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BPost and Nordzucker: Searching for the Essence of Ne Bis in Idem in European Union Law

ECJ 22 March 2022, Case C-117/20, BPost v Autorité belge de la concurrence Case C-151/20, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Nordzucker AG e.a.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2022

Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel
Pieter Van Cleynenbreugel*
Affiliation:
Professor of European Union law, University of Liège, Belgium; Guest professor of EU competition law, Université Paris-Dauphine, France; [email protected].
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European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 2022 , pp. 357 - 374
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© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of European Constitutional Law Review

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References

1 The Court of Justice of the European Union already recognised it as a fundamental principle prior to the Charter becoming a binding legal instrument, see ECJ Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2002:582, para. 59.

2 M. Luchtman, ‘The ECJ’s Recent Case Law on Ne Bis in Idem: Implications for Law Enforcement in a Shared Legal Order’, 55 Common Market Law Review (2018) p. 1717. See also among others J. Vervaele, ‘The Transnational Ne Bis in Idem Principle in the EU: Mutual Recognition and Equivalent protection of Human Rights’, 1 Utrecht Law Review (2005) p. 2; M. Wasmeier and N. Thwaites, ‘The Development of Ne Bis in Idem into a Transnational Fundamental Right’, 31 European Law Review (2006) p. 565; B. Van Bockel, The Ne Bis in Idem Principle in EU law (Kluwer 2010) p. 267 and J. Vervaele; ‘Ne Bis in Idem: Towards a Transnational Constitutional Principles in the EU?’, 9 Utrecht Law Review (2013) p. 211; J. Lelieur, ‘“Transnationalising” Ne Bis in Idem: How the Rule of Ne Bis in Idem Reveals the Principle of Personal Legal Certainty’, 9 Utrecht Law Review (2013) p. 198; and A. Turma, ‘Ne Bis in Idem in European Law: A Difficult Exercise in Constitutional Pluralism’, 9 European Papers (2020) p. 1341. For the ECJ’s apparent influence on ECtHR case law, see by way of example C. Serneels, ‘“Unionisation” of the European Court of Human Rights’ Ne Bis in Idem Jurisprudence: the Case of Mihalache v Romania’, 11 New Journal of European Criminal Law (2020) p. 232-234.

3 ECJ 22 March 2022, Case C-117/20, BPost, ECLI:EU:C:2022:202 (hereafter, BPost) and ECJ 22 March 2022, Case C-151/20, Nordzucker, ECLI:EU:C:2022:203 (hereafter Nordzucker).

4 For the autonomous notion of criminal in EU law, see ECJ 5 June 2012, Case C-489/10, Bonda, ECLI:EU:C:2012:319, para. 37; ECJ 20 March 2018, Case C-524/15, Menci, ECLI:EU:C:2018:197, para. 26; see also ECJ 26 February 2013, Case C-617/10, Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para. 35. The Court aligns this notion with the ECHR one, see ECtHR 23 November 1976, Engel and Others v the Netherlands, CE:ECHR:1976:1123JUD000510071, para. 82. See also V. Franssen, ‘La notion “pénale”: mot magique ou critère trompeur? Réflexions sur les distinctions entre le droit pénal et le droit quasi pénal’, in D. Thiel (ed.), Existe-t-il encore un seul non bis in idem aujourd’hui? (L’Harmattan 2017) p. 57.

5 ECJ 11 February 2003, Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Gözutök and Brügge, ECLI:EU:C:2003:87, paras. 28-30 and ECJ 10 March 2005, Case C-469/03, Miraglia, ECLI:EU:C:2005:156, para. 35. A second procedure includes one which could only result in a declaration of anticompetitive behaviour because of immunity from fines subsequent to a leniency application: see Nordzucker, supra n. 3, paras. 64-65.

6 On those conditions see M. Luchtman, ‘Ne Bis in Idem at the Interface of Administrative and Criminal Law Enforcement - Sufficiently Connected in Substance, Time and Space?’, Revue internationale de droit penal (2019) p. 339.

7 See for a summary of that distinction the Opinion of AG Bobek in ECJ 2 September 2021, Case C-117/20, BPost, ECLI:EU:C:2021:680, paras. 39-41.

8 See by way of examples, ECJ 9 March 2006, Case C-436/04, van Esbroeck, ECLI:EU:C:2006:165, para. 36; ECJ 28 September 2006, Case C-467/04, Gasparini and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2006:610, para. 54; ECJ 28 September 2006, Case C-150/05, van Straaten, ECLI:EU:C:2006:614, para. 48; ECJ 18 July 2007, Case C-367/05, Kraaijenbrink, ECLI:EU:C:2007:444, para. 26; ECJ 16 November 2010, Case C-261/09, Mantello, ECLI:EU:C:2010:683, para. 39.

9 Opinion of AG Bobek in BPost, supra n. 7, para. 40.

10 It goes back to the Walt Wilhelm case, where the Court held that EU and national competition laws did target restrictive behaviour from different points of view and with a different focus. Their parallel application was therefore possible, although consecutive sanctions needed to consider that a sanction had already been imposed for the same behaviour under another legal norm: ECJ 13 February 1969, Case 14-68, Walt Wilhelm, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4, para. 3.

11 ECJ 7 January 2004, Case C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland et al. v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2004:6, para. 338. See also R. Nazzini, ‘Parallel Proceedings in EU Competition Law – Ne Bis in Idem as a Limiting Principle’, in B. Van Bockel (ed.), Ne Bis in Idem in EU Law (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 131; and A. Rosano, ‘Ne Bis Interpretatio In Idem? The Two Faces of the Ne Bis In Idem Principle in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice’, 18 German Law Journal (2017) p. 39.

12 A. Weyembergh and I. Armada, ‘The Principle of Ne Bis in Idem in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, in V. Mitsilegas et al. (eds.), Research Handbook in EU Criminal Law (Edward Elgar 2016) p. 207; see also P. Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Le non bis in idem en droit de la concurrence: un monde de différence avec le penal?’, in Thiel, supra n. 4, p. 171.

13 BPost, supra n. 3, paras. 10-11.

14 Ibid., para. 12.

15 Ibid., paras. 13-14.

16 Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para. 16.

17 Ibid., para. 17.

18 Ibid., paras. 21-23.

19 Opinion of AG Bobek in BPost, supra n. 7, paras. 132-141. Opinion of AG Bobek in Case C-151/20, Nordzucker, ECLI:EU:C:2021:681, para. 39.

20 Opinion of AG Bobek in BPost, supra n. 7, para. 127.

21 Ibid., para. 119.

22 BPost, supra n. 3, para. 33; Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para. 38.

23 BPost, supra n. 3, para. 37. The Court more particularly referred to ECtHR 10 February 2009, Sergey Zolotukhin v Russia, CE:ECHR:2009:0210JUD001493903, § 83 and 84, and ECtHR 20 May 2014, Pirttimäki v Finland, CE:ECHR:2014:0520JUD003523211, § 49-52.

24 BPost, supra n. 3, para. 33; Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para. 38.

25 Menci, supra n. 4, para. 35; ECJ 20 March 2018, Case C-537/16, Garlsson Real Estate, ECLI:EU:C:2018:193, para. 37; ECJ 20 March 2018, Joined Cases C-596/16 and C-597/16, Di Puma, ECLI:EU:C:2018:192, paras. 38-40.

26 BPost, supra n. 3, para. 37.

27 Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para. 38.

28 Ibid., para. 41.

29 BPost, supra n. 3, para. 34; Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para. 39.

30 BPost, supra n. 3, para. 35; Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para. 40.

31 BPost, supra n. 3, para. 35; Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para. 40.

32 Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para. 41.

33 Ibid., para. 44.

34 Ibid., para. 46.

35 Ibid., para. 47.

36 BPost, supra n. 3, para. 41; Nordzucker, ibid., para. 50.

37 BPost, ibid., para. 43.

38 Ibid., para. 49.

39 Ibid., para. 51.

40 Ibid., paras. 55-58.

41 As it had been called upon to do, see R. Nazzini, ‘Parallel Proceedings in EU Competition Law – Ne Bis in Idem as a Limiting Principle’, in Van Bockel, supra n. 11, p. 160; Luchtman, supra n. 2, p. 1724-1725 notes that the rationale for a competition law specific ne bis in idem standard may no longer be correct in light of the Charter.

42 For the difference between national and transnational ne bis in idem issues in EU law, see also J. Vervaele, ‘The Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and its Ne Bis in Idem Principle in the Member States of the EU’, 6 Review of European Administrative Law (2013) p. 134.

43 Neither judgment raised questions regarding the scope of EU law; on that notion, see M. Dougan, ‘Judicial Review of Member State Action under the General Principles and the Charter: Defining the “Scope of Union Law’, 53 Common Market Law Review (2015) p. 1201.

44 For a criticism regarding the limits of that approach, see M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, ‘Jurisdictional Conflicts in Criminal Matters and Their Settlement within EU’s Supranational Settings’, European Criminal Law Review (2017) p. 30.

45 ECJ 3 April 2019, Case C-617/17, PZU, ECLI:EU:C:2019:283, para. 37.

46 By way of example van Esbroeck, supra n. 8, para. 38.

47 Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para. 41.

48 Ibid., para. 47.

49 BPost, supra n. 3, para. 51.

50 Opinion of AG Bobek in BPost, supra n. 7, para. 135.

51 Art. 55 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement foresees that member states cannot exclude ne bis in idem claims in cases involving behaviour taking place in part on their territory when the acts also took place in part in the territory of another member state where a first judgment was delivered. The Convention implicitly appears to acknowledge that such situations fall within the scope of ne bis in idem.

52 Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para 47.

53 At least according to the Explanations to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, [2007] OJ C303/17; see also D. Sarmiento, ‘Ne Bis in Idem in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice’, in Van Bockel, supra n. 11, p. 105.

54 See on that clause, X. Groussot and A. Ericsson, ‘Ne Bis in Idem in the EU and ECHR Legal Orders – A Matter of Uniform Interpretation?’ in Van Bockel, supra n. 11, p. 71-76.

55 For examples, see ECtHR 15 November 2016, A and B v Norway, CE:ECHR:2016:1115JUD002413011. For a focus on the connection between the substance of procedures, see ECtHR 21 July 2020, Velkov v Bulgaria, CE:ECHR:2000:0518JUD004148898.

56 See also for that difference H. Satzger, ‘Application Problems Relating to “Ne Bis in Idem” as Guaranteed under Art. 50 CFR/Art. 54 CISA and Art. 4 Prot. No. 7 ECHR’, eucrim – The European Criminal Law Association’s Forum (2019) p. 215.

57 See also W. Devroe, ‘How General Should General Principles Be? Ne Bis in Idem in EU Competition Law’, in U. Bernitz et al. (eds.), General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law (Kluwer 2013) p. 407.

58 That assumption requires a narrow understanding of Art. 52(3)’s homogeneity clause: see Groussot and Ericsson, supra n. 54, p. 77-78.

59 Menci, supra n. 4, para. 46.

60 This implies that the legal basis which permits the interference with another right must itself define the scope of the limitation on the exercise of the right concerned, see ECJ 5 May 2022, Case C-570/20, BV, ECLI:EU:C:2022:348, para. 31.

61 BPost, supra n. 3, para. 48.

62 See on that strict necessity, M. Vetzo, ‘The Past, Present and Future of the Ne Bis in Idem Dialogue between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights: The Cases of Menci, Garlsson and Di Puma’, 11 Review of European Administrative Law (2018) p. 70-74.

63 BPost, supra n. 3, para. 51.

64 Ibid., paras. 44 and 49; Nordzucker, supra n. 3, paras. 52 and 56.

65 G. Lo Schiavo, ‘The Principle of Ne Bis in Idem and the Application of Criminal Sanctions: of scope and Restrictions’, 14 EuConst (2018) p. 660.

66 Contrary to what the Walt Wilhelm case had implied, but as also proposed by the Advocate General in his Opinion in Nordzucker, supra n. 19, para. 58.

67 Opinion of AG Bobek in Nordzucker, supra n. 19, para. 58.

68 Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para. 56.

69 On the European Competition Network, see M. De Visser, Network-based Governance in EC Law: The Example of EC Competition and EC Communications Law (Hart Publishing 2009) p. 440.

70 See, in that regard, M. Kaiafa-Gbandi, ‘Addressing the Problems of Jurisdictional Conflicts in Criminal Matters within the EU’, eucrim – The European Criminal Law Association’s Forum (2020) p. 209-213.

71 BV, supra n. 60, para. 50.

72 It has indeed been argued quite convincingly that more coordination and transnational exchanges of information should rather result in avoiding double enforcement: see Luchtman, supra n. 2, p. 1746.

73 See to that extent, A. Perrone, ‘EU Market Abuse Regulation: The Puzzle of Enforcement’, 21 European Business Organization Law Review (2020) p. 379.

74 For an attempt, see Opinion of AG Jääskinnen in Case C-129/14 PPU, Spasic, ECLI:EU:C:2014:739, para. 88; the Court for its part did not touch upon the essence prior to BPost and Nordzucker.

75 BPost, supra n. 3, para. 43.

76 Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para. 55.

77 Ibid., para. 56.

78 See Groussot and Ericsson, supra n. 54, p. 57.

79 Ibid.

80 W. Wils, ‘The Principle of “Ne Bis in Idem2 in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis’, 26 World Competition (2003) p. 136.

81 Groussot and Ericsson, supra n. 54, p. 55.

82 Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para. 56.

83 BPost, supra n. 3, para. 58.

84 Ibid., para. 51; Nordzucker, supra n. 3, para. 47.

85 See BPost, ibid., para. 58.

86 For an overview, see M. Dawson et al., ‘What is the Added Value of the Concept of the “Essence” of EU Fundamental Rights?’, 20 German Law Journal (2019) p. 765-769.

87 T. Tridimas and G. Gentile, ‘The Essence of Rights: an Unreliable Boundary?’, 20 German Law Journal (2019) p. 804.

88 Tridimas and Gentile, supra n. 87, p. 804.

89 K. Lenaerts, ‘Limits on Limitations: The Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU’, 20 German Law Journal (2019) p. 792-793.

90 T. Ojanen, ‘Making the Essence of Fundamental Rights Real: The Court of Justice of the European Union Clarifies the Structure of Fundamental Rights under the Charter’, 12 EuConst (2016) p. 318; M. Brkan, ‘The Concept of Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal Order: Peeling the Onion to its Core’, 14 EuConst (2018) p. 332 and M. Brkan, ‘The Essence of the Fundamental Rights to Privacy and Data Protection: Finding the Way Through the Maze of the CJEU’s Constitutional Reasoning’, 20 German Law Journal (2019) p. 864.

91 E. Muir, ‘The Essence of the Fundamental Right to Equal Treatment – Back to the Origins?’, 20 German Law Journal (2019) p. 817.

92 For that position, see ECJ 26 February 2013, Case C-399/11, Melloni, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, para. 60.

93 O. De Schutter, ‘The Implementation of the Charter by the Institutions of the European Union’, in S. Peers et al. (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Commentary (Hart Publishing 2013) p. 1627.