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The Determinants of Constitutional Amendability: amendment models or amendment culture? - Z. Elkins et al., The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge University Press2009); - T. Ginsburg and J. Melton, ‘Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty’, 13(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law (2015) p. 686–713.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 April 2016

Xenophon Contiades  and
Alkmene Fotiadou
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Abstract

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Keywords

comparative constitutional amendmentlegal cultureempirical constitutionalism
Type
Review Essay
Information
European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , May 2016 , pp. 192 - 211
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2016 

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Footnotes

*

Dr.iur, Professor of Public Law, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Peloponnese; Managing Director, Centre for European Constitutional Law (Athens, Greece). Email: [email protected].

**

Dr.iur, Research Associate, Centre for European Constitutional Law (Athens, Greece). Email: [email protected].

References

1 Elkins, Z. et al., The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge University Press 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Epstein, L. and Martin, A. D., An introduction to empirical legal research (Oxford University Press 2014) p. 42Google Scholar.

3 Ginsburg, T. and Melton, J., ‘Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty’, 13(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law (2015) p. 686-713CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 See the distinction in Law, D., ‘Constitutions’, in P. Cane and H. Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press 2012) p. 379-398Google Scholar. Law points out that empirical research most often is conducted in relation to the ‘small c’ constitution.

5 Hirschl, R., Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2014)Google Scholar; Rosenfeld, M., The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture and Community (Routledge 2009)Google Scholar; Jacobsohn, G. J., Constitutional Identity (Harvard University Press 2010)Google Scholar.

6 See Balkin, J., Constitutional Redemption: Political faith in an unjust world (Harvard University Press 2011) p. 178CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 See ‘Legal Culture and Legal Consciousness’ in Smelser, N. J. and Bates, P. B. (eds.), The International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences (Elsevier 2001) p. 8625Google Scholar.

8 See e.g. Oliver, D. and Fusaro, C. (eds.), How Constitutions Change: A Comparative Study (Hart Publishing 2011)Google Scholar; Contiades, X. (ed.), Engineering Constitutional Change. A Comparative Perspective on Europe, Canada and the USA (Routledge 2013)Google Scholar.

9 See e.g. Lutz, D., ‘Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment’, 88(2) American Political Science Review (1994) p. 355-370CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lorenz, A., ‘How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity: Four Concepts and Two Alternatives’, 17(3) Journal of Theoretical Politics (2005) p. 339-361CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Elkins et al., supra n. 1.

10 Contiades, X. and Fotiadou, A., ‘Models of Constitutional Change’, in Contiades (ed.), supra n. 8, p. 417-468Google Scholar.

11 Ginsburg and Melton, supra n. 3, p. 687.

12 Contiades and Fotiadou, supra n. 10, p. 417-468 at p. 433.

13 Id. p. 440 ff.

14 Ginsburg and Melton, supra n. 3, p. 699.

15 Elkins et al., supra n. 1, p. 2-3.

16 Contiades and Fotiadou, supra n. 10, p. 432.

17 Strauss, D., ‘The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments’, 114 Harvard Law Review (2001) p. 1457CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 1487; Denning, B. P. and Vile, J. R., ‘The Relevance of Constitutional Amendments: A Response to David Strauss’, 77 Tulane Law Review (2002) p. 247Google Scholar.

18 Contiades and Fotiadou, supra n. 10, p. 432.

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20 Contiades and Fotiadou, supra n. 10, p. 458.

21 Id. p. 459.

22 Ginsburg and Melton, supra n. 3, p. 699.

23 Id. p. 687.

24 Rosenfeld, supra n. 5, p. 185.

25 Id. p. 149.

26 Elkins et al., supra n. 1, p. 207.

27 See Lutz, supra n. 9, p. 355-370 and also Lorenz, supra n. 9, p. 339-361.

28 Ginsburg and Melton, supra n. 3, p. 712.

29 Id. p. 699.

30 Contiades and Fotiadou, supra n. 10, p. 441, 417.

31 Ginsburg and Melton, supra n. 3, p. 693.

32 Id. p. 693.

33 Art. 110 Greek Constitution: ‘(2) The need for revision of the Constitution shall be ascertained by a resolution of Parliament adopted, on the proposal of not less than fifty Members of Parliament, by a three-fifths majority of the total number of its members in two ballots, held at least one month apart. This resolution shall define specifically the provisions to be revised. (3) Upon a resolution by Parliament on the revision of the Constitution, the next Parliament shall, in the course of its opening session, decide on the provisions to be revised by an absolute majority of the total number of its members. (4) Should a proposal for revision of the Constitution receive the majority of the votes of the total number of members but not the three-fifths majority specified in paragraph 2, the next Parliament may, in its opening session, decide on the provisions to be revised by a three-fifths majority of the total number of its members’.

34 Ginsburg and Melton, supra n. 3, p. 708.

35 See Contiades, X. and Tassopoulos, I., ‘Constitutional Change in Greece’, in Contiades (ed.), supra n. 8, p. 158Google Scholar ff.

36 Ginsburg and Melton, supra n. 3, p. 713.

37 Contiades and Fotiadou, supra n. 10, p. 432.

38 Ginsburg and Melton, supra n. 3, p. 700.

39 Contiades and Fotiadou, supra n. 10, p. 419.

40 Elkins et al., supra n. 1, p. 13.

41 Id. p. 13.

42 Hutchinson and Colon-Rios, supra n. 19, p. 50.

43 Ginsburg and Melton, supra n. 3, p. 702.

44 B. Ackerman, We the People, Volume 1: Foundations (Belknap Press 1993).

45 According to Jack Balkin ‘This is largely due to the fact that Ackerman’s theory flows from his understanding of history. Because he wants to get his facts right, as he studies the history, his theory adjusts accordingly’. See Balkin, J., ‘Bruce 3.0’, <//balkin.blogspot.gr/2014/05/bruce-30.html>>Google Scholar, visited 9 February 2016.

46 Contiades and Fotiadou, supra n. 10, p. 460.

47 Id. p. 461.

48 Ginsburg and Melton, supra n. 3, p. 701.

49 Id. p. 712, 713.

50 Contiades and Fotiadou, supra n. 10, p. 462.

51 Ginsburg and Melton, supra n. 3, p. 708.

52 Donohue, J. J. and Wolfers, J., ‘Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate’, 58 Stanford Law Review (2005) p. 791-841Google Scholar.

53 Cameron, W. B., Informal Sociology: A Casual Introduction to Sociological Thinking (Random House 1963)Google Scholar.

54 Hirschl, supra n. 5, p. 268.

55 Ginsburg and Melton, supra n. 3, p. 708.

56 Metrics-based approaches to culture have been attempted before in the field of psychology. Still, not only have they been subject to severe criticism but most importantly they bring forth how many parameters must be taken into consideration for quantifying culture. See Hofstede, G. et al., Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, 3rd edn (McGraw-Hill Education 2010)Google Scholar; McSweeney, B., ‘Hofstede’s Model of National Cultural Differences – and their Consequences: A Triumph of Faith – a Failure of Analysis’, 55(1) Human Relations (2002) p. 89-118CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57 Epstein and Martin, supra n. 2, p. 42.

58 Id. p. 65, 42.

59 Legrand, P., ‘Econocentrism’, 59(2) University of Toronto Law Journal (2009) p. 215-222CrossRefGoogle Scholar, (221).

60 Mazzone, J., ‘The Creation of a Constitutional Culture’, 40 Tulsa Law Review (2004) p. 671Google Scholar.

61 See Vorländer, H., ‘What is “Constitutional Culture”’, in S. Hensel et al. (eds.), Constitutional Cultures (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2012) p. 21Google Scholar.

62 Mazonne, supra n. 60, p. 672.

63 On constitutional culture and democracy see Ferejohn, J. et al. (eds.), Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule (Cambridge University Press 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

64 Law, supra n. 4, p. 388.

65 See Epstein, L. and King, G., ‘The rules of inference’, 69 University of Chicago Law Review (2002) p. 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 7.

66 See Epstein and King, supra n. 65, p. 7; Goldsmith, J. and Vermeule, A., ‘Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship’, 69 University of Chicago Law Review (2002) p. 153CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Epstein, L. and King, G., ‘A reply’, 69 University of Chicago Law Review (2002) p. 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 191.

67 Legrand, supra n. 59, p. 218.

68 Stone, D. A., Policy Paradox and Political Reason (Harper Collins 1988) p. 136-137Google Scholar.

69 See Whittington, K., ‘Constitutionalism’, in G. A. Caldeira et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press 2008) p. 292-294Google Scholar.

70 Contiades and Fotiadou, supra n. 10, p. 440.

71 Id. p. 446 ff.

72 See Contiades, X. and Fotiadou, A., ‘On Resilience of Constitutions. What Makes Constitutions Resistant to External Shocks?’, 9 ICL-Journal (2015) p. 3-26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73 Albert, R., ‘The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules’, 59(2) McGill Law Journal (2013) p. 225CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

74 Roznai, Y., ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments – The Migration and Success of a Constitutional Idea’, 61(3) American Journal of Comparative Law (2013) p. 657CrossRefGoogle Scholar.