6, para. 8.

52 ECJ 15 May 1986, Case 222/84, Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. See also ECtHR 24 November 1994, Case No. 15287/89, Beaumartin v France, para. 38; ECtHR 21 July 2011, Case No. 32181/04 and 32122/05, Sigma Radio Television v Cyprus, para. 157.

53 In such a case, domestic courts could also inquire with the Court about the validity of reasoned proposals, under Art. 267 TFEU.

54 AG Jacobs 15 September 2005, Case C-301/03, Italy v Commission, paras. 57-72. For an example of the approach, see EGC 13 December 2016, Case T-713/14, International and European Public Services Organisation v ECB.

55 Art. 263(2) TFEU.

56 Statement of observations submitted by the Commission in Case C-216/18 PPU, The Minister for Justice and Equality v LM, 7 May 2018, para. 8, published by the Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights, <www.hfhr.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/uwagi-Komisji.pdf>, visited 27 October 2018.

57 European Commission, supra n. 3., fn 91. See also paras. 133-135.

58 LM, supra n. 1, para. 67.

59 Arts. 110a-110c, 112-112d of the Act of 27 July 2001 on the organisation of common courts, Dz.U. 2016 r. poz. 2062, as amended or added by Art. 108(17-19) of the Act of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court, Dz.U. 2018 r., poz. 5.

60 Art. 27 of the Act on the Supreme Court, ibid. Venice Commission, Opinion No. 604/2017, 11 December 2017, para. 91.

61 See ‘Position Paper of the Board of the ENCJ on the membership of the KRS of Poland’, p. 3-4, available at <www.encj.eu/index.php/node/492>, visited 27 October 2018; and the information on the suspension available at <www.encj.eu/node/495>, visited 27 October 2018.

62 Report by the Legal Experts Team of Batory Foundation, 14 March 2018, available in Polish at <www.batory.org.pl/dla_mediow/raport_fundacji_batorego_o_demontazu_sadownictwa>, visited 27 October 2018, p. 15-16.

63 Venice Commission, Opinion No. 904/2017, 11 December 2017, para. 100 ff.

64 European Commission, supra n. 3, para. 157 ff.

65 Venice Commission, supra n. 63, paras. 121-126. On the role of court presidents in the Central and Eastern Europe see Kosař, D. and Šipulova, K., ‘The Strasbourg Court Meets Abusive Constitutionalism: Baka v. Hungary and the Rule’, 10 Hague Journal of the Rule of Law (2018) p. 83 at p. 97CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

66 Stowarzyszenie Sędziów Polskich “Iustitia” [Association of Polish Judges “Iustitia”], Stan Niezależnego Sądownictwa w Polsce. Raport z Badań i Analiz [The State of Independent Judiciary in Poland. Research and Analysis Report], October 2018, available in Polish at <www.iustitia.pl/images/pliki/Raport_Iustitia.pdf>, visited 27 October 2018.

67 The Irish High Court, Minister for Justice and Equality v LM, supra n. 18, paras. 27-28, 51-52.

68 Bárd and van Ballegooij argue, quite to the contrary, that the Court should have framed the issue in LM in rule-of-law terms instead of fair-trial terms. See Bárd and van Ballegooij, supra n. 16.

69 The High Court of Ireland, The Minister for Justice and Equality v Artur Celmer, 1 August 2018, available at <www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2018/H484.html>, visited 27 October 2018, paras. 30-31.

70 ECtHR 9 February 2012, Case No. 42856/06, Kinský v Czech Republic, paras. 95-97.

71 K. Sobczak, ‘Sąd z Irlandii nie wierzy prezesowi i pyta o praworządność sędziego’, available at <www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/sad-z-irlandii-pyta-o-niezaleznosc-polskich-sadow,313063.html>, visited 27 October 2018.

72 K. Skory, ‘Rzeszowski sąd odpowiada na pytania Hiszpanów o niezależność’, available at <www.rmf24.pl/raporty/raport-batalia-o-sady/fakty/news-rzeszowski-sad-odpowiada-na-pytania-hiszpanow-o-niezaleznosc,nId,2641864>, visited 27 October 2018.

73 LM, supra n. 1, paras. 70-71.

74 Dori, supra n. 6; Statement by Poland, supra n. 6, para. 24. The Court itself had used this line of argumentation in ECJ 30 May 2013, Case C-168/13 PPU, Jérémy F v Premier Ministre, para. 49. See also Case C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Opinion of AG Bot, para. 87.

75 Arguably, due to the political nature of the Art. 7 TEU procedure, courts would not be bound by a decision of the Council (Art. 7(1) TEU) or the European Council (Art. 7(2) TEU) finding no risk or no breach to the rule of law. Courts would still be empowered and obliged, under Art. 19(1) TEU and 47 of the Charter, to guarantee assessment of the chances for fair trials before independent judges.

76 For instance, with regard to the Poland, see ECtHR 30 November 2010, Case 23614/08, Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban v Poland, paras. 45-46.

77 ASJP, supra n. 7, para. 32.

78 There are linguistic differences between the various versions of this provision, and some stipulate ‘effective judicial protection’. For instance, the French version stipulates ‘protection juridictionnelle effective’ and the Italian one ‘tutela giurisdizionale effettiva’.

79 ECJ 8 March 2011, Opinion 1/09, paras. 68-69. On objective principles, as opposed to subjective rights, and on the ‘radiation thesis’, see Alexy, supra n. 45, pp. 352-354. See also Krajewski, M., ‘The Court of Justice and Athena’s Dilemma’, 3 European Papers (2018) p. 395Google Scholar.

80 Bonelli, M. and Claes, M., ‘Judicial Serendipity: How Portuguese judges came to the rescue of the Polish judiciary’, 14(3) EuConst (2018) p. 622 at p. 638Google Scholar.

81 Pending Case C-192/18, Application of 15 March 2018, OJ L 204, p. 23 (a case regarding ordinary courts); for information on the pending case regarding the Polish Supreme Court, see the Commission press release of 24 September 2018 available at <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-5830_en.htm>, visited 27 October 2018.

82 The preliminary reference from the Polish Supreme Court: order of 2 August 2018, Case III UZP 4/18 (Court of Justice Case C-522/18); order of 1 August 2018, Case III PO 6/19; order of 30 August 2018, Case III PO 7/18; order of 19 September 2018, Joined Cases III PO 8/18 and III PO 9/18; order of 3 October 2018, Case II PK 153/17. See also the preliminary reference from the Regional Court in Warsaw, order of 8 September 2018, Case VIII K 146/18; and from the Regional Court in Łódź, order of 31 August 2018, Case I C 205/17.

83 The European Convention, ‘Final report of the discussion circle on the Court of Justice’, 25 March 2003, CONV 636/03, para. 18, <www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs_all/committees/conv/20030403/03c_en.pdf>, visited 27 October 2018.

84 ECJ 25 July 2002, Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, paras. 40-41.

85 Tridimas, T., ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union’, in R. Schütze and T. Tridimas (eds), Oxford Principles of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2018) p. 581Google Scholar at p. 582-584. See also ECJ 3 October 2013, Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, Opinion of AG Kokott, paras. 34, 116 and 121.

86 Lenaerts, K., ‘The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union’, 44 Common Market Law Review (2007) p. 1625 at p. 1629Google Scholar. In this light, the opinion that the Court could ‘reconfigure’ the EU constitutional order by means of the application of Art. 19(1) TEU in ASJP (see Ovádek, supra n. 9) seems to be much exaggerated.

87 A. Arnull, ‘Remedies Before National Courts’, in Schütze and Tridimas, supra n. 85, p. 1011; Krommendijk, J., ‘Is There Light on the Horizon? The Distinction Between “Rewe Effectiveness” and the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in Article 47 of the Charter after Orizonte’, 53 Common Market Law Review (2016) p. 1395Google Scholar.

88 See, for instance, Dougan, M., National Remedies Before the Court of Justice: Issues of Harmonisation and Differentiation (Hart Publishing 2004)Google Scholar.

89 ECJ 13 March 2007, Case C-432/05, Unibet, paras. 37-44.

90 ECJ 6 October 2015, Case C-61/14, Orizzonte Salute; ECJ 22 December 2010, Case C-279/09, DEB; ECJ 13 December 2017, Case C-403/16, El Hassani.

91 ECJ 6 September 2012, Case C-619/10, Trade Agency.

92 ECJ 4 June 2013, Case C-300/11, ZZ.

93 ECJ 27 September 2017, Case C-73/16, Peter Puškár, paras. 87-98.

94 ECJ 14 March 2013, Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz.

95 Safjan, M. and Düsterhaus, D., ‘A Union of Effective Judicial Protection: Addressing a Multi-level Challenge through the Lens of Article 47 CFREU’, Yearbook of European Law (2014) p. 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

96 Burley, A.-M. and Mattili, W., ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration’, 47 International Organizations (1993) p. 41CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 60.

97 ECJ 18 December 2014, Opinion 2/13 (EU Accession to ECHR), paras. 174-176.

98 ECJ 6 March 2018, Case C-284/16, Slovakia v Achmea, paras. 35-37 and the case law cited.

99 Independence is one of the criteria of a ‘court of tribunal’, within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU, which can make a preliminary reference to the Court. However, to broaden the access to preliminary reference procedure, the Court applies a ‘lax criterion of judicial independence’. See Opinion of AG Colomer 29 November 2001, Case C-17/00, François De Coster v Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort; Bonelli and Claes, supra n. 80, p. 631.

100 ECJ 19 September 2006, Case C-506/04, Wilson; ECJ 31 January 2013, Case C-175/11, H.I.D. & B.A. v Refugee Applications Commissioner. In the latter case, the Court avoided the need to assess the independence of said adjudicatory body, having found that its decisions were subject to judicial review by courts in the strict sense.

101 ASJP, supra n. 7, paras. 40-41.

102 However, AG Øe proposed separating the issues of access to effective remedy and judicial independence in the interpretation of Art. 19(1) TEU. Opinion of AG Øe in ECJ 18 May 2017, Case C-64/16, paras. 57-68.

103 Frąckowiak-Adamska, supra n. 30.

104 Supra n. 81.

105 Supra n. 82.

106 M. Taborowski, ‘The Commission takes a step back in the fight for the Rule of Law’, Verfassungsblog, 3 January 2018, <verfassungsblog.de/the-commission-takes-a-step-back-in-the-fight-for-the-rule-of-law>, visited 27 October 2018.

107 On 11 October 2018, 27 new judges of the Supreme Court were appointed. See the press release at <www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=467-292d9931-9fa5-4b04-8516-5c932ff6bdf2&ListName=Wydarzenia>, visited 27 October 2018.

108 The Supreme Court of Poland, order of 30 August 2018, Case III PO 7/18.

109 S. Biernat and M. Kawczyńska, ‘Why the Polish Supreme Court’s Reference on Judicial Independence to the CJEU is Admissible after all’, Verfassungsblog, 23 August 2018, <verfassungsblog.de/why-the-polish-supreme-courts-reference-on-judicial-independence-to-the-cjeu-is-admissible-after-all/>, visited 27 October 2018.

110 Pech, L. and Kochenov, D., ‘Better Late than Never? On the European Commission’s Rule of Law Framework and its First Activation’, 55 Journal of Common Market Studies (2016) p. 1062 at p. 1065Google Scholar.