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39 Appendix A, V.

40 Appendix A, IV.

41 In tracing sons and unmarried daughters, the principal problem is deaths subsequent to their father's demise but before they themselves reached maturity. The principal problem with respect to married daughters is ascertaining the occupations of husbands whom we know to come from London business families but who themselves cannot be identified as businessmen.

42 The 10 aldermanic sons and kin who themselves became aldermen were two sons each of Sir Francis Child and Sir Francis Eyles; the eldest sons of Sir Ambrose Crowley, Sir Richard Levett, and Sir John Parsons; nephews of Sir Samuel Stanier and Sir Patience Ward, and Sir Charles Thorold's brother.

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55 Samuel Heathcote was a younger brother of Sir Gilbert, Sir William Scawen was Sir Thomas's elder brother, William Gore was the eldest son and John Gore a younger son of Sir William, Owen Buckingham was the only son of Sir Owen, and Edward Jeffreys was the eldest son of Sir Jeffrey. Rowland Aynsworth and John Edmonds were, respectively, the sons-in-law of Sir John Fleet and Sir William Hedges. In addition, Hedges, by his first marriage, was an uncle of Sir Samuel Sambrooke.

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70 The usefulness of civic officeholding as a predictor of the careers of eldest sons would not necessarily hold true for mid-eighteenth-century London, for by then the flight from the freedom by substantial businessmen had escalated. Hence, a substantially lower proportion of businessmen directors of the monied companies were citizens and a substantially lower proportion of common councilmen were merchants or financiers. See Rogers, N., ‘London politics from Walpole to Pitt: patriotism and independency in an era of commercial imperialism, 1738–63’ (Ph.d. thesis, University of Toronto 1974), 312, 340–1.Google Scholar

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