Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2020
This paper proposes a classification of government expropriations of foreign property based on the types of alliances sought out by governments in their quest for support for those actions. Based on a review of historical literature and social science studies of expropriations in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America in the twentieth century, we define three types of alliances: with organized labor, with domestic business owners, or with sections of the civil service or the ruling party. We posit that each sector allying itself with the government expects rewards from the expropriation. We maintain that the type of alliance is determined by several factors, in particular, the longevity and legitimacy of the nation-state of the expropriating country, the strength of organized labor, and the political participation and strength of the domestic business sector. Our framework complements existing studies explaining when and why expropriations take place.
The authors are listed alphabetically; both contributed equally to the article.
We are grateful for the feedback and comments on previous versions of this paper in presentations at the World Economic History Conference (Stellenbosch, 2011; Boston, 2018), Business History Conference (Philadelphia, 2012), World Business History Conference (Frankfurt, 2014), Academy of International Business (Copenhagen, 2019), Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá, 2012), Florida International University (Miami, 2010), École Polytechnique (Paris, 2014), and University College of London (2019). We give special thanks to Stephen Kobrin, Rory Miller, Aldo Musacchio, Thilo Jungkind, Eric Godelier, Hervé Dumez, Noel Maurer, Carlos Dávila, Kenneth Lipartito, Jason Yackee, Lauge Poulson, and Mira Wilkins. We also thank the Andrew Popp as the journal editor and anonymous referees for their suggestions.