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The Swedish Riksdag as Scrutiniser of the Principle of Subsidiarity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 August 2016

Anna Jonsson Cornell
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Abstract

Early Warning Mechanism – Principle of Subsidiarity – Lisbon Treaty – Protocol No. 2 on Proportionality and Subsidiarity – A theoretical definition of the Principle of Subsidiarity – The scope of the Principle of Subsidiarity – Scrutiny of the respect for the principle of subsidiarity – The role of national parliaments in the EU legislative procedure – The Swedish Riksdag – national constitutional law – decentralised scrutiny – no selection mechanism – sectoral committees – reasoned opinions – the role of the Plenary – the Committee on the Constitution – method for scrutiny – the principle of proportionality – principle of conferral – legality – European Public Prosecutor’s Office – broad or narrow scrutiny – impact of the Early Warning Mechanism

Keywords

EU lawnational parliamentssubsidiarity
Type
Articles
Information
European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , September 2016 , pp. 294 - 317
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2016 

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Footnotes

*

The author is very grateful for the valuable comments from Dr Hans Hegeland and the anonymous reviewers.

References

1 This particular topic is being dealt with in Cornell, A. Jonsson and Goldoni, M. (eds.), National and Regional Parliaments in the EU-legislative Procedure post-Lisbon. The Impact of the Early Warning System (Hart 2016)Google Scholar. See also Jančić, D., ‘The Game of Cards: National Parliaments in the EU and the Future of the Early Warning Mechanism and the Political Dialogue’, 52 CMLRev (2015) p. 939 Google Scholar.

2 See, for example, the special issue ’After Lisbon: National Parliaments in the EU’, 38(2) West European Politics (2015).

3 Jančić, supra n. 1.

4 Scholars have pointed out important differences in how Nordic national parliaments have approached their post-Lisbon responsibilities, focusing on the scrutiny of the principle of subsidiarity. Cooper, I., ‘The Nordic Parliaments and the EU’, in C. Howard Gron et al. (eds.), Still the other European Community? The Nordic Countries and the European Union (Routledge 2015) p. 1 Google Scholar, Cooper, I., ‘The Subsidiarity Early Warning Mechanism: Three Questions and a Typology’, and A. Jonsson Cornell, ‘Similar but Different: Comparing the Scrutiny of the Principle of Subsidiarity in Sweden, Denmark and Finland’, both in Jonsson Cornell and Goldoni, supra n. 1 Google Scholar.

5 2014/15:KU5, p. 21, 39, 2015/16:KU5.

6 Rozenberg, O. and Hefftler, C., ‘Introduction’, in C. Hefftler et al. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2015) p. 22 Google Scholar.

7 For example Kiiver, P., The Early Warning Mechanism System for the Principle of Subsidiarity. Constitutional Theory and Empirical Reality (Routledge 2012)Google Scholar, Popelier, P. and Vandenbruwaene, W., ‘The Subsidiarity Mechanism as a Tool for Inter-Level Dialogue in Belgium: On Regional Blindness and Cooperative Flaws’, 7 EuConst (2011) p. 204 Google Scholar, Besselink, L. and van Mourik, B., ‘The Parliamentary legitimacy of the European Union: The Role of the States General within the European Union’, 8(1) Utrecht Law Review (2012) p. 28 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Jonsson Cornell, supra n. 4.

8 Rozenberg, supra n. 6, p. 17, 21. See also Jančić, D., ‘The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy Boost?’, 8(1) Utrecht Law Review (2012) p. 78 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 For the latest contribution on national parliaments in general, see Hefftler et al., supra n. 6. In Jonsson Cornell and Goldoni, supra n. 1, case studies focusing on the Early Warning Mechanism proper in inter alia Italy, Belgium, France, the UK, Poland and the Czech Republic, Germany and Austria Sweden, Denmark and Finland are presented.

10 For a comparative analysis see Jonsson Cornell, supra n. 4.

11 Jančić, supra n. 8.

12 See, for example, Goldoni, M., ‘The Early Warning System and the Monti II Regulation: the Case for a Political Interpretation’, 10 EuConst (2014) p. 90 Google Scholar, and Cooper, supra n. 4.

13 See for example Fabbrini, F. and Granat, K., ‘“Yellow Card but No Foul”: The Role of the National Parliaments Under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal For an EU Regulation on the Right to Strike’, 50 CMLRev (2013) p. 115 Google Scholar at p. 120-125. The authors argue for a narrow review based on textual, structural and functional arguments. See also Jančić, supra n. 1 at p. 974, who calls for an expansion of the scope of the Early Warning Mechanism.

14 In the case of the Monti II proposal the Commission withdrew its proposal due to a yellow card, even though the Commission insisted that there had been no violation of the principle of subsidiarity. A yellow card was issued concerning the EPPO-proposal on 28 October 2013.

15 For the purpose of this article, empirical refers to the way in which national parliaments define and review subsidiarity.

16 For a take on the EU point of view see Jančić, supra n. 1 at p. 944.

17 Kiiver, supra n. 7, p. 96 ff.

18 Fabbrini, supra n. 13, at p. 124-125. The authors build on Schütze, R., From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (Oxford University Press 2009) p. 250 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The authors also argue for the ‘cross-border activity’ test, as put forward by Advocate General Maduro in ECJ 10 June 2010, Case C-58/08, Vodafone v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Opinion of A.G. Maduro.

19 Fabbrini, supra n. 13, p. 121.

20 For Sweden see 2014/15:KU5. See also Kiiver, supra n. 7, p. 95.

21 ECJ 13 May 1997, Case C-233/94, Germany v Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-2405, para. 25.

22 COM(2013) 851 final, p. 6.

23 Kiiver, supra n. 7, p. 100-101.

24 See also supra n. 21, para 25.

25 See, for example, Fabbrini, supra n. 13 at p. 122-124.

26 Goldoni, supra n. 12 at p. 101.

27 Ibid., p. 102.

28 Ibid., p. 105.

29 Ibid., p. 105.

30 ibid., p. 107-108.

31 Jančić, supra n. 1 at p. 942, 974.

32 Kiiver, supra n. 7 at p. 71.

33 Also supported by the German Bundesrat definition of the scope, Kiiver, supra n. 7, p. 98.

34 Ibid., p. 98-99.

35 Jančić, supra n. 1 at p. 974.

36 Hettne, J. et al., Subsidiaritet I EU efter Lissabon, 2013/14:RFR 10, p. 15 Google Scholar. Concerning the burden of proof on the Commission in this regard, see ECJ 23 September 2009, Case T-263/07, Republic of Estonia v Commission, para. 52, on the transposition of a Directive into national law. The Court stated ‘… in a field such as that of the environment, which is governed by Articles 174 EC to 176 EC, where the Community and the Member States share competence, the Community, that is to say the Commission in the present case, has the burden of proving to what extent the powers of the Member State and, therefore, its freedom of action, are limited …’.

37 ECJ 23 September 2009, Case T-263/07, Republic of Estonia v Commission, para. 51.

38 Cooper, supra n. 4.

39 The Riksdag Act was changed in 2014, Riksdagsordning (2014:801). The new law entered into force on 1 September 2014.

40 2009/10:KU2 Tillämpning av Lissabonfördraget i riksdagen, p. 13.

41 Hettne, supra n. 36, p. 43. See also 2008/09:RS4 Tillämpningen av Lissabonfördraget i riksdagen, p. 52.

42 2012/13:KU15. As a result of an e contrario reading of riksdagsordningen 11:21 2, 3.

43 Hegeland, H., ‘The Swedish Parliament and EU Affairs: From Reluctant Player to Europeanized Actor’, in Hefftler et al., supra n. 6, p. 425 at p. 428 Google Scholar, 432.

44 Hettne, supra n. 36, p. 45, 2013/14:KU5, p. 16.

45 2014/15:KU5, p. 17.

46 Each of the sectoral committees has its own secretariat that assists in the further preparation. Supra n. 43, at p. 431.

47 2014/15:KU5, p. 40.

48 2013/14:JuU13, 2013/14:KU5, 2014/15:JuU2y.

49 2013/14:KU20, p. 18-21. There is no sanction mechanism involved. The only tool available is a vote of no-confidence in the Government, which is, at least in this context, a rather blunt tool.

50 2009/10:KU2, p. 14.

51 In October 2015 the Committee on the Constitution submitted five reports to the Riksdag, 2010/11:KU18, 2011/12:KU4, 2012/13:KU8, 2013/14:KU5, 2014/15:KU5 dealing with the years 2009-2013. The two first reports provided systematic analysis of all the review cases, while the final three focus more on the outcome of the review. Attention is also paid to weaknesses in the Commission’s assessment of subsidiarity.

52 2014/15:KU5, p. 8.

53 See, for example, 2014/15:KU5, p. 175.

54 2008/09:RS4 Tillämpningen av Lissabonfördraget i riksdagen, p. 53.

55 2013/14:KU5, p. 8-9.

56 2014/15:KU5, p. 9.

57 2013/14:KU5, p. 8-9, 2015/16:KU5, p. 7-8.

58 2013/14:KU5, p. 35.

59 2014/15:KU5, p. 40.

60 Ibid., p. 74.

61 2013/14:KU5, p. 59, 2014/14:KU5, p. 74.

62 2013/14:KU5, p. 60, 2014/14:KU5, p. 75.

63 2013/14:KU5, p. 61.

64 2014/14:KU5, p. 75.

65 Ibid., p. 75.

66 2013/14:KU5, p. 13-14.

67 2008/09:RS4 Tillämpningen av Lissabonfördraget i riksdagen, p. 52.

68 Ibid.

69 Compare ibid., and 2011/12:SoU18.

70 Jonsson, A., ‘EU:s lagstiftningsprocess och subsidiaritetsprövningen: Nya möjligheter för nationellt inflytande?’, 4 SVJT (2011) p. 413 Google Scholar at p. 427. See also Bergström, C. F., ‘Subsidiaritetsprövningen: riksdagen hittar en ny roll i EU:s lagstiftningsprocess’, 3 ERT (2010) p. 423 Google Scholar.

71 Hettne, supra n. 36, p. 48.

72 Ibid., p. 47.

73 Ibid., p. 48.

74 Ibid., p. 22.

75 2014/15:KU5, p. 15.

76 Hettne, supra n. 36, p. 50.

77 2013/14:KU5, p. 36, 2014/15:KU5.

78 The Committee relied on ECJ, 10 December, C-491-01, Brittish American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd v Imperial Tobacco Ltd, paras. 122-141, 180-185, and Hettne, J., Subsidiaritetsprincipen: Politisk granskning eller juridisk kontroll? [The principle of subsidiarity: Political scrutiny or judicial control?] (SIEPS 2003)Google Scholar.

79 2013/14:TU5.

80 2014/15:KU5, p. 15. See also Hettne, supra n. 36, p. 27, 52-53.

81 2014/15:KU5, p. 39.

82 2014/15:TU1y.

83 2013/14:KU5, p. 16. For a complete list of topics see, bilaga [appendix] 12. The number for 2011 was 124.

84 2013/14:KU5, p. 16-18. 2009-2010 71 proposals were reviewed and three reasoned opinions adopted by the Chamber.

85 Ibid., p. 17.

86 2011/12:JuU29, Riksdagsskrivelse 2011/12:156.

87 2014/15:KU5, p. 21.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 2015/16:KU5, p. 20.

91 See Hettne, supra n. 36, p. 49.

92 COM(2013) 851 final.

93 2013/14:JuU13. The Committee on Justice had voiced its opinion concerning this regulation already at the initial stage of the Political Dialogue process, i.e. when the Commission presented its 2013 work program. See 2012/13:JuU2y.

94 2013/14:JuU13, p. 8.

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid., p. 9.

97 COM(2013) 851 final, p. 5.

98 2014/15:TU1y.

99 2013/14:KU5, p. 8.

100 See, 2013/14:KU5, p. 68-69 and 2014/14:KU5, p. 39-40.

101 2013/14:KU5, p. 8-9.

102 2012/13:KU8, p. 1, 30. The Committee also repeated the possibility for committees to ask the Committee for guidance concerning interpretation and method, while also stating that the yearly reports are supposed to function as a support for sectoral committees.

103 2011/12:KU4, p. 23.

104 For an illustration see, for example, 2013/14:KU5, p. 12-15.

105 2013/14:KU5, p. 8, 2011/12:KU4, p. 35.

106 Granat, K., National parliaments and the policing of the subsidiarity principle (European University Institute 2014)Google Scholar. See also Jančić, supra n. 1, p. 948.