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² Bugaric, B., ‘A Crisis of Constitutional Democracy in Post-Communist Europe: “Lands in-between” Democracy and Authoritarianism’, 13 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2015) p. 219 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁸ ‘New constitutionalism’ has been understood as a shift, occurring in the twentieth century, towards increasing legalisation of the public sphere and juridification of political disputes. See, inter alia, Mandel, M., ‘A Brief History of the New Constitutionalism, or “How We Changed Everything So That Everything Would Remain the Same”’, 32 Israel Law Review (1998) p. 250 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 251 and Hirschl, R., Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard University Press 2004)Google Scholar. An exploration of the interplay between this shift and the neoliberal economic policies that have gained dominance at the same time, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, goes beyond the scope of this article. However, see Obendorfer, L., ‘From New Constitutionalism to Authoritarian Constitutionalism: New Economic Governance and the State of European Democracy’, in Jaeger, J. and Springler, E. (eds.), Asymmetric Crisis in Europe and Possible Futures Critical Political Economy and Post-Keynesian Perspectives (Routledge 2015) p. 186 Google Scholar.

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¹⁴ Krastev, I., After Europe (Pennsylvania University Press 2017) p. 73 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ Bugaric, supra n. 2.

¹⁶ See discussion in Ekman, J. et al., ‘Challenges and Realities of Political Participation and Civic Engagement in Central and Eastern Europe’, 32 East European Politics (2016) p. 1 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹⁹ Parvu, supra n. 13, p. 264.

²⁰ See, for instance, N. Corbu and E. Negrea-Busuioc, ‘“Economy Matters!” People’s Evaluation of Their National Economies and the Success of Populist Parties in Central and Eastern Europe’, Paper presented at the ECPR 2016 General Conference, 7-10 September 2016.

²¹ R.F. Inglehart and P. Norris, ‘Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-nots and Cultural Backlash’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 2 September 2016, p. 2. This is different from arguments about populists’ economic policies, which have been read as sharing reorientations to welfare chauvinism and economic protectionism as responses to the financial crisis. See Otjes, S. et al., ‘It’s not Economic Interventionism, Stupid! Reassessing the Political Economy of Radical Right-wing Populist Parties’, 24 Swiss Political Science Review (2018) p. 270 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² N. Roubini et al., ‘Will The Economic Crisis Split East And West in Europe?’, Forbes, 26 February 2009, available at 〈www.forbes.com/2009/02/25/eastern-europe-eu-banks-euro-opinions-columnists_nouriel_roubini.html〉, visited 4 September 2019.

²³ Kriesi, H. and Pappas, T.S., European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession (ECPR Press 2015) p. 318–319 Google Scholar.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 3-4 and 315-316.

²⁵ Bugaric, for example, finds that Central and Eastern European populists’ alternative economic policies are hugely appealing to their voters, but only in conjunction with ethnonationalism and authoritarianism. See his ‘Central Europe’s Descent into Autocracy: A Constitutional Analysis of Authoritarian Populism’, 17 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2019) p. 597. See also Inglehart and Norris, supra n. 21, p. 4.

²⁶ Mueller, supra n. 3.

²⁷ See European Parliament Resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012) (2012/2130(INI)) at para. 74 and, more recently, European Parliament Resolution of 25 October 2016, A8-0283/2016, with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights.

²⁸ E. Zalan, ‘Ten Years on, Romania and Bulgaria Still Dogged by Corruption’, EUobserver, 25 January 2017.

²⁹ Mueller, supra n. 7, p. 58. For a more general discussion of the type of restrained democracy adopted in post-war Europe, see Mueller, J.W., Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe (Yale University Press 2011)Google Scholar and Blokker, P., ‘The Evolution of Constitutionalism in the Post-communist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Some Lessons for the Post-Soviet Space’, in Petrov, R. and Van Elsuwege, P. (eds.), Post-Soviet Constitutions and Challenges of Regional Integration: Adapting to European and Eurasian Integration Projects (Routledge 2017) p. 5 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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³¹ See J. Nergelius, ‘The Role of the Venice Commission in Maintaining the Rule of Law in Hungary and in Romania’, in von Bogdandy and Sonnevend, supra n. 4, p. 291; Jakab, A. and Sonnevend, P., ‘Continuity with Deficiencies: The New Basic Law of Hungary’, 9 EuConst (2013) p. 102 Google Scholar.

³² On mechanisms for rule of law protection in the EU, see Costa, C. and Kochenov, D. (eds.), Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge University Press 2016)Google Scholar.

³³ Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations, amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 May 2018 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations. For a critical assessment of these regulations, see Morijn, J., ‘Responding to “Populist” Politics at EU Level: Regulation 1141/2014 and Beyond’, 17 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2019) p. 617 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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³⁷ Zielonka, J., Counter-revolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat (Oxford University Press 2018)Google Scholar. This despite calls, at the time of enlargement, for it to trigger a reassessment of the European project as a whole. See Zielonka, J., Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union (Oxford University Press 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Sadurski, W., Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of Europe (Oxford University Press 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁴³ Landau, supra n. 40, p. 260. Addressing Hungary specifically, Landau takes this further and raises the possibility of developing conceptions of unconstitutional constitutions to describe those that do not function in a certain way and adhere to certain principles. The latter idea is also developed in Albert, R., ‘Four Unconstitutional Constitutions and Their Democratic Foundations’, 50 Cornell Journal of International Law (2017) p. 169 Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Scheppele, K.L., ‘Autocratic Legalism’, 85 University of Chicago Law Review (2018) p. 545 Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Taggart, P., ‘Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics’, in Meny, Y. and Surel, Y. (eds.), Democracies and the Populist Challenge (Palgrave 2002) p. 71 Google Scholar. As will be discussed below, Central and Eastern European populists have not opted for the institutionalisation of direct democracy instruments; quite the opposite.

⁴⁶ S. Rummens, ‘Legitimacy without Visibility? On the Role of Mini-publics in the Democratic System’, in Reuchamps and Suiter, supra n. 9, p. 135.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ P. Mair, ‘Populist Democracy versus Party Democracy’, in Meny and Surel, supra n. 45, p. 81 at p. 88-89. See, generally, Mair, P., Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy (Verso 2013)Google Scholar. More recently, see Walker, N., ‘Populism and Constitutional Tension’, 17 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2019) p. 515 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ See, broadly, Krastev, supra n. 14, p. 61-106. See also Krygier, in this issue, discussing the challenges of not only institutionalising liberal democracy and the rule of law, but also of the failure to cope with the specifically political character of those challenges.

⁵⁰ Mungiu-Pippidi, A., ‘EU Accession Is No “End of History”’, 18 Journal of Democracy (2007) p. 12 Google Scholar.

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⁵² Mueller, supra n. 7, p. 79.

⁵³ I. van Biezen, ‘The Decline in Party Membership Across Europe Means That Political Parties Need to Reconsider How They Engage with the Electorate’, EUROPP, 6 May 2013.

⁵⁴ Bugaric, supra n. 2, p. 242.

⁵⁵ USR describes its membership as a pragmatic union between ‘people on the left and on the right and the centre’ and, given the urgency of the anti-corruption fight and the gap between politics and society, it claims not to ‘have the right to be split … along ideological criteria’ (my translations). Moreover, it describes corruption as affecting all other political parties and claims to wish to engage in a politics based on integrity and competence rather than ideology. See USR’s FAQ page on their website, 〈www.usr.ro/intrebari-frecvente/#ideologie〉, visited 4 September 2019.

⁵⁶ A telling chant during the early 2017 anti-corruption protests in Romania was that ‘all parties are the same filth’.

⁵⁷ P. Hockenos, ‘Hungary Finally Has an Opposition Worth a Damn’, Foreign Policy, 17 January 2019, 〈foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/17/hungary-finally-has-an-opposition-worth-a-damn/〉, visited 4 September 2019. Momentum gained nearly 10% of the vote in the 2019 European parliamentary elections.

⁵⁸ See Ekman et al., supra n. 16; Marchenko, A., ‘Civic Activities in Eastern Europe: Links with Democratic Political Culture’, 32 East European Politics (2016) p. 12 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Foa, R.S. and Ekiert, G., ‘The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society Reassessed’, 56 European Journal of Political Research (2017) p. 419 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁹ Marchenko, supra n. 58, p. 22.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ A similar point is made about the 2013-2014 anti-government protests in Romania by Margarit, D., ‘Civic Disenchantment and Political Distress: The Case of the Romanian Autumn’, 32 East European Politics (2016) p. 46 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶² M. Dunai, ‘Hungarian Protests Intensify as Orbán Heads to Brussels’, Reuters, 13 December 2018, 〈www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-protest-idUSKBN1OC2OM〉, visited 4 September 2019 and A. Koper and L. Kelly, ‘Protests in Poland Condemn Controversial Judicial Reforms’, Reuters, 16 July 2017, 〈www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-politics-protests-idUSKBN1A10S3〉, visited 4 September 2019.

⁶³ Dimitrova, supra n. 12, p. 259. This is especially true in Hungary, where the Orbán regime has been successful in changing electoral laws so as to further entrench its hold on power and disadvantage the political opposition.

⁶⁴ Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, supra n. 51, p. 84.

⁶⁵ Mueller, supra n. 7, p. 62.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 63.

⁶⁷ For an assessment of direct democracy in post-1989 Hungary, see Z.T. Pallinger, ‘The Uses of Direct Democracy in Hungary’, Paper presented at the ECPR 2016 General Conference, 7-10 September 2016.

⁶⁸ P. Karasz, ‘Leader of Hungary Defends New Constitution’, The New York Times, 7 February 2012, 〈www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/world/europe/viktor-orban-defends-hungarys-new-constitution.html〉, visited 4 September 2019.

⁶⁹ Ulrich Preuss, for instance, has referred to basic laws in Central and Eastern Europe as ‘constitutions without a constituent power’, which he has claimed has contributed to the fragile conditions of constitutionalism in the region. See Preuss, U., ‘The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and Eastern Europe’, in Loughlin, M. and Walker, N. (eds.), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford University Press 2012) p. 228 Google Scholar.

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⁷¹ Fruhstorfer, A. and Hein, M., Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: From Post-Socialist Transition to the Reform of Political Systems (Springer 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Puchalska, B., Limits to Democratic Constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe (Routledge 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁷³ Ibid., p. 67.

⁷⁴ See Pietraru, D.I., The Romanian Constitution of 1991: The “Stolen” Constitution (New School for Social Research, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing 1997) p. 151–274 Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ An example of a particularly difficult to amend constitution in the region is Romania’s, which also incorporates substantive limitations on constitutional change in Art. 153. An example of informal constitutional change is Slovenia’s, discussed by Bugaric, supra n. 2, at p. 227-230.

⁷⁶ Arato, A., Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy (Rowman & Littlefield 2000) p. 153 Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ Bugaric, supra n. 25, p. 609.

⁷⁸ Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, supra n. 51, p. 118.

⁷⁹ Mueller, supra n. 7, p. 103.

⁸⁰ A notable exception is Paul Blokker. See, inter alia, his ‘Populism as a Constitutional Project’, 17 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2019) p. 536 and his discussion of populism as a critique of the ‘logic of liberalism’ in this issue.

⁸¹ Bugaric, supra n. 2.

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⁸⁵ Hungary’s 2016 migrant quota referendum, albeit ultimately unsuccessful for the Orbán government, is a good example of how the referendum tool can be used by populists in power.

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⁹² Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, supra n. 51, p. 116.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 98-99.

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¹⁰² Ibid., p. 67.

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¹⁰⁵ Mueller, supra n. 7, p. 96.

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¹¹³ Parkinson, supra n. 103, p. 147-162.

¹¹⁴ The latter is the approach proposed by adherents of the systemic turn in deliberative democratic theory. See Parkinson and Mansbridge, supra n. 10.

¹¹⁵ Parkinson, supra n. 103, p. 155.

¹¹⁶ Levy, R. and Orr, G., The Law of Deliberative Democracy (Routledge 2017)Google Scholar and Levy et al., supra n. 83.

¹¹⁷ S. Chambers, ‘Afterword: Populist Constitutionalism v. Deliberative Constitutionalism’, in Levy et al., supra n. 83, p. 370 at p. 371.

¹¹⁸ As such, my argument shares important similarities with democratic constitutionalists such as Joel Colon-Rios and Paul Blokker, who argue that a substantial degree of openness and responsiveness of the constitutional system is vital to democracies. See Colon-Rios, J., Weak Constitutionalism: Democratic Legitimacy and the Question of Constituent Power (Routledge 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and P. Blokker, ‘Constitutional Reform in Europe and Recourse to the People’, in Contiades and Fotiadou, supra n. 82, p. 31 at p. 40-42.

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¹²¹ Parkinson, supra n. 103, p. 160.

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¹³⁰ della Porta, supra n. 83, p. 179-180 and Talpin, supra n. 126.

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¹³³ Parkinson and Mansbridge, supra n. 10.

¹³⁴ della Porta, supra n. 83, p. 183.

¹³⁵ See, for instance, the ongoing participatory budgeting initiatives in Cluj-Napoca, Romania: 〈bugetareparticipativa.ro/〉, visited 4 September 2019 and emulated in further Romanian cities. See also Kamrowska-Zaluska, D., ‘Participatory Budgeting in Poland – Missing Link in Urban Regeneration Process’, 161 Procedia Engineering (2016) p. 1996 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹³⁸ Blokker, supra n. 118, p. 51.

¹³⁹ Gupte, M. and Bartlett, R.V., ‘Necessary Preconditions for Deliberative Environmental Democracy? Challenging the Modernity Bias of Current Theory’, 7 Global Environmental Politics (2007) p. 94 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹⁴¹ Fournier et al., supra n. 123.

¹⁴² Andras Sajo makes this point, albeit referring to a deliberative turn in the EU. See Sajo, A., ‘Constitution without the Constituent Moment: A View from the New Member States’, 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2005) p. 243 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 260.

¹⁴³ Gupte and Bartlett, supra n. 139, p. 95.

¹⁴⁴ On deliberative democracy during the ‘post-truth’ era, see Curato, N. et al., Power in Deliberative Democracy: Norms, Forums, Systems (Palgrave Macmillan 2019) p. 137–172 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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¹⁴⁶ Chambers, supra n. 117, p. 371.

¹⁴⁷ J.S. Dryzek et al., ‘The Crisis of Democracy and the Science of Deliberation: Citizens Can Avoid Polarization and Make Sound Decisions’, Science, 15 March 2019, p. 1145.

¹⁴⁸ To read more about the Brexit citizen assembly, see The Constitution Unit, Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit, 〈www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/europe/citizens-assembly-on-brexit〉, visited 4 September 2019.

¹⁴⁹ Dryzek et al., supra n. 147, p. 1146.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ N. Curato and L.J. Parry, ‘Deliberative Democracy Must Rise to the Threat of Populist Rhetoric’, The Conversation, 7 June 2017.

¹⁵² See A. Fung, ‘Deliberation before the Revolution: Toward an Ethics of Deliberative Democracy in an Unjust World’, Political Theory (2005) p. 397, as well as Dryzek, supra n. 110.