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HAVING TO DO WITH KNOWLEDGE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2016

Baron Reed
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Abstract

I articulate the value of the epistemic and the central importance of epistemology in response to a challenge from Allan Hazlett. I argue that epistemic evaluations should not be simply absorbed into a single, all-things-considered point of view.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Special Issue 4: 2015 Episteme Conference , December 2016 , pp. 549 - 554
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

REFERENCES

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