¹ I follow Johann Arnason here in identifying a distinctive historical region in the form of East-Central Europe, distinct from both a Germanic Mitteleuropa and Russian-controlled Eastern Europe proper, see Arnason, J.P., ‘Introduction: Demarcating East Central Europe’, 8(4) European Journal of Social Theory (2005) p. 387 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Jiří Přibáň, for instance, spoke of the ‘fiction of legal revolutions’ (see J. Přibáň, Dissidents of Law (Ashgate 2002) p. 89, and together with Wojciech Sadurksi of a ‘self-limiting and legalistic revolution’ (see Přibáň, J. and Sadurski, W., ‘The Role of Political Rights in the Democratization of Central and Eastern Europe’, in Sadurski, W. (ed), Political Rights under Stress in 21^st Century Europe (Oxford University Press 2006) p. 196–238 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 299), while Andrew Arato referred to ‘gentle’ and ‘legal’ revolutionaries (see Arato, A., ‘Dilemmas Arising from the Power to Create Constitutions in Eastern Europe’, 14(3-4) Cardozo Law Review (1993) p. 661)Google Scholar and the former Chief Judge of the Hungarian Constitutional Court László Sólyom related to the ‘revolution under the rule of law’ (see Sólyom, L., ‘The role of constitutional courts in the transition to democracy: with special reference to Hungary’, 18(1) International Sociology (2003) p. 133)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Scheppele, K.L., ‘The Social Lives of Constitutions’, in Blokker, P. and Thornhill, C. (eds), Sociological Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2017) p. 35 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A. Sledzinska-Simon, ‘The Polish Revolution: 2015-2017’, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 25 July 2017, 〈www.iconnectblog.com/2017/07/the-polish-revolution-2015-2017〉, visited 5 September 2019.

⁴ See Krygier, Kosař, Baroš, and Dufek, and Suteu (all in this special section). But as attested by Kosař et al., not dissimilar developments are occurring in Czechia and Slovakia, too. See further W. Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (Oxford University Press 2019).

⁵ See, e.g., R.D. Kelemen and L. Pech, ‘Why Autocrats Love Constitutional Identity and Constitutional Pluralism’. No. 2. Reconnect Working Paper, 2018.

⁶ See, e.g., Landau, D., ‘Abusive constitutionalism’, 47 UCDL Rev. (2013) p. 189 Google Scholar; W. Sadurski, ‘How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding’, No. 18/01 Sydney Law School Research Paper (2018); W. Sadurski, ‘Polish Constitutional Tribunal Under PiS: From an Activist Court, to a Paralysed Tribunal, to a Governmental Enabler’, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2018) p. 1; Scheppele, K.L., ‘Autocratic Legalism’, 85 University of Chicago Law Review (2018) p. 545 Google Scholar.

⁷ Scheppele, K.L., ‘The Opportunism of Populists and the Defense of Constitutional Liberalism’, 20(3) German Law Journal (2019) p. 331 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ It should be noted that Scheppele is a clear exception in that she does engage in the systematic study of the ideas and forms of critique of the conservative populists, see Scheppele, supra n. 7.

⁹ Dąbrowska, E., ‘New conservatism in Poland: The discourse coalition around Law and Justice’, in Bluhm, K. and Varga, M. (eds.), New Conservatives in Russia and East Central Europe (Routledge 2018) p. 92 at p. 93CrossRefGoogle Scholar (emphasis added).

¹⁰ I do not wish to imply that this is the case throughout the region. The Czech populism of Andrej Babiš is, for instance, often defined as ‘technopopulism’, lacking in a strong nationalist or conservative component. Also, in the case of Romania, the populism of the governing PSD appears less conservative and nationalist.

¹¹ Trencsenyi, B. et al., A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe Volume II: Negotiating Modernity in the 'Short Twentieth Century’ and Beyond (Oxford University Press 2018) p. 277 Google Scholar.

¹² One prominent example in Europe is the recent ‘yellow-green’ populist coalition of the Lega and the Movimento Cinque Stelle in Italy, which pursued similar policies against universal, individual human rights, criticised powerful judicial institutions, displayed scepticism towards minority rights, and openly defied the European integration project.

¹³ Cf Rupnik, J., ‘The Crisis of Liberalism’, 29(3) Journal of Democracy (2018) p. 24 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bluhm and Varga, supra n. 9; Bucholc, M., ‘Commemorative Lawmaking: Memory Frames of the Democratic Backsliding in Poland After 2015’, 11(1) Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2019) p. 85 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Buzogány, A. and Varga, M., ‘The ideational foundations of the illiberal backlash in Central and Eastern Europe. The case of Hungary’, 25(6) Review of International Political Economy (2018) p. 811 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zielonka, J., Counter-revolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat (Oxford University Press 2018)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Cf Scheppele, supra n. 7; T. Csillag and I. Szelenyi, ‘Drifting from liberal democracy. Neo-conservative ideology of managed illiberal democratic capitalism in post-communist Europe’, Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics (2015) p. 1; K. Jasiecki, ‘“Conservative modernization” and the rise of Law and Justice in Poland’, in Bluhm and Varga, supra n. 9, p. 130; Grzebalska, W. and Pető, A., ‘The gendered modus operandi of the illiberal transformation in Hungary and Poland’, 68 Women’s Studies International Forum (2018) p. 164 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ Wolff-Powęska, A., ‘Trommler der Revolution Jungkonservative und Polens Rechte’, 3-5 Osteuropa (2018) p. 57 Google Scholar at p. 59. Krzysztof Jasiecki speaks of a ‘conservative modernization’ strategy: Jasiecki, supra n. 14.

¹⁶ Trencsenyi et al., supra n. 11.

¹⁷ It is important, but somewhat beyond the scope of this paper, to recognise the important differences between conservatives. Whereas some, such as Ryszard Legutko and András Lánczi, have strongly criticised liberal constitutionalism, individual rights, and related judicial institutions (such as independent apex courts), others, such as István Stumpf, take a more moderate position. Lech Morawski, one of the ‘pseudo-judges’ of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (who died in 2017), endorsed a view of ‘judicial restraint’, in which the Constitutional Tribunal takes a less active role and parliament (and government) become more prominent. See, in general, for extensive discussions of different conservative currents, Matyja, R., ‘Songs of innocence and songs of experience’, in Kopeček, M. and Wciślik, P. (eds.), Thinking Through Transition (CEU Press 2015) p. 201 Google Scholar; Dąbrowska, supra n. 9; Trencsenyi et al., supra n. 11, ch. 6; Buzogány and Varga, supra n. 13.

¹⁸ Wolff-Powęska, supra n. 15, p. 59.

¹⁹ Kim Scheppele has discussed the anti-liberal ideology of the Hungarian Fidesz party in-depth, see Scheppele, supra n. 7.

²⁰ Furedi, F., Populism and the European Culture Wars: The Conflict of Values Between Hungary and the EU (Routledge 2017) p. 5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²¹ Ackerman, B., Revolutionary Constitutions: Charismatic Leadership and the Rule of Law (Harvard University Press 2019)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² The critique present in populist discourse and practice will be discussed in the second part of the paper.

²³ Jacques Rupnik, a renowned historian and expert of the East-Central European region, equally identifies Ryszard Legutko, together with Marcin Król, as important sources of critique of liberalism, not least in terms of a decoupling of democracy and liberalism, see Rupnik, supra n. 13.

²⁴ Such critique is interesting because it parallels or echoes critical voices regarding liberalism that can be found in the West (more on this below). Trencsenyi et al. draw, for instance, attention to the interest in republicanism and Hannah Arendt amongst Polish populists, Trencsenyi et al., supra n. 11, ch. 6.

²⁵ J.C. Isaac, ‘Is there illiberal democracy?’ Eurozine (2017), 〈www.eurozine.com/is-there-illiberal-democracy〉, visited 5 September 2019.

²⁶ See Trencsenyi et al., supra n. 11, ch. 6; Matyja, supra n. 17; Dąbrowska, supra n. 9.

²⁷ Matyja, supra n. 17, p. 203.

²⁸ Trencsenyi et al., supra n. 11, ch. 6.

²⁹ Dąbrowska, supra n. 9, p. 97.

³⁰ Legutko, R., ‘What’s Wrong with Liberalism?’, 50(1) Modern Age (2008) p. 7 Google Scholar.

³¹ Regarding this point, as well as some of the other points of critique discussed here, there is considerable overlap with other conservative thinkers. In the Polish context, Dariusz Gawin has, for instance, observed that liberal ‘tolerance’ does not clearly indicate what is morally right, see Trencsenyi et al., supra n. 11, p. 280. Similar ideas can be found in the works of the Hungarian intellectual András Lánczi, see Scheppele, supra n. 7. As observed above, this is not to say, however, that conservative populism is homogeneous.

³² Legutko, supra n. 30, p. 7, 8; italics in original. See also Rupnik, supra n. 13; Dąbrowska, supra n. 9; Matyja, supra n. 17.

³³ Legutko, supra n. 30, p. 8; italics in original.

³⁴ Such critical views of liberalism are clearly not confined to contemporary articulations of conservative populism in East-Central Europe. One finds similar points of critique in, for instance, leftist thinking, including critical legal studies, as well as in Western conservative thinking (see Skorupski, J., ‘The conservative critique of liberalism’, in The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism (Cambridge University Press 2015) p. 401 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sumption, Lord, ‘The Limits of the Law’, in Barber, N.W. et al., Lord Sumption and the Limits of the Law (Oxford University Press 2016 Google Scholar). In my opinion, this indicates a certain critical thrust in the views expressed by populists that needs to be acknowledged (not least because it exposes problems in liberal, legal thinking and practice), even if the practical, political, and normative answers provided by populists as an alternative are too often strongly at odds with democracy and hence fail to properly and convincingly live up to the critique.

³⁵ Legutko, R., The Demon in Democracy: Totalitarian Temptations in Free Societies (Encounter Books 2016) p. 118 Google Scholar.

³⁶ Legutko, supra n. 30, p. 9.

³⁷ Legutko, supra n. 30, p. 13. Lánczi makes a similar point in Political Realism and Wisdom that liberalism fails to engage with reality: Lánczi, A., Political Realism and Wisdom (Palgrave 2015 CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

³⁸ Legutko, supra n. 35, p. 131.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 132.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 134.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 135. A further aspect of the weakness and inauthenticity of liberalism, according to conservatives, is that it is lacking in ‘independent thinking’ (for those countries that have ‘imported’ liberalism) and displays a form of ‘voluntary colonialism’. Such inauthenticity is, in particular, inherent to the project of European integration: Wolff-Powęska, supra n. 15, p. 60-61. Legutko equally claims that the Polish have not only been made financially, but also mentally dependent on Western mentors and benefactors (Wolff-Powęska, supra n. 15, p. 62).

⁴² Legutko, supra n. 35, p. 140. This inauthenticity argument, in a typically populist manner, also means that intellectual knowledge and any form of expertise is frowned upon, whereas ‘popular knowledge’ is deemed superior (cf Wolff-Powęska, supra n. 15, p. 6).

⁴³ Hirschman, A.O., The Rhetoric of Reaction (Harvard University Press 1991 CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

⁴⁴ Legutko, supra n. 35, p. 141.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 141.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 101.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 96.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 101.

⁴⁹ Meaning here the continuing influence of ‘post-communists’ (former communists) in politics in the post-1989 era, for instance, in judicial and political positions (cf Trencsenyi et al., supra n. 11).

⁵⁰ Wolff-Powęska, supra n. 15, p. 57, 59.

⁵¹ Scheppele, supra n. 3, p. 61.

⁵² Ibid., p. 60.

⁵³ K.L. Scheppele, ‘Counter-constitutions: Narrating the Nation in Post- Soviet Hungary’, paper given at George Washington University, Washington DC, 2 April 2004.

⁵⁴ Cf E. Kowalewska, ‘Competing visions of Constitutionalism in Post-Socialist Poland’, paper presented at conference ‘New constitutionalism? New forms of democracy and rule of law beyond liberalism’, International Institute for the Sociology of Law, Oñati, Spain, 12-13 July 2018.

⁵⁵ See also Blokker, P., ‘Populism as a Constitutional Project’, 17(2) ICON (2019)Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ In a legalistic view of law, the rule of law is treated as a ‘political and revolutionary virtue which must be heavily defended’: Priban, J., Dissidents of Law: on the 1989 Velvet Revolutions, Legitimations, Fictions of Legality and Contemporary Version of the Social Contract (Ashgate 2002) p. 88.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Blokker, P., ‘Populist Constitutionalism’, in de la Torre, C. (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Global Populism (Routledge 2018); Blokker Google Scholar, supra n. 55.

⁵⁸ T. Koncewicz, ‘Understanding the politics of resentment’, Verfassungsblog, 28 September 2017.

⁵⁹ Trencsenyi et al., supra n. 11, p. 282.

⁶⁰ A. Balcer, ‘Beneath the surface of illiberalism: The recurring temptation of ‘national democracy’ in Poland and Hungary – with lessons for Europe’, Warsaw: Wise Europe, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, available at 〈wise-europa.eu/en/2017/02/14/beneath-the-surface-of-illiberalism-2/〉, visited 17 September 2019.

⁶¹ Legutko, supra n. 30, p. 9.

⁶² Ibid., p. 9.

⁶³ See 〈www.politico.eu/article/poland-constitution-crisis-kaczynski-duda/〉, visited 5 September 2019.

⁶⁴ Cited in Bucholc, M. and Komornik, M., ‘Gewaltenteilung ausgehebelt. Der Umbau der polnischen Justiz’, 3–5 Osteuropa (2018) p. 7 at p. 9 Google Scholar, emphasis added.

⁶⁵ J. Majchrowski et al., Report of the Team of Experts on the Issues Related to the Constitutional Tribunal of 15 July 2016 (2016) p. 16, 〈www.sejm.gov.pl/media8.nsf/files/ASEA-ADRKC8/%24File/Report%20of%20the%20Team%20of%20Experts%20on%20the%20Issues%20Related%20to%20the%20Constitutional%20Tribunal.pdf〉, visited 5 September 2019.

⁶⁶ Cited in Bucholc and Komornik, supra n. 64, p. 9.

⁶⁷ Government of Poland, ‘Position regarding draft Opinion of the Venice Commission on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal of 22 July’ (2016) p. 5 〈www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-REF(2016)060-e〉, visited 5 September 2019.

⁶⁸ In a similar manner, in a Symposium at the University of Oxford in May 2017, the late professor Lech Morawski, one of the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal appointed by PiS, accused the members of the Venice Commission of being experts closely allied to the (now former) president of the Tribunal, Rzepliński, see L. Morawski, Contribution to Symposium ‘The Polish constitutional crisis and institutional self-defence’, Trinity College, University of Oxford, 9 May 2017, p. 6, 〈trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/uroczystosci_spotkania_wizyty/2017/2017_05_09_Oxford/Wystapienie_prof._L.Morawskiego_w_Oxfordzie.pdf〉, visited 5 September 2019.

⁶⁹ Bucholc, M. and Komornik, M., ‘Die PiS und das Recht. Verfassungskrise und polnische Rechtskultur’, 66(1–2) Osteuropa (2016) p. 79 at p. 91 Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ Majchrowski et al., supra n. 65, p. 3-7.

⁷¹ See 〈pis.org.pl/aktualnosci/nie-pozwolimy-na-niszczenie-tradycyjnych-polskich-wartosci〉, visited 5 September 2019.

⁷² See 〈budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/〉, visited 17 September 2019.

⁷³ Cf Mautner, M., Law and the Culture of Israel (Oxford University Press 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁴ Teubner, G., Juridification of Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis in the Areas of Labor, Corporate, Antitrust and Social Welfare Law (Vol. 6) (Walter de Gruyter 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁵ Zajadło, J., ‘Pojęcie “imposybilizm prawny” a polityczność prawa i prawoznawstwa’, 72(3) Państwo i Prawo (2017)Google Scholar. See also 〈www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/prof-zajadlo-nie-ulegajmy-propagandzie-imposybilizmu-prawnego,70164.html〉, visited 17 September 2019.

⁷⁶ J. Kaczyński, ‘Czy Polska jest państwem prawa?Wykład na Uniwersytecie Jagiellońskim (2011), 〈pressje.pl/media/pressje_shop/article/article__issue_7.pdf〉, visited 5 September 2019.

⁷⁷ See K. Mazur, ‘Jarosław Kaczyński – ostatni rewolucjonista III RP’ [Jarosław Kaczyński – The last revolutionary of the Third Polish Republic] (2016), 〈klubjagiellonski.pl/2016/01/18/jaroslaw-kaczynski-ostatni-rewolucjonista-iii-rp/〉, visited 17 September 2019.

⁷⁸ Cited in Stanley, B., ‘Populism in central and Eastern Europe’, in The Oxford Handbook of Populism (Oxford University Press 2017) p. 140 Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ Kaczyński, supra n. 76, p. 227, cited in Bucholc, M., ‘The Polish Constitutional Crisis 2015–16: A Figurational Perspective’, 5(2) Human Figurations (2016)Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ Too many contemporary commentators on the ‘backlash’ or ‘illiberal turn’ in East-Central Europe seem largely unaware of (or simply ignore) the historical origins, and continuous presence in post-1989 times, of various counter-constitutional projects. As, for instance, clearly shown by Robert Brier’s discussion of the 1996-97 constitutional debates in Poland, many of the current arguments were already part of the highly polarised discussions between post-communists and left-liberals on the one hand, and the centre-right conservatives, gathered in Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) (PiS formed later, in 2001, out of parts of this conservative political grouping), on the other. For instance, Krzaklewski, leader of AWS, strongly argued against the draft constitution as violating the convictions of a larger part of society (see Brier, R., ‘The Roots of the “Fourth Republic” Solidarity’s Cultural Legacy to Polish Politics’, 23(1) East European Politics and Societies (2009) p. 63 at p. 65 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Jasiecki, supra n. 13), while others denounced the particularist, interest-based nature of the document and its reflection of a singular ideological orientation (p. 66).

⁸¹ Morawski, supra n. 68, p. 6.

⁸² Mazur, supra n. 77.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Sadurski, supra n. 2.

⁸⁵ Grzebalska and Pető, supra n. 14, p. 165.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 165.

⁸⁷ Mazur, supra n. 77.

⁸⁸ Morawski, supra n. 68, p. 3.

⁸⁹ Majchrowski, supra n. 65, p. 3.

⁹⁰ Morawski, supra n. 68, p. 4.

⁹¹ See 〈www.politico.eu/article/western-liberals-have-misunderstood-hungary-migration-geneva-convention/〉, visited 5 September 2019.

⁹² Grzebalska and Pető, supra n. 14.

⁹³ Cf Jasiecki, K., ‘The Nature of Capitalism in Poland. Controversy over the Economy Since the End of 2015: The Prospects of Business Elites and Employer Associations’, 8 Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy (2017) p. 171 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹⁴ As, for instance, becomes clear from the constitutional politics and debates in the transformative years in both Poland as well as Hungary, cf Brier, supra n. 80; Blokker, P., Multiple Democracies in Europe. Political Culture in New Member States (Routledge 2010)Google Scholar.

⁹⁵ Jasiecki, supra n. 14.

⁹⁶ Skąpska, G., ‘The decline of liberal constitutionalism in East Central Europe’, in Vihalemm, P. et al. (eds), The Routledge International Handbook of European Social Transformations (Routledge 2018)Google Scholar; Bucholc, supra n. 79; Bucholc and Komornik, supra n. 64.

⁹⁷ What I find particularly unhelpful is the tendency in current academic debate to ‘internalise’ the populist mindset by dividing academic contributions into ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ statements, contributing in this way to an atrophy of the intellectual terrain of discussion and, even worse, limiting any intellectual creativity/imagination in formulating insightful answers to the current dire predicament of constitutional democracy.

⁹⁸ As I argued some years ago (see Blokker, P., New Democracies in Crisis?: A Comparative Constitutional Study of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia (Routledge 2013))CrossRefGoogle Scholar. I believe that an important dimension of the current processes of ‘backsliding’ involves the lack of social embeddedness of the post-1989 liberal-constitutional projects.