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Rethinking Europe - Dieter Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy (Oxford University Press2017, transl. by Justin Collings), pp. 273, originally published as Europa ja – aber welches? (Verlag C.H.Beck oHG 2016)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 October 2019

Paul Post
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Type
Book Review
Information
European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 15 , Issue 3 , September 2019 , pp. 589 - 598
Copyright
© 2019 The Authors 

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Footnotes

*

Lawyer at De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek in Amsterdam, Netherlands. The views expressed in this review are the author’s own.

References

1 Grimm’s, other recent books in English are Sovereignty, The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept (Columbia University Press 2015, transl. Cooper, B.) and Constitutionalism. Past-Present-Future (Oxford University Press 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Except for chapter 3 (‘Sovereignty in Europe’), which was published before as ‘Sovereignty in the European Union’ in J. van der Walt and J. Ellsworth (eds.), Constitutional Sovereignty and Social Solidarity in Europe (Nomos 2015) p. 39, and chapter 5 (‘The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalization – The European Case’), which is an extended version of an eponymous article published in 21 European Law Journal (2015) p. 460.

3 In line with the three recommendations made by Grimm in the collection’s first essay, see The Constitution of European Democracy, p. 35; see also Grimm’s introduction of his proposals on Latest Thinking, 〈lt.org/publication/where-does-eus-acceptance-problem-come-and-how-can-it-be-counteracted〉, last accessed 7 August 2019.

4 Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy, p. v.

5 This is a consistent part of Grimm’s thinking on this topic, which for example also figures in his contribution to the July 2017 number of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘on comprend trop rarement que [le deficit démocratique] trouve sa source principale dans la transformation des traités européens en Constitution’. In this piece, Grimm employs the term ‘l’hyperconstitutionnalisation’. See p. 19 ff.

6 Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy, p. 28. See for an elaborate discussion of the concept, Loughlin, M., ‘What is Constitutionalisation?’, in Dobner, P. and Loughlin, M. (eds.), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford University Press 2010) p. 47–69, esp. p. 63-68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 ECJ 5 April 1963, Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen.

8 ECJ 15 July 1964, Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL.

9 ECJ 23 April 1986, Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament, para. 23.

10 Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy, p. 195.

11 Ibid., p. 94.

12 See for a discussion of the horizontal effect of these provisions, Hartkamp, A., ‘The Effect of the EC Treaty in Private Law: On Direct and Indirect Horizontal Effects of Primary Community Law’, 18 European Review of Private Law (2010) p. 527 Google Scholar.

13 Arts. 45(3), 52(1) and 65(1)(b) TFEU.

14 See e.g. ECJ 30 November 1995, Case C-55/94, Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano.

15 See e.g. Scharpf, F.W., Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford University Press 1999) p. 43 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy p. 30, p. 98-99.

17 Ibid., p. 98, p. 128.

18 It is, in the words of Majone, ‘integration by stealth’. See Majone, G., Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth (Oxford University Press 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy, p. 35-36; see also p. 76.

20 Ibid., p. 18.

21 Ibid., p. 9.

22 Ibid., p. 32.

23 Declaration 17 concerning primacy.

24 Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy, p. 177.

25 Ibid., p. 35.

26 Ibid., p. 14.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., p. 177.

29 Among many others, Davies, G, ‘Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place at the Wrong Time’, 43 Common Market Law Review (2006) p. 63 Google Scholar.

30 Craig, P., ‘Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis’, 50 Journal of Common Market Studies (2012) p. 72 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 Lindseth, P.L., ‘Equilibrium, Demoi-cracy, and Delegation in the Crisis of European Integration’, 15 German Law Journal (2014) p. 529 at p. 558 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 Moens, G.A. and Trone, J., ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity In EU Judicial And Legislative Practice: Panacea Or Placebo?’, 41 Journal of Legislation (2015) p. 65 at p. 72 Google Scholar.

33 In this context, chambers of bicameral systems have one vote each, while chambers in unicameral systems have two votes.

34 Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy, p. 15; see also p. 177.

35 See, for a discussion of the latest early warning, Fromage, D. and Kreilinger, V., ‘National Parliaments’ Third Yellow Card and the Struggle over the Revision of the Posted Workers Directive’, 10 European Journal of Legal Studies (2017) p. 125 Google Scholar.

36 Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy, p. 35; see also p. 18.

37 Marquand, D.I., Parliament for Europe (Jonathan Cape Ltd 1979) p. 65 Google Scholar.

38 See e.g. Rittberger, B., Building Europe’s Parliament: Democratic Representation beyond the Nation State (Oxford University Press 2005 CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Hix, S. et al., Democratic Politics in the European Parliament (Cambridge University Press 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 As has been argued previously, e.g. in Fabbrini, S., Which European Union? Europe after the Euro Crisis (Cambridge University Press 2015) p. 172–184 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also van Middelaar, L., De nieuwe politiek van Europa (Historische Uitgeverij 2017) p. 321–330 Google Scholar.

40 Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy p.117-129 (chapter 7).

41 Ibid., p. 16.

42 Ibid., p. 32-33; see also p. 17 and further, p. 113-114.

43 Ibid., p. 18.

44 Ibid., p. 179.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., p. 107.

47 Ibid., p. 119.

48 As I argued previously and more elaborately in ‘The Spitzenkandidaten procedure. Genesis and nemesis of a constitutional convention’ (LLM thesis, Leiden University, 2015) p. 56-57, available at 〈njb.nl/Uploads/2015/9/LLM-Thesis---LLM-European-Law---Paul-W.-Post.pdf〉, visited 7 August 2019.

49 J-C. Juncker, ‘A New Start for Europe’, Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session, 15 July 2014, 〈europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-567_en.htm〉, visited 7 August 2019.

50 Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy, p. 12.

51 D. Cameron, ‘Presidency of the European Commission: article by David Cameron’, 13 June 2014, 〈www.gov.uk/government/news/presidency-of-the-european-commission-article-by-david-cameron〉, visited 7 August 2019.

52 Grimm, The Constitution of European Democracy, p. 233.

53 Majone, supra n. 18.

54 E.J-M.F. Macron, ‘Discours à Berlin’, Lecture at Humboldt University, 10 January 2017, 〈en-marche.fr/articles/discours/meeting-macron-berlin-discours〉, visited 7 August 2019.

55 See e.g. E.J-M.F. Macron, ‘Initiative pour l’Europe – Discours d’Emmanuel Macron pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique’, Lecture at Paris-Sorbonne University, 26 September 2017, 〈www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/initiative-pour-l-europe-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique〉, visited 7 August 2019.