¹ BVerfG 14 January 2014, 2 BvR 2728/13 et al., OMT (reference), BVerfGE vol. 134, p. 366 at p. 420 ff, para. 106-133 (dissenting opinion Lübbe-Wolff). OMT stands for Outright Monetary Transactions.

² BVerfG 5 May 2020, 2 BvR 859/15 et al., PSPP, ⟨www.bverfg.de/e/rs20200505_2bvr085915.html⟩, visited 14 December 2020. An English translation is available on the English language website of the Court ⟨www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Homepage/home_node.html⟩, visited 14 December 2020. PSPP stands for Public Sector Purchase Programme.

³ E.g. on ⟨eulawlive.com⟩ by D. Sarmiento; H. Sauer; N. Arriba-Sellier. See also J. Ziller, ‘L’insoutenable pesanteur du juge constitutionnel allemand’, 8 May 2020, ⟨blogdroiteuropeen.com⟩; an early in-depth analysis was A. Champsaur, ‘The German Constitutional Court has fallen into its own trap’, 15 May 2020, ⟨iflr.com⟩; and a rather exceptional blog entry was an acting judge of the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) harshly criticising the judges of the Constitutional Court in P. Meier-Beck, ‘Ultra vires?‘ 11 May 2020, ⟨d-kart.de/blog/2020/05/11/ultra-vires/⟩. All websites in this footnote and the following ones visited 14 December 2020.

⁴ In chronological order: A. Thiele; B. Wegener; M. Maduro; A. Steinbach; M. Kottmann and R. Sangi; M. Avbelj; A. Lang; M. Wilkinson; A. Brade and M. Gentzsch; T. Marzal; K. Alter; O.W. Lembcke; A. Farahat; F. Fabbrini; M. van den Brink; I. Pernice; C. Möllers; H. Kube; S. Leuschner; F. Strumia; A. Guazzarotti; J. Jahn; K.F. Gärditz; F. Bignami; O. Garner; C. Krenn; András Jakab and Pál Sonnevend; R.D. Kelemen, P. Eeckhout, F. Fabbrini, L. Pech and R. Uitz writing for 32 scholars of EU law; triggering a response by M. Baranski, F.B. Bastos and M. van den Brink; C. Walter; D. Sarmiento and J.H.H. Weiler; A. Zhang; R.A. Miller; A. Hatje. My contribution here was F.C. Mayer, ‘Auf dem Weg zum Richterfaustrecht?’, 7 May 2020, ⟨verfassungsblog.de/auf-dem-weg-zum-richterfaustrecht/⟩.

⁵ EU affairs committee, Committee documents 19(21)97 (C. Walter), 99 (B. Wegener), 100 (C.-D. Classen), 101 (C. Calliess) and 103 (F.C. Mayer). Some of these experts went on to publish their statements in law reviews, see B. Wegener, ‘Karlsruher Unheil’, 55 Europarecht (2020) p. 347; C. Calliess, ‘Konfrontation statt Kooperation zwischen BVerfG und EuGH?’, 39 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (2020) p. 897; F.C. Mayer, ‘Der Ultra vires-Akt’, 75 Juristenzeitung (2020) p. 725.

⁶ T. Ackermann, ‘Not Mastering the Treaties: The German Federal Constitutional Court’s PSPP judgment’, 57 CMLR (2020) p. 965; U. Karpenstein, ‘Zu Nebenwirkungen und Risiken: Das EZB-Anleihenkaufprogramm vor dem BVerfG’, 31 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2019) p. 705; D. Grimm, ‘Eine neue Superinstanz in der EU?’, 53 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (2020) p. 129; G. Krings, ‘Die Kompetenzkontrolle der EU – einer muss es ja machen’ 53 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (2020) p. 160; W. Kahl, ‘Optimierungspotenzial im “Kooperationsverhältnis” zwischen EuGH und BVerfG’, 39 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (2020) p. 824; M. Nettesheim, ‘Das PSPP-Urteil des BVerfG – ein Angriff auf die EU?’, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2020) p. 1631; F. Schorkopf, ‘Wer wandelt die Verfassung?’, 75 Juristenzeitung (2020) p. 7.

⁷ See 12 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2020) p. 489 ff.) with short contributions by K. Barley; H. Siekmann; S. Simon and H. Rathke; T. Möllers; K. F. Gärditz; I. Pernice; P. Meier-Beck; M. Ludwigs; F. Kainer; A. Geiger and J. Bartels; M. Pießkalla; S. Wernicke and a critical commentary by J. Dietze, M. Kellerbauer, M. Klamert, L. Malferrari, T. Scharf, D. Schnichels, signed by J. Basedow, P. Behrens, G. Berrisch, J. Ceyssens, S. Griller, H. Hofmann, S. Kalss, K. Langenbucher, L.D. Loacker, T. Öhlinger, I. Pernice, J. Schmidt, F. Schurr, G. Schwendinger, D. Thym, A. von Bonin and R. van der Hout.

⁸ See 21 German Law Journal (2020) p. 944 ff with a vast array of views by D. Grimm; F. Schorkopf; I. Feichtner; K. Schneider; M. Goldmann; M. Wendel; N. Petersen; S. Simon and H. Rathke; T. Violante; J. Lindeboom; M. Avbelj; V. Perju. My contribution there was F.C. Mayer, ‘To Boldly Go Where No Court Has Gone Before’, 21 German Law Journal (2020) p. 1116 ff.

⁹ See e.g. H. Prantl, ‘Der Staat Europa’, SZ, 9 May 2010 p. 5; W. Schroeder, ‘Karlsruher EZB-Urteil: Rechthaberei mit Folgen’, Der Standard, 11 May 2020; C. Landfried, ‘Verfassungsgerichte sind nicht da zur Korrektur der Europapolitik’, NZZ, 18 June 2020 p. 8.

¹⁰ The tone was set the day after the ruling by R. Müller, ‘Die Gefolgschaft verweigert’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 May 2020 p. 1 and online-only commentaries on ⟨faz.net/einspruch⟩ by F. Schorkopf, ‘Antwort auf eine entgrenzte Politik’, 8 May 2020 and M. Ludwigs, ‘Zeit für Ehrlichkeit’, 15 May 2020. Then followed D. Grimm, ‘Jetzt war es so weit’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 May 2020 p. 9 and P. Kirchhof, ‘Chance für Europa’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 May 2020 p. 6, albeit on the same page with critical comments from former German ECJ judge G. Hirsch, ‘Zwei Wächter in Schilda’, and former German ECHR judge A. Nussberger, ‘Die Crux des letzten Wortes’, ibid. Critique of the ruling was voiced in the economic section of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, though: see P. Bofinger, M. Hellwig, M. Hüther, M. Schnitzer, M. Schularick and G. Wolff, ‘Gefahr für die Unabhängigkeit der Notenbank’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 May 2020 p. 18. The ‘Staat und Recht’ section fired back with twice as many professors, albeit mostly emeriti, and not exactly all of them legal experts, in C.-W. Canaris, O. Höffe, W. Kahl, P. Graf Kielmansegg, G. Kirchhof, A. Rödder, S. Röser, R. Schmidt, E. Schmidt-Aßmann, H.-W. Sinn, T. Vesting, N. von Bomhard and F.-C. Zeitler, ‘Auf die europäischen Grundlagen besinnen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 June 2020 p. 7.

¹¹ See J.A. Kämmerer, ‘Ein problematisches Urteil’, 6 June 2020 on ⟨faz.net/einspruch⟩; and finally, in July, a critique of the ruling by a group of younger law professors written weeks earlier found its way into the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, see H.P. Aust, M. Bäcker, M. Hailbronner, C. Herrmann, J.A. Kämmerer, M. Kotzur, A.K. Mangold, M. Payandeh, H. Sauer, A. v. Ungern-Sternberg and M. Wendel, ‘Wider die Angst’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 July 2020 p. 7. The series concluded with a private law emeritus – defending the Court, C.-W. Canaris, ‘Ohne demokratische Legitimation’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 August 2020 p. 6.

¹² See P.M. Huber, ‘Das EZB-Urteil war zwingend’ (Interview), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 May 2020, p. 2; P.M. Huber, ‘Spieler auf Augenhöhe’ (Interview), SZ, 13 May 2020, p. 5; A. Voßkuhle, ‘Erfolg ist eher kalt’ (Interview), Die Zeit, 14 May 2020, p. 6. See also the statements by judge rapporteur Huber in a webinar available on YouTube, below, n. 108 and the account of Judge Maidowski trying to explain and defend the ruling in a meeting of the German-Polish judges’ association 26 May 2020, ‘Verfassungsrichter Dr. Ulrich Maidowski erklärt: Anders als die polnische Regierung will das Bundesverfassungsgericht mehr Kontrolle durch den Europäischen Gerichtshof, nicht weniger’, ⟨dprv.eu⟩. And of course, see also former judges D. Grimm and P. Kirchhof, supra n. 10, in defence of their colleagues.

¹³ The dissenting judge did not file a dissenting opinion and he or she is not known. There was some speculation that the dissent came from the group of dissenters in the UPC case (BVerfG, 13 February 2020, 2 BvR 739/17, Unified Patent Court Agreement), decided earlier in 2020. In that case three judges (Maidowski, König, Langenfeld) were prepared to put an end to the never-ending expansion of standing in EU-related cases, based on Art. 38 Basic Law. Considering extra-judicial statements by judges (supra n. 12) most observers seem to believe that most likely the dissent came from Judge König or Judge Langenfeld, but again, this is just a speculative theory. Note that with the departure of Judge Voßkuhle in July 2020 and the new judge, Astrid Wallrabenstein, presenting herself at least not as a eurosceptic (see the quotes in ‘New Kids in Karlsruhe’, FAS, 21 June 2020 p. 6), majorities may shift in the Second Senate.

¹⁴ The European Court of Justice had already been called upon by the Second Senate in 2014 with regard to the European Central Bank’s OMT programme. In a broader sense, both programmes are measures in the Euro crisis, but they differ significantly: while Outright Monetary Transactions were limited only to Member States in crisis, the PSPP as ‘Quantitative easing’ is not limited to these states and is part of the more traditional repertoire of central bank tools.

¹⁵ See e.g. Unified Patent Court Agreement, supra n. 13.

¹⁶ It is worth looking at the wording of Art. 38 Basic Law in order to understand to what extent the interpretation given to this provision by the German Constitutional Court in the context of standing is far-fetched: ‘(1) Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections. They shall be representatives of the whole people, not bound by orders or instructions, and responsible only to their conscience.

(2) Any person who has attained the age of eighteen shall be entitled to vote; any person who has attained the age of majority may be elected.

(3) Details shall be regulated by a federal law’.

¹⁷ Again, the wording of Art. 79 Basic Law gives no indication of such a far-reaching scope of application: ‘(1) This Basic Law may be amended only by a law expressly amending or supplementing its text. In the case of an international treaty regarding a peace settlement, the preparation of a peace settlement, or the phasing out of an occupation regime, or designed to promote the defence of the Federal Republic, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of making clear that the provisions of this Basic Law do not preclude the conclusion and entry into force of the treaty, to add language to the Basic Law that merely makes this clarification.

(2) Any such law shall be carried by two thirds of the Members of the Bundestag and two thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat.

(3) Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 [inter alia the principle of democracy] shall be inadmissible’.

¹⁸ All English language citations are taken from the English language version of the ruling published on the website of the Federal Constitutional Court, supra, n. 2.

¹⁹ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 184.

²⁰ Note, though, that headnotes are technically not part of the judgment and are not legally binding; they may best be explained as some kind of executive summary provided by the court for the hasty reader.

²¹ ECJ 11 December 2018, Case C-493/17, Weiss et al., EU:C:2018:1000.

²² BVerfG, supra, n. 2, paras. 162, 163.

²³ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, paras. 176, 177.

²⁴ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 235.

²⁵ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 235.

²⁶ See in greater detail F.C. Mayer, ‘Die drei Dimensionen der europäischen Kompetenzdebatte’, 61 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2001) p. 577.

²⁷ For a French example which is also interesting because of the strategy of using a national parliament to voice competence concerns, see the Debré proposal in the French National Assembly ‘Proposition de loi portant rétablissement de la souveraineté de la République en matière d’énergie nucléaire’, AN (Sixième législature, Deuxième session extraordinaire de 1978-1979), Document No. 917; see in that context also the editorial ‘Quis custodiet the European Court of Justice?’, 30 CMLR (1993) p. 899.

²⁸ See on this and the following account, in particular the role of the German Länder, Mayer, supra n. 26, p. 577 ff, with further references. There is some evidence that the Länder concern is, in reality, not about EU legislation, but mostly about regional economic policy. Besides European structural policy, it is the state aid control by the Commission which – from a Länder point of view – threatens to cut off one of the few areas of leeway to be economically competitive as a region by offering incentives for investment etc.

²⁹ See on this F.C. Mayer, ‘Competences reloaded’, 3 ICON (2005) p. 493 at p. 504 ff.

³⁰ Former Ministerpräsident Peter Müller from Saarland and former Minister of the Interior of Thuringia Peter Huber who also served as the judge rapporteur in the PSPP case.

³¹ This could be translated as ‘vanished powers’: D. Simon, Le système juridique communautaire, 3rd edn. (PUF Droit 2001) p. 83 ff with reference to V. Constantinesco, Compétences et pouvoirs dans les Communautés européennes (LGDJ 1974) p. 231 ff and p. 248.

³² See UK Government Services, ‘Review of the balance competences’, ⟨www.gov.uk/guidance/review-of-the-balance-of-competences⟩, visited 14 December 2020.

³³ See for more detail on this F.C. Mayer, Die Europäische Union als Präsidialregime (forthcoming).

³⁴ BVerfG 12 October 1993, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92, Maastricht, BVerfGE vol. 89, p. 155 at p. 188. See on this H. Sauer, Jurisdiktionskonflikte in Mehrebenensystemen (Springer 2008) p. 179 ff. For an overview of the case law of the BVerfG in European matters see also F.C. Mayer, ‘Judicial Power and European Integration. The Case of Germany’, in C. Landfried (ed.), Judicial Power (Cambridge University Press 2019) p. 183. For a recent comprehensive comparative study see A. Lang, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der vernetzten Weltordnung (Springer 2020).

³⁵ Literally: ‘acts breaking out’.

³⁶ For the argument that the ECJ’s Alcan decision (ECJ 20 March 1997, Case C-24/95, Land Rheinland-Pfalz v Alcan Deutschland (1997) ECR I-1591) was an ultra vires act see R. Scholz, ‘Zum Verhältnis von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Verwaltungsverfahrensrecht’, 51 DÖV (1998) p. 261. Another example is the ultra vires critique of the ECJ’s case law on the precedence of EU law over national administrative court procedures by F. Schoch, 112 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (1997) p. 289 at p. 294 ff.

³⁷ BVerfG 17 February 2000, 2 BvR 1210/98, Alcan, 53 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2000) p. 2015.

³⁸ BVerfG 7 June 2000, 2 BvL 1/97, Banana regulation, BVerfGE vol. 102, p.147.

³⁹ BVerfG 30 June 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 et al., Lisbon, BVerfGE vol. 123, p. 267 at p. 353 ff.

⁴⁰ On this see F.C. Mayer, ‘Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction’, in A. von Bogdandy et al., Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd edn. (Hart Publishing 2010) p. 399 at p. 431; see also F.C. Mayer, ‘Rashomon in Karlsruhe – A Reflection on Democracy and Identity in the European Union’, 9 ICON (2011) p. 757.

⁴¹ Lisbon, supra n. 39, at p. 358 para. 249. In the words of the Court this list includes ‘citizenship, the civil and the military monopoly on the use of force, revenue and expenditure including external financing and all elements of encroachment that are decisive for the realisation of fundamental rights […]. These important areas also include cultural issues such as the disposition of language, the shaping of circumstances concerning the family and education, the ordering of the freedom of opinion, press and of association and the dealing with the profession of faith or ideology’.

⁴² BVerfG 6 July 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell, BVerfGE vol. 126, p. 286 at p. 303 ff On this ruling see F.C. Mayer and M. Walter, ‘Die Europarechtsfreundlichkeit des BVerfG nach dem Honeywell-Beschluss’, 33 Jura (2011) p. 532 with further references. The case had been pending for four years; the plaintiffs argued that the 2005 Mangold decision of the ECJ (22 November 2005, Case C-144/04, Mangold (2005) ECR I-9981) was ultra vires.

⁴³ See the dissenting opinion by Judge Landau, who accused the Senate majority of setting the bar for ultra vires acts too high, and of departing from the Lisbon decision in that respect: Honeywell, supra n. 42, at p. 318.

⁴⁴ OMT (reference), supra n. 1, at p. 392 ff and BVerfG 21 June 2016, 2 BvR 2728/13 et al., 2 BvE 13/13, OMT, BVerfGE vol. 142, p. 123 at p. 199 ff. On new nuances of the ultra vires doctrine of the Court see M. Wendel, ‘Kompetenzrechtliche Grenzgänge: Karlsruhes Ultra-vires-Vorlage an den EuGH’, 74 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (2014) p. 615 at p. 627 ff.

⁴⁵ The cases are still pending: 2 BvR 1368/16, 2 BvR 1444/16, 2 BvR 1482/16, 2 BvE 3/16 and, separately, 2 BvE 4/16 on CETA; 2 BvR 882/19 and 2 BvR 966/19 on EUSFTA.

⁴⁶ BVerfG 7 September 2011, 2 BvR 987/10 et al., Greece and EFSF; BVerfGE vol. 129, p. 124 ff; BVerfG 28 February 2012, 2 BvE 8/11, Committee of Nine, BVerfGE vol. 130, p. 318 ff; BVerfG 19 June 2012, 2 BvE 4/11, ESM, BVerfGE vol. 131, p. 152 ff; BVerfG 12 September 2012, 2 BvR 1390/12 et al., ESM and Fiscal Compact, BVerfGE vol. 132, p. 195 ff.

⁴⁷ BVerfG 9 November 2011, 2 BvC 4/10 et al., Five-Percent-Threshold, BVerfGE vol. 129, p. 300 ff and BVerfG 26 February 2014, 2 BvE 2/13 et al., 2 BvR 2220, 2221, 2238/13, Three-Percent-Threshold, BVerfGE vol. 135, p. 259 ff.

⁴⁸ Note that this had been quite different in the Maastricht decision, where the Court saw the European strand of democracy, embodied by the directly elected European Parliament, on an equal footing with the Member State mechanisms of democracy and legitimacy: ‘provision of democratic legitimacy via the European Parliament, elected by the citizens of the Member States’: Maastricht, supra n. 34, at p. 185.

⁴⁹ BVerfG 24 April 2013, 1 BvR 1215/07, Anti-terror database, BVerfGE vol. 133, p. 277 at p. 316.

⁵⁰ See on that the relevant provisions in Section 16 of the Statute on the Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz.

⁵¹ BVerfG 6 November 2019, 1 BvR 16/13 and 1 BvR 276/17, Right to be forgotten I and II, 73 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2020) p. 300 and 314.

⁵² In the ECJ proceedings, the Italian government even argued that the German preliminary reference in the PSPP case was inadmissible, because – in their view – the German court indicated that it was not prepared to accept an ECJ decision as binding, insisting on a final decision-making power, Weiss et al., supra n. 21, para. 18.

⁵³ See F.C. Mayer, Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztentscheidung (C.H. Beck 2000) passim; Mayer, ‘Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction’, in von Bogdandy et al., supra n. 40, p. 400 ff.

⁵⁴ According to M. Usteri, Theorie des Bundesstaates (Schulthess 1954) p. 96 para. 56, the term can be traced back to C. Böhlau, Competenz-Competenz? (Veit 1869).

⁵⁵ J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The State “über alles”’, in O. Due et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Ulrich Everling (Nomos 1995) p. 1652: ‘judicial competence-competence’.

⁵⁶ Former German ECJ judge G. Hirsch, ‘Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Kooperation oder Konfrontation?’, 49 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1996) p. 2457.

⁵⁷ C. Tomuschat, ‘Die Europäische Union unter der Aufsicht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, 20 EuGRZ (1993) p. 489 at p. 494.

⁵⁸ B. Kahl, ‘Europäische Union: Bundesstaat – Staatenbund – Staatenverbund?’, 33 Der Staat (1994) p. 241 at p. 243.

⁵⁹ D. Chalmers, ‘Judicial Preferences and the Community Legal Order’, 60 Modern Law Review (1997) p. 164.

⁶⁰ H.D. Jarass, ‘Die Kompetenzverteilung zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und den Mitgliedstaaten’, 121 AöR (1996) p. 173 at p. 198 ff.

⁶¹ K. Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism’, 38 American Journal of Comparative Law (1990) p. 205 at p. 253 with reference to P.A. Freund, ‘Umpiring the Federal System’, 54 Columbia Law Review (1954) p. 561.

⁶² See for this Mayer (2000), supra n. 53, p. 283 ff.

⁶³ H. Steinberger, ‘Die Europäische Union im Lichte der Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 12. Oktober 1993’, in U. Beyerlin et. al. (eds.), Festschrift für Rudolf Bernhardt (Springer 1995) p. 1330.

⁶⁴ BVerfG 12 October 1993, 2 BvR 211 BvR 16/13 and 1 BvR 276/1734, 2159/92, Maastricht, BVerfGE vol. 89, p. 155 at p. 189; the term ‘ausbrechen’ was already used in BVerfG 8 April 1987, 2 BvR 687/85, Kloppenburg, BVerfGE vol. 75, p. 223 at p. 242.

⁶⁵ Lisbon, supra n. 39, at p. 353.

⁶⁶ See Mayer (2000), supra n. 53, p. 26, regarding ultra vires acts by courts and the distinction between level-immanent and level-transcendent ultra vires acts, which – as far as the term is concerned – draws on the distinction between constitution-immanent and constitution-transcendent limitations to constitutional amendment, see for this P. Pernthaler, Der Verfassungskern (Manz 1998) p. 4 with further references, in particular to A. Merkl, ‘Das Problem der Rechtskontinuität und die Forderung des einheitlichen rechtlichen Weltbildes’, 5 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (1926) p. 497.

⁶⁷ There is an established distinction in German Federal theory between Verbandskompetenz (the powers attributed to a level of public authority) and Organkompetenz (the powers attributed to an institution of that level).

⁶⁸ US Supreme Court, United States v Alfonso Lopez Jr.,115 S. Ct. 1624.

⁶⁹ Of course, there may be a case where an act cannot be based on competence in the narrow sense and in addition turns out to be formally deficient, violating higher law etc.

⁷⁰ For details in this respect see F.C. Mayer, ‘Article 19 TEU’, in E. Grabitz et al. (eds.), Das Recht der Europäischen Union (C.H. Beck 2019) supplement no. 66.

⁷¹ ECJ 22 October 1987, Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost (1987) ECR 4199 at p. 4230 ff.

⁷² C.F. Ophüls, ‘Juristische Grundgedanken des Schumanplans’, 4 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1951) p. 289 at p. 291; C.F. Ophüls, ‘Zur ideengeschichtlichen Herkunft der Gemeinschaftsverfassung’, in E. von Caemmerer et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Walter Hallstein (Vittorio Klostermann 1966) p. 387 at p. 390, 396.

⁷³ European Commission, 10 May 2020, statement by President von der Leyen, ⟨ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_20_846⟩, visited 14 December 2020.

⁷⁴ See B.-O. Bryde, ‘Transnationale Rechtsstaatlichkeit’, in C. Hohmann-Dennhardt et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Renate Jaeger (N.P. Engel Verlag 2011) p. 65 at p. 70 ‘the Federal Republic would have to be condemned’; T. Giegerich, ‘The Federal Constitutional Court’s Judgment on the Treaty of Lisbon: The Last Word (German) Wisdom Ever Has to Say on a United Europe?’, 52 German Yearbook of International Law (2009) p. 9 at p. 25; C. Hillgruber, ‘Grenzen der Rechtsfortbildung durch den EuGH – Hat Europarecht Methode?’, in T. von Danwitz et al. (eds.), Auf dem Wege zu einer europäischen Staatlichkeit (Boorberg 1993) p. 45 fn. 40 (‘final decision of the ECJ inevitable’).

⁷⁵ Mentioned even in Honeywell, supra n. 42, at p. 303.

⁷⁶ Another path to the ECJ leads via a state liability procedure in the German civil courts, the competent courts for state liability in the German legal order, in which the plaintiff sues Germany for damage caused by the qualified breach of European law by the Federal Constitutional Court, the qualified breach being the disregarding of the preliminary decision of the ECJ. See for EU law-induced state liability for the domestic court’s failure to respect EU law, ECJ 30 September 2003, Case C-224/01, Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich (2003) ECR I-10239; ECJ 13 June 2006, Case C-173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo v Repubblica italiana (2006) ECR I-5177.

⁷⁷ An example is the Hendrix GmbH (Pingo-Hähnchen) case. Following a non-reference by the Bundesgerichtshof, the German supreme court on private law, BGH, 11 May 1989, I ZR 163/88, the Commission initiated preliminary proceedings according to Art. 169 EC (A/90/0406), then issued a formal notice (3 August 1990, SG (90)/D/25672 figure V). There, acknowledging judicial independence, the Commission requested the promotion of its legal interpretation among the respective courts and called for legislative measures in case of repeated non-referral. The case ended there. See for some background G. Meier, ‘Zur Einwirkung des Gemeinschaftsrechts auf nationales Verfahrensrecht im Falle höchstrichterlicher Vertragsverletzungen’, 2 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (1991) p. 11 with further references; J. Sack, ‘Verstoßverfahren und höchstrichterliche Vertragsverletzungen. Eine Klarstellung’, 2 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (1991) p. 246. The Commission’s earlier perspective is captured in an answer to a Parliamentary question in 1983, [1983] OJ C 268, p. 25.

⁷⁸ See ECJ 9 December 2003, Case C-129/00, Commission v Italy (2003) ECR I-14637. See also the infringement procedure against Sweden, 2003/2161, C (2004) 3899, and before that the formal notice by the Commission dated 1 April 2004 (SG (2004) D/201417). No further steps were taken after an amendment of the Swedish laws.

⁷⁹ ECJ 4 October 2018, Case C-416/17, Accor, ECLI:EU:C:2018:811.

⁸⁰ Note that Art. 131 TFEU requests every Member State to ensure that, as to the European Central Bank, its national laws are in line with the Treaties. This could affect the statute that defines e.g. standing of plaintiffs, the Statute on the Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz.

⁸¹ ECJ 6 October 1982, Case 283/81, CILFIT (1982) ECR 3415.

⁸² See Bryde, supra n. 74, p. 71, at fn. 23: ‘The ‘actio popularis’ introduced in the Maastricht decision and extended in the Lisbon decision can indeed be seen as such a transgression of competences’.

⁸³ Honeywell, supra n. 42, at p. 303.

⁸⁴ Ibid. I am quoting from the translation available at the website of the Federal Constitutional Court, see supra n. 2.

⁸⁵ Honeywell, supra n. 42, at p. 303.

⁸⁶ Ibid., at p. 286.

⁸⁷ Ibid., and at Headnote 1.

⁸⁸ Honeywell, supra n. 42, at p. 306.

⁸⁹ Weiss et al., supra n. 21, para 37.

⁹⁰ Ibid., para. 71.

⁹¹ Ibid., para. 73.

⁹² ECJ 10 July 2003, Case C-11/00, Commission v ECB, EU:C:2003:395, para. 134.

⁹³ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 119.

⁹⁴ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 116.

⁹⁵ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 117.

⁹⁶ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 119.

⁹⁷ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 153.

⁹⁸ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 118.

⁹⁹ The ECJ judgment Weiss et al. has been widely discussed, see R. Broemel, ‘Unionsrechtlicher Rahmen währungspolitischer Maßnahmen des ESZB’, 35 Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung (2019) p. 276; C. Dornacher, ‘Schlusskapitel oder Zwischenakt?’, 54 Europarecht (2019) p. 546 (this author stresses that the ECJ standard is ‘correct’); F. Heide, ‘Anmerkung, EuGH, Urteil v. 11. 12. 2018 – C-493/17 H. Weiss u. a.’, 74 Juristenzeitung (2019) p. 305; M. Ludwigs, ‘Das PSPP-Urteil des EuGH als Provokation der Eskalation’, EWS (2019) p. 1; P.-C. Müller-Graff, ‘Anmerkung, EuGH: Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht: Anleihenkaufprogramm der EZB zulässig’, 30 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2019) p. 172 (who argues that the ECJ’s generous proportionality test can be justified by the ECJ’s duty to respect the treaty’s choice to attribute the primary political responsibility to the institution which also has expertise, the European Central Bank); M. Dawson and A. Bobić, ‘Quantitative Easing at the Court of Justice – Doing whatever it takes to save the Euro: Weiss and Others’, 56 CMLR (2019) p. 1004 (despite a critical reading of the ECJ’s proportionality approach – which I don’t find convincing– the authors don’t see arbitrariness in the ECJ decision); A. Mooij ‘The Weiss judgment: The Court’s further clarification of the ECB’s legal framework’, 26 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2019) p. 449; F. Martucci, Décisions et commentaires (Bruylant 2019) p. 1009 at p. 1033; B. Raganelli ‘Acquisto di titoli del debito sovrano sui mercati secondari, mandato della BCE e diritto dell’Unione. Nota a Corte di giustizia dell‘Unione europea, sentenza 11/12/2018, n. C-493/17’, 144 Il Foro italiano (2019) p. 172; J. Calvo Vérgez, ‘La aprobación de la Directiva (UE) 2017/952, por la que se modifica la Directiva antielusión fiscal, y su proyección sobre los llamados mecanismos híbridos’, 46 Revista Aranzadi Unión Europea (2019) p. 27.

¹⁰⁰ There is only a reference to the mostly critical article on Weiss by M. Dawson and A. Bobić. A sound methodological assessment of the literature would have required the Senate to address the question why ultra vires was not a widespread critique in academic writing on the case.

¹⁰¹ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 178.

¹⁰² The expectation that the ECJ should intervene in such a case is a different discussion to the one at stake here, which is about a national court basically substituting itself for the ECJ.

¹⁰³ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 178: ‘The ECB’s actions must therefore be qualified as an ultra-vires act’.

¹⁰⁴ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, paras. 157, 178.

¹⁰⁵ For a similar view see A. Champsaur, ‘Opinion: The German Constitutional Court has fallen into its own trap’, IFLR, 15 May 2020, ⟨www.iflr.com/Article/3932835/Opinion-The-German-Constitutional-Court-has-fallen-into-its-own-trap.html⟩, visited 14 December 2020.

¹⁰⁶ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 110.

¹⁰⁷ BVerfG 18 July 2017, 2 BvR 859, 1651, 2006/15, 980/16, PSPP (reference) BVerfGE vol. 146, p. 216 at p. 261 ff.

¹⁰⁸ That’s also how the judge rapporteur in the case tells the story: P.M. Huber, ‘Nach dem EZB-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts: Ist die europäische Rechtsgemeinschaft in Gefahr?’, The Greens/EFA in the EP, Webinar 18 June 2020, ⟨www.youtube.com/watch?v=dxtMK3XaZlM⟩, visited 14 December 2020.

¹⁰⁹ AG Cruz Villalón 14 January 2015, Case 62/14, Opinion 62/14 Gauweiler et al. – OMT, EU:C:2015:7, para. 159 ff.

¹¹⁰ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 112.

¹¹¹ P.M. Huber, Interview, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 May 2020, p. 5 In German: ‘Wenn wir freundlicher argumentiert hätten, hätten die Tatbestandsvoraussetzungen für einen Ultra vires-Akt nicht vorgelegen’.

¹¹² In German: Eine Antwort ‘wie man sie auch dem Amtsgericht Buxtehude auf eine schnell gemachte Vorlage geben würde’, Webinar of 18 June 2020, supra n. 108, at 0:20:45 and 2:21:05.

¹¹³ A. Voßkuhle, ‘Der europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund’, 29 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (2010) p. 1.

¹¹⁴ The concept refers to the Verfassungsverbund-Staatenverbund controversy. Staatenverbund is the language of the Federal Constitutional Court in the 1993 Maastricht decision, emphasising the Staat. The term Verfassungsverbund with an emphasis on constitution was coined in response by I. Pernice, ‘Bestandssicherung der Verfassungen’, in R. Bieber and P. Widmer (eds), L’espace constitutionnel européen (Schulthess 1995) p. 225 at p. 261 ff. Both concepts are difficult to translate. The term multilevel constitutionalism captures only a part of the concept, see I. Pernice, ‘Constitutional Law Implications for a State Participating in a Process of Regional Integration’, in E. Riedel (ed.), German Reports. XV. International Congress on Comparative Law (1998) p. 40 ff; for a French version of the concept as constitution composée, see I. Pernice and F.C. Mayer, ‘De la constitution composée de l’Europe’, 36 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (2000) p. 623 ff.

¹¹⁵ A. Voßkuhle, ‘Multilevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts – Der europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund’, 6 EuConst (2010) p. 175.

¹¹⁶ BVerfG, supra, n. 2, para. 180 ff.

¹¹⁷ I explored this some time ago in my Staatsrechtslehrervortrag: F.C. Mayer ‘Verfassung im Nationalstaat: Von der Gesamtordnung zur europäischen Teilordnung?’, 75 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (2016) p. 7.

¹¹⁸ See on national constitutional identity Mayer (2000), supra n. 53, p. 341 ff. Looking at the certification procedure established in the US between US Supreme Court and State Supreme Court, I discuss the possibility of introducing a similar bi-directional consulting mechanism on identity issues between the ECJ and the highest national courts, p. 312 and 340; discussed in more detail in Mayer, supra n. 26, p. 591 ff.

¹¹⁹ The following elements of critique are explored in greater detail in F.C. Mayer, ‘Auf dem Weg zum Richterfaustrecht?’, Verfassungsblog, ⟨verfassungsblog.de/auf-dem-weg-zum-richterfaustrecht⟩, visited 14 December 2020 (English version: F.C. Mayer, ‘To Boldly Go Where No Court Has Gone Before’, 21 German Law Journal (2020) p. 1116 ff), and Mayer, ‘Stellungnahme zur Öffentlichen Anhörung’, supra n. 5, Committee Document 19(21)103.

¹²⁰ About the legal control and limits of legal independence of the European Central Bank see Commission v ECB, supra n. 92, para. 134.

¹²¹ See the detailed account at H. James, Making the European Monetary Union (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2012) passim, in particular p. 187, 265 ff, 270 ff.

¹²² That was a last minute amendment to Art. 88 Basic Law, introduced in the Legal Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag, Bundestag Drucksache 12/3896, p. 21 ff. See in that context also BVerfG 31 March 1998, 2 BvR 1877/97 and 50/98, Euro, BVerfGE vol. 97, p. 350 at p. 372, para. 89.

¹²³ See A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Yale University Press 1962).

¹²⁴ Even if the Court refers to a rather technical understanding of arbitrariness (Willkür, BVerfG, supra, n. 6, para. Judgment of May 05, 2020 at Headnote 2, paras. 112, 118) within the framework of an established case law on constitutional law limits for courts, the detrimental linguistic effect of a literal translation of the term Willkür should have been taken into consideration. German recent history has seen Willkürgerichte, arbitrary courts. The ECJ is no such arbitrary court.

¹²⁵ See on this the leading textbook on fundamental rights law in Germany, T. Kingreen and R. Poscher, Grundrechte. Staatsrecht II, 35^th edn. (C.F. Müller 2019) para. 344: ‘Daher läuft die Prüfung der Verhältnismäßigkeit im engeren Sinne stets Gefahr, bei allem Bemühen um Rationalität die subjektiven Urteile und Vorurteile des Prüfenden zur Geltung zu bringen’. [Therefore, the test of proportionality in the narrower sense – that is the balancing test at a third level of scrutiny, which comes after the first level question on the suitability of a measure to reach an objective and the second level question on the necessity of a measure to reach an objective – always runs the risk, in all efforts to achieve rationality, of emphasising the subjective judgments and prejudices of the examiner.]

¹²⁶ See the rather harsh commentary on the Court’s OMT decision: ‘very amateuristic course in monetary politics’, C. Secondat et al., ‘The German Constitutional Court’s Decision about the European Central Bank’s OMT Mechanism: A Masterpiece of Judicial Arrogance’, European Policy Briefs No. 30 (April 2014) p. 4.

¹²⁷ See supra n. 12, Judge Maidowski explaining this aspect of the ruling to Polish colleagues.

¹²⁸ See S. Detjen, ‘EZB-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts: Gefährliche Textbausteine aus Karlsruhe’. Comment 5 May 2020, Deutschlandfunk, ⟨ondemand-mp3.dradio.de/file/dradio/2020/05/05/gefaehrliche_textbau-steine_aus_karlsruhe_dlf_20200505_1907_5edbc2aa.mp3⟩, visited 17 December 2020. The Polish Prime Minister Morawiecki described the BVerfG’s judgement as one of the most important in the history of the EU, ‘EU droht Deutschland mit Verfahren’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 May 2020, ⟨www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/eu-droht-deutschland-mit-vertragsverletzungsverfahren-16762097.html⟩, visited 14 December 2020.

¹²⁹ Judge Lübbe-Wolff saw this coming in her dissenting opinion on the OMT reference: ‘Walking in the desert’, Anticipated in OMT (reference), supra n. 1, at p. 426 (dissenting opinion Lübbe-Wolff).

¹³⁰ See Section 35 Statute on the Federal Constitutional Court, Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz.

¹³¹ President Koen Lenaerts, ‘Europese Hof komt meer center stage’ (Interview), NRC Handelsblad, 17 May 2020, ⟨www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2020/05/17/president-koen-lenaerts-europese-hof-komt-meer-center-stage-a4000000⟩, visited 14 December 2020.

¹³² See ⟨www.ecb.europa.eu/press/accounts/2020/html/ecb.mg200625~fd97330d5f.en.html⟩, visited 14 December 2020.

¹³³ Bundestag Drucksache 19/20621.

¹³⁴ With a new judge on the bench, the majorities on EU-related cases in the Second Senate may change, see supra n. 13.

¹³⁵ Decision (EU) 2020/440 of the European Central Bank of 24 March 2020 on a temporary pandemic emergency purchase programme (ECB/2020/17).

¹³⁶ Huber, supra n. 111. For a critical analysis of the PSPP interviews given by BVerfG-Judges Voßkuhle and Huber and further by ECJ President Lenaerts, see ‘Verfassungsrichter in der Defensive’, Verfassungsblog, 21 May 2020, ⟨verfassungsblog.de/verfassungsrichter-in-der-defensive/⟩, visited 14 December 2020.

¹³⁷ G. Hirsch, ‘Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Kooperation oder Konfrontation?’, 49 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1996) p. 2457.

¹³⁸ See for example C. Tomuschat, ‘Die Europäische Union unter der Aufsicht des BVerfG’, 20 Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift (1993) p. 489 at p. 494 ff; G. C. Rodríguez Iglesias, ‘Zur ‘Verfassung’ der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’, 23 Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift (1996) p. 125 at p. 127. Further references in Mayer (2000), supra n. 53, p. 117.

¹³⁹ T. Schilling, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible Foundations’, 37 Harvard International Law Journal (1996) p. 389; see also A. Paulus, ‘Kompetenzüberschreitende Akte von Organen der Europäischen Union’, in B. Simma and C. Schulte (eds.), Akten des 23. Österreichischen Völkerrechtstages (Linde Verlag 1999) p. 49 and Bryde, supra n. 74, p. 70 ff.

¹⁴⁰ See for example M. Heintzen, ‘Die “Herrschaft” über die Europäischen Gemeinschaftsverträge – Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europäischer Gerichtshof auf Konfliktkurs?’, 119 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts (1994) p. 564; N. MacCormick, ‘The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now’, 1 European Law Journal (1995) p. 259.

¹⁴¹ See on this A. Verdross, Völkerrecht, 2^nd edn. (Springer 1950) p. 24 ff, with reference to H. Kelsen.

¹⁴² J. Isensee, ‘Vorrang des Europarechts und deutsche Verfassungsvorbehalte’, in J. Burmeister et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Klaus Stern (C.H. Beck 1997) p. 1265.

¹⁴³ A Proposal for a European Constitution (European Constitutional Group 1993) p. 13.

¹⁴⁴ J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The European Union Belongs to its Citizens: Three Immodest Proposals’, 22 European Law Review (1997) p. 150 at p. 155; see also J.H.H Weiler et al., ‘European Democracy and its Critique’, 18 West European Politics (1995) p. 4 at p. 38.

¹⁴⁵ P.L. Lindseth, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 Columbia Law Review (1999) p. 628 at p. 731 ff.

¹⁴⁶ I. Pernice, ‘Kompetenzabgrenzung im Europäischen Verfassungsverbund’, 55 Juristenzeitung (2000) p. 866 at p. 874 and p. 876.

¹⁴⁷ Mayer (2000), supra n. 53, p. 337.

¹⁴⁸ See S. Broß, ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht – Europäischer Gerichtshof – Europäischer Gerichtshof für Kompetenzkonflikte’, 92 VerwArch (2001) p. 425; U. Di Fabio, ‘Ist die Staatswerdung Europas unausweichlich?’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2001) p. 8. For more details on the different proposals see Mayer, supra n. 26, p. 606 ff.

¹⁴⁹ German ECJ Judge Colneric once presented a detailed account of the court’s jurisprudence in the field of control of competences which explains how the European Court of Justice embraces this role and why perceptions of the ECJ on that matter may be different: N. Colneric, ‘Der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften als Kompetenzgericht’, 13 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2002) p.709.

¹⁵⁰ See the second Opinion of the ECJ regarding an accession of the EU to the ECHR, ECJ 18 December 2014, Case 2/13, Opinion 2/13 (ECHR-Accession), EU:C:2014:2454.

¹⁵¹ Several Member States have voiced constitutional reservations with regard to EU law. But there are only two examples known of ultra vires findings by national courts (Czech Constitutional Court 31 January 2012, Case Pl. ÚS 5/12, Slovakian Pensions – Landtová; and Danish Højesteret 6 December 2016, Case 15/2014, Ajos). Essentially, the first one was the result of a domestic conflict between the highest Czech courts, for more detail on that see F.C. Mayer and M. Wendel, ‘Die verfassungsrechtlichen Grundlagen des Europarechts’, in Enzyklopädie des Europarechts, vol. 1, 2^nd edn. (Nomos 2021) para. 246 ff. The second one expresses a reluctance which might endanger the unity of EU law, see in detail M. Madsen, ‘Legal Disintegration?’, Verfassungsblog, 30 January 2017, ⟨verfassungsblog.de/legal-disintegration-the-ruling-of-the-danish-supreme-court-in-ajos⟩, visited 14 December 2020. In neither case, however, did the courts aspire to literally take over the role and function of the ECJ as court of last resort on EU law, as the Federal Constitutional Court does in the present case.

¹⁵² This solution to a conflict between domestic constitution and EU law is suggested by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in its decision on EU membership, 1 May 2005, Case K 18/04, Accession Treaty of Poland, Headnote 1.

¹⁵³ For a substantive critique of this general tendency to ‘de-limitation’ (Entgrenzung) see M. Jestaedt et al., Das entgrenzte Gericht (Suhrkamp 2011).

¹⁵⁴ See on this the critique of C. Schönberger, ‘Die Europäische Union zwischen “Demokratiedefizit” und Bundesstaatsverbot. Anmerkungen zum Lissabon-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, 48 Der Staat (2009) p. 535 at p. 539 ff.

¹⁵⁵ BVerfG 18 July 2005, 2 BvR 2236/04, European Arrest Warrant, BVerfGE vol. 113, p. 273 at p. 336 (dissenting opinion Lübbe-Wolff).

¹⁵⁶ The scope of application of the two thirds majority was extended by the court in the UPC case (Unified Patent Court Agreement, supra n. 13), with three judges dissenting.

¹⁵⁷ Political parties hostile or sceptical on European integration combined with a two-thirds majority requirement leads to small opposition parties in the role of veto players in the Bundestag. In the Bundesrat, majorities depend on the agreements the coalition governments at the Länder level have on voting on European affairs in the Bundesrat. The debate on the majority required to ratify the NextGenerationEU-approach in Germany is a recent example for the difficulties in that context. See the hearing in the European Affairs Committee of the Bundestag held on 26 November 2020, ⟨www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2020/kw44-pa-europa-eigenmittelsystem-799448⟩, visited 14 December 2020.

¹⁵⁸ See the harsh critique from the world of private law, pointing to the risk of serious damage for the functioning of competition law: T. Ackermann, ‘Das europäische Wettbewerbsrecht als Kollateralschaden des PSPP-Urteils des Bundesverfassungsgerichts?’, 8 Neue Zeitschrift für Kartellrecht (2020) p. 281.

¹⁵⁹ See F.C. Mayer, ‘Die Europäische Union als Rechtsgemeinschaft’, 70 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2017) p. 3631.