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Plan G – A ‘Counterblast’? British Policy towards the Messina Countries, 1956

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 September 2008

Martin Schaad
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Extract

As the new Labour government has declared its intention to enhance Britain's role in Europe, there is renewed interest in the chequered history of Anglo-European relations. Of particular relevance in view of the present policy reappraisal is the period between 1955 and 1963, as the challenge here is to account for perhaps the most fundamental policy reversal: from Britain's refusal to take part in the common market project launched by the six member countries of the European Coal and Steel Community(ECSC) at the Messina conference to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's effort to negotiate entry into the European Economic Community (EEC). Given that this latter effort proved unsuccessful, it is said by some that the earlier date represents the British failure to seize the opportunity to be part of the European project. The catchphrase‘missing the boat at Messina’ – though not undisputed – is most illustrative of this view.

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Articles
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Contemporary European History , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , March 1998 , pp. 39 - 60
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1998

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References

I am very grateful to Professors George C. Peden, Joachim Jens Hesse andAlan Milward as well as toDr Piers Ludlow, Dr Frances Lynch and BettinaBastian-Burgess for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. For funding and encouragement, I am indebted to the Carnegie Trust for theUniversities of Scotland as well as to the German Historical Institute, London.

1 The most comprehensive account of British policy towards European integration after 1955 remains that of Camps, Miriam, Britain and the European Community, 1955–1963 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964).Google Scholar For details of Plan G and the subsequent negotiations, see The Free Trade Area Negotiations, Political and Economic Planning Occasional Papers Vol. 2 (London: Political and Economic Planning, 1959) by the same author, and the official documentation Negotiations for a EuropeanFree Trade Area. Documents relating to the Negotiations from July, 1956, to December, 1958, Cmnd. 641 (London: HMSO, 1959).Google Scholar

2 Comment by an official of the Foreign Office's Western Department on the chances of influencing German economic and monetary policy from within or without the common market, 11 June 1956, in FO 371/124587, Foreign Office Record, Public Record Office, London. All subsequent references to the Foreign Office (FO), the Treasury (T) and the Cabinet (CAB) are also to files held here.

3 Prime Minister Major's promise to the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in March 1991 as quoted in Young, John W., Britain and European Unity, 1945–1992 (London: Macmillan, 1993), 162;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Robin Cook's first policy statement as Foreign Secretary, 2 May 1997, on the Foreign Office's Internet site: http://www.fco.gov.uk/keythemes/europe.

4 In 1960, officials under the Treasury's Permanent Secretary Sir Frank Lee were examining the political and economic effects of Britain signing the Treaties of Rome. This was their answer to Prime Minister Macmillan's question I (6) as to Britain's ability to influence the future course of integration. See EQ (60) 29, 1 June 1960, in CAB 134/1820 and C (60) 107, 6 July 1960, in CAB 129/102.

5 The British assessment of and reactions to the Messina enterprise are thoroughly documented by Burgess, Simon and Edwards, Geoffrey: ‘The Six plus One: British policy-making and the question of European economic integration, 1955’, in International Affairs, Vol. 64 (3) (1988), 393–413CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Young, John W., ‘The Parting of Ways'? Britain, the Messina Conference and the Spaak Committee, June–December 1955’, in Dockrill, Michael and Young, John W., eds., British Foreign Policy, 1945–1956 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 197–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 These were essentially the conclusions of an interdepartmental working group under the chairmanship of Burke Trend who, as Under-Secretary to Clarke was later to be influential in formulating Plan G.See the report of the working group of 24 Oct. 1955, MAC (55) 199, 200 and 201 in CAB 134/1030.

7 See Churchill's cabinet memorandum C (51) 32, 29 Nov. 1951, in CAB 129/48.

8 For examples of the growing literature on American attitudes towards European integration, see Winand, Pascaline, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993)Google Scholar, and Klaus Schwabe, ‘Die Vereinigten Staaten und die Europäische Integration: Alternativen der amerikanischen Außenpolitik (1950–55)’, in Trausch, G., ed., Die Europäische Integration vom Schumanplan bis zu den Verträgen von Rom (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993).Google Scholar

9 A free trade area arrangement implies the removal of tariffs and quotas on the trade flows between the members of that area. A customs union arrangement additionally implies the harmonisation of tariffs all members impose on imports from countries which are not members of that union.

10 Among the many who share this view, see Young, John W., Britain and European Unity, 1945–1992 (London: Macmillan, 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chapters 2 and 3. Judging Plan G on its economic merits, Alan Milward essentially arrives at the conclusion that it was so heavily biased in Britain's favour, that it could only have been meant to secure the ‘best of both worlds’; see Milward, Alan S., The European Rescue of the Nation State (London: Routledge, 1992), chapter 7.Google Scholar

11 See, in particular, Greenwood's, SeanBritain and European CooperationSince 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)Google Scholar, chapter 6, in which he argues that ‘behind the trappings of a modest conversion to “Europeanism” lay nothing much more than a common British reflex urge to wreck the Spaak proposals’. See also Lamb, Richard, The Failure of the Eden Government (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1987), 87–99Google Scholar, and The Macmillan Years, 1957–1963 (London: John Murray, 1995), chapter 7.Google Scholar Finally, see Griffiths, Richard T., ‘A Slow One Hundred and EightyDegree Turn’ (unpublished paper, European University Institute conference, Florence, 17–19 Feb. 1994).Google Scholar

12 The effect of this division on the formulation of Germany's policy on European integration is thoroughly documented. See, for example, Schwarz, Hans-Peter, Adenauer: Der Staatsmann: 1952–1967 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1991), chapters 2 and 3Google Scholar, and Küsters, Hanns-Jürgen, ‘Der Streit um Kompetenzen und Konzeptionen deutscher Europapolitik, 1949–1959’, in W. Bührer, L. Herbst and Sowade, H., eds., Vom Marshallplan zur EWG, die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt (München: Oldenbourg, 1990), 335–70.Google Scholar

13 For example, the departmental head of the German Foreign Ministry's European Political Integration department, Wilhelm Hartlieb, speculated that the common market was meant to ‘dissolve’ in the wider scheme. See his memorandum of 25 July 1956. See also the comments of Walter Hallstein (State Secretary at the German Foreign Ministry, later to be appointed first President of the European Commission) at the meeting between State Secretaries of Foreign Ministries of the Six, 20 July 1956, both in AA:PA Vol. 927 Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry, Bonn. All subsequent references to the Auswärtige Amt (AA) are also to the Political Archive in Bonn.

14 See comments made by Spaak's Chef de Cabinet, Robert Rothschild, during ‘Messina! Messina! or the parting of Ways’, BBC Radio 3 programme, written and presented by Michael Charlton, transmitted 9 March 1981, transcript held at BBC Script Library.

15 For the discussion about withdrawal, see William Strath (Head of the Treasury's Overseas Finance Division) to Chancellor R. A. Butler, 20 Sep. 1955, and Sir Edward Bridges (Permanent Secretary to the Treasury) to Butler, 20 Sep. 1955, as well as Crookshank (Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons) to Butler, 21 Sep. 1955, Harold Macmillan (then Foreign Secretary) to Butler, 23 Sep. 1955, and Thorneycroft (President of Board of Trade) to Butler, 23 Sep. 1955, all in T 232/432. For the ongoing dispute about the departure of the British representative, see conflicting comments by Bretherton and Rothschild during ‘Messina! Messina!’.

16 See EP (55) 11th meeting, 11 Nov. 1955, in CAB 134/1226. The relevant committee of officials had indeed advised against such an approach, claiming that 'an attempt to persuade the six countriesto pursue their scheme … within the OEEC had no chance of success'; see ES (55) 8th meeting, 1 Nov. 1955 in CAB 134/889.

17 See Lord Reading (Minister of State, FO) relaying the EP Committee's conclusions to FO, and draft of the two telegrams, 11 Nov. 1955 by the head of the Foreign Office's Mutual Aid Department, Alan Edden, in FO 371/116035A.

18 See memo by Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees, 24 Nov. 1955, MAC (55) 219, in CAB 134/1030, and Frank Figures (Under-Secretary, Treasury) to Clarke (Third Secretary, Treasury) and Wright (Assistant Under-Secretary, FO), 25 Nov. 1955, in T 234/182.

19 For Sir Hugh's statement, see 6 Dec. 1955, in T 234/182.

20 See Sir Hugh reporting to MAC, 12 Dec. 1955, MAC (55) 233, in CAB 134/1030.

21 See for example the instructions sent by FO to high commissioners after the informal OEEC meeting, in which British policy towards the Six was still described as ‘pressing for the plan to be fitted in the wider framework of the OEEC’, 14 Dec. 1955, in T 234/182.

22 Frederick Hoyer-Millar (HM Ambassador in Bonn) to FO, quoting official English translation of German reply, 31 Dec. 1956, in FO 371/122044.

23 For the full text of the German reply and for the latter comment by Robert Munro (Mutual Aid Department, FO), see Tebbit (HM embassy, Bonn) to Edden, 31 Dec. 1955, in FO 371/122044.

24 See reports by HM Ambassador in The Hague, Sir Paul Mason, 10 Dec. 1955, 10 Dec. 1955, 13 Dec. 1955, and 14 Dec. 1955. These prompted Sir Hugh to quote other Dutch politicians to the contrary effect, presumably because he felt that his account of the meeting was being challenged; see Sir Hugh to FO, 12 Dec. 1955, 17 Dec. 1955, 21 Dec. 1955, all in FO 371/116035b. See also Sir Paul to FO and minutes by Munro and Rodgers (Assistant Head of the Mutual Aid Department, FO), to the effect that the meeting seems to have backfired, 8 Dec. 1955, in FO 371/122044.

25 See Roger Makins (HM Ambassador, Washington) to FO 23 Dec. 1955. See also minutes by Munro, Rodgers, Johnson (Head of Western Department, FO) and Edden, all in FO 371/115999.

26 MAC (56) 2nd meeting, 10 Jan. 1956, in CAB 134/1282. See also Wright to Clarke 11 Jan. 1956, in FO 371/122022.

27 MAC (56) 6, 13 Jan. 1956, in CAB 134/1283.

28 However, some Treasury officials still assumed that the common market would fail; see Clarke to Sir Leslie Rowan (Second Secretary, Treasury), 16 Jan. 1956, in T 234/182.

29 See, for example, Schwabe, Klaus, ‘Die Vereinigten Staaten und die Europäische Integration: Alternativen der amerikanischen Außenpolitik (1950–55)’, in Trausch, G., ed., Die Europäische Integration vom Schumanplan bis zu den Verträgen von Rom (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993).Google Scholar

30 Eden reporting to cabinet, CM (56) 13th meeting, 9 Feb. 1956, in CAB 128/30.

31 For the first Foreign Office official worried about Britain's negative approach, see proposals by Minister of State, Anthony Nutting, of extending the Commonwealth preference system to cover Europe in his memorandum, 10 Jan. 1956, in FO 371/122023.

32 For his claim, see Macmillan, Harold, Riding the Storm, 1956–1959 (London: Macmillan, 1971), 74–7.Google Scholar

33 See, for example, Macmillan to Sir Leslie, 23 Jan. 1956, in T 234/183, and to Sir Edward, 1 Feb. 1956 and 24 Feb. 1956, both in T 234/100.

34 Sir Caimcross, Alec, Years of Recovery: British Economic Policy 1945–51 (London: Methuen, 1985), 55.Google Scholar

35 Macmillan to Sir Edward, 24 Feb. 1956, in T 234/100. For the records of the Clarke working group, see T 234/101, and also FO 371/122025. Substantive work only began in March 1956; see Clarke to Harold Caccia (Deputy Under-Secretary, FO), 1 March 1956, and record of first meeting 7 March 1956, both in FO 371/122024.

36 See report by Clarke working group, 21 April 1956, in FO 271/122025.

37 Note by Clarke, 29 May 1956, in T 234/101, not citing any evidence for the latter claim. The working group had not asked for an FO assessment at this stage.

38 See Bretherton's four-page memorandum on the advantages of an industrial free trade area, undated (received in registry 15 March 1956), in FO 371/122044; see also Bretherton's note to Clarke working group, 4 April 1956, also in FO 371/122044.

39 For the two articles by Meade, see Manchester Guardian 14 March 1956 and 15 March 1956; for Bretherton's claim see Charlton, Michael, The Price of Victory (London: BBC, 1983), 177–87.Google Scholar For the suspicion of official encouragement, see Camps, Miriam, Britain and the European Community, 1955–1963 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964).Google Scholar For advance information, see Figgures to FO, passing on Meade's letter to Bretherton, 25 Jan. 1956, FO 371/122044. See also footnote 62 below.

40 See record of meeting, 31 May 1956, in FO 371/122028.

41 See Thomeycroft to Macmillan, 22 May 1956, in FO 371/122028.

42 For the discussion about the telegram, see EP (55) 11th meeting, 11 Nov. 1955, CAB 134/1226 and Edden's draft, 11 Nov. 1955, F 371/116035A. See also Macmillan to Sir Edward, 1 Feb. 1956, in T 234/100, and Thomeycroft to Macmillan, 22 May 1956, in FO 371/122028.

43 See Clarke to Sir Leslie, 16 Jan. 1956, in T 234/182, and Macmillan complaining about this attitude to Sir Edward, 1 Feb. 1956, in T 234/100.

44 For the expectation that the chances of the common market would increase after the French elections, see Johnston to Lord Hood (Head of Western Organisation Department, FO), arguing that it would no longer be reasonable ‘to suppose that the “slipper” would ultimately be left with the French’, 23 Jan. 1956, in FO 371/122022. For the views of opponents of the common market in Germany, see Allen (HM embassy, Bonn) to FO, 24 Jan. 1956, in FO 371/122022. For the view on German industry, see Treasury brief for Eden's visit to the US, 6 Jan. 1956, in T 234/182, and UK delegation to the ECSC reporting to the FO on the views of the chairman of the BDI, Fritz Berg, 10 Jan. 1956, in FO 371/122022.

45 See papers of the Clarke working group, in T 234/100 passim, and its report, 21 April 1956, in FO 371/122025. For a particularly striking example of the British assessment of the German economy, see report of 11 July 1956, in FO 371/124587.

46 See, for example, Greenwood, Sean, Britain and European Cooperation since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)Google Scholar, especially chapters 4–6.

47 Brief for the PM–s visit in MAC (56) 6, 13 Jan. 1956, in CAB 134/1283.

48 For the following argument, see Wright to Clarke, 11 Jan. 1956, in FO 371/122022, Nutting's memorandum of 10 Jan. 1956, in FO 371/122023, and the report of Clarke's working group, 21 April 1956, in FO 371/122025.

49 Wright's memorandum, 17 May 1956, in FO 371/122028.

50 Caccia's comment on an ES El report, 30 May 1956, in FO 371/122028.

51 See Clarke to Sir Leslie, 16 Jan. 1956, in T 234/182.

52 Macmillan to Sir Edward, 1 Feb. 1956, in T 234/100.

53 See Clarke's memo, 29 May 1956, in T 234/101.

54 See report of Clarke's working group, 21 April 1956, in FO 371/122025.

55 Allen to FO, 24 Jan. 1956, in FO 371/122022.

56 See Munro's comment on the report, 24 Jan. 1956, in FO 371/122022.

57 While Erhard concentrated on criticising supranational integration within the cabinet, he did not shy away from making his views public in most confrontational terms (see, for example, his article in the official Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregienng, Bonn 6 Sep. 1955). For privately voiced criticisms, see Erhard to Adenauer, 25 March 1955, in B 136/1310 Vol. 1 (BuKa), Files of the Bundeskanzleramt, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz. Subsequent references to the Chancellor's Office (BuKa), the Ministry for Economics (BMWi) and the Ministry for Economic Co-operation (BMWZ), are also to documents held in Koblenz.

58 See Adenauer, Konrad, Erinnerungen, 1955–1959 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1967), 253.Google Scholar While German Ministers are accountable for the running of their departments (Ressortprinzip) as well as for the joint formulation of policy (Kabinettsprinzip), the German Chancellor has the constitutional right to issue guidelines. This Richtlinienkompetenz is laid down in Art. 65 of the basic law. For Adenauer's skilful use of this provision, see Hennis, Wilhelm, Richtlinienkompetenz und Regierungstechnik (Tübingen: Mohr, 1964).Google Scholar

59 See Munro's comment on the report, 24 Jan. 1956, in FO 371/122022. See also the brief for the Erhard visit, discussed in the Mutual Aid Committee 7th meeting, 17 Feb. 1956 in CAB 134/1282. The brief itself stated: ‘It would be desirable to remind Professor Erhard that he was himself uncertain about the outcome of the common market and its effect on free trade policies’, in MAC (56) 27, in CAB 134/1283.

60 Note on the discussion between Macmillan and Erhard on 23 Feb. 1956. See also note on earlier discussion, 21 Feb. 1956, both in T 234/27. Erhard also made his views public in the official Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, Vol. 4 no. 10, 8 March 1956 (English version), in FO 371/122024.

61 Hoyer-Millar to Prime Minister's Office, 4 April 1956, in PREM 11/1365; see also report on Adenauer's speech, in 23 March 1956, FO 371/122024.

62 The brief for Brentano's visit recommended asking the minister whether ‘the German Government [is] prepared for the fact that the failure of the common market idea may have serious effects on Europe? and have they given any thought to what else would be needed?’, in T 234/67; see also Foreign Office brief for the visit, FO 371/122025.

63 Note of conversation by Figgures, 2 May 1956, in T 234/67. Next to Figgures's report about Brentano's reference to Meade's articles, Clarke scribbled at the margin: ‘i.e. Plan E’.

64 Clarke's memo on the report of his working group, 29 May 1956, in T 234/101. The ‘collective approach’ referred to the 1952 plan to move towards limited convertibility within the sterling area, as part of a wider goal of removing world-wide barriers to trade. The ultimate goal of the plan was, of course, full convertibility. The collective approach had been formulated by the then head of the Treasury's Overseas Finance Division, Sir Leslie and Sir George Lewis French Bolton of the Bank of England. For a discussion of their plan, see Milward, Alan S., The European Rescue of the Nation State (London: Roudedge, 1992), 358–84.Google Scholar

65 See Thnorneycroft to Macmillan, 22 May 1956, in FO 371/122028 and memo by Board of Trade 22 May 1956, in T 234/195. For the Foreign Office preference for the first alternative, see MAC (56) 14th meeting, 27 April 1956, discussing FO memorandum MAC (56) 64 on the merger of institutions of the Council of Europe and OEEC, described by Figgures as a ‘counterblast to the Messina proposals’, in CAB 134/1282. For FO fear that E would encounter US opposition, see Wright's minute, 17 May 1956, in FO 371/122028. Interestingly, this correct prediction of US reactions was ignored.

66 See record of the ministerial meeting in the Treasury, 31 May 1956, in FO 371/122028.

67 See Clarke's opening paper to the working group, 2 June 1956, in T 234/102.

68 Greenwood, Sean, Britain and European Cooperation Since 1945(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 70.Google Scholar See, for example, Sir Hugh to Wright, 11 Aug. 1956, in T 234/196.

69 See FBI to FO, 3 Sep. 1956, in FO 371/122033. See also the resolution sent to FO by the British National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce, 29 Oct. 1956, in FO 371/122038.

70 See Figgures's draft questionnaire, 27 July 1956, in FO 371/122032. The letter itself is in ES (EI) (56) 3, in CAB 134/1239.

71 See comments by Colonial Secretary in cabinet, CM (56) 66th meeting, 18 Sep. 1956, in CAB 128/30. For the benefits of an Anglo-Australian wheat agreement to the reception of Plan G, see EP (56) 71, 31 Aug. 1956, in CAB 134/1231.

72 See HM embassy, Washington to FO, 11 Aug. 1956, FO 371/122033.

73 Jebb, in ES (EI) (56) 18, 17 Aug. 1956, CAB 134/1239. The same argument was, however, restated by Clarke, 3 Sep. 1956, in T 234/197 and it also entered into the report of 31 Aug. 1956. EP (56) 70, in CAB 134/1231.

74 Within a free trade area, the definition of origin refers to the circumstances under which a product can be regarded as having been produced within that area, and which should hence enjoy freedom from tariffs if sold in another member country. The origin of goods traded between member countries of the free trade area has to be controlled at the border in order to avoid possible deflections of trade flows. These occur if one free trade area country has a lower external tariff on certain products. Imports into this country may then be re-exported free of tariff to another member country, thereby undermining the latter's tariff protection and hence tariff autonomy vis-à-vis third countries. The practical advantage of a customs union lies in the fact that the common external tariff prevents this effect, thereby allowing for real integration in form of the abolition of border controls. However, when seeking to include only some and not all members of a customs union in a free trade area, the problem of definition of origin is aggravated. A product may be produced in or enter a low tariff member country of the free trade area, be re-exported tariff-free to a member country of both customs union and free trade area, and finally enter – again tariff-free – the customs union country not participating in the free trade area. The latter country would by default become a member of the free trade area against its will. The only measure to avoid this effect lies in reintroducing border controls between those customs union members which are also members of the free trade area, and those which are not. This, in turn, would mean that there is no real customs union any longer. There is no historical precedent for a solution to this problem.

75 See Allen to Wright, 11 Aug. 1956, FO 371/122033.

76 See the final report, 31 Aug. 1956, EP (56) 70, in CAB 134/1231.

77 See Cabinet memorandum by the Chancellor and the President of the Board of Trade entitled ‘United Kingdom Commercial Policy’ CP (56) 192, 28 July 1956 in CAB 129/82 1956 (emphasis in original).

78 See CM (56) 65th meeting, 14 Sep. 1956, and CM (56) 66th meeting, 18 Sep. 1956, both in CAB 128/30. The same ‘scaring tactic’ was used to convince Commonwealth Finance Ministers, see Figgures to Wright, sending a draft letter to Commonwealth Finance Ministers, 10 Sep. 1956, in FO 371/122033.

79 For the text of Macmillan's news conference in Washington, see ES (EI) (56) 50, 4 Oct. 1956, in CAB 134/1240. For the press release, see Central Office for Information, overseas press service, 3 Oct. 1956, in FO 371/122052.

80 See Isaacson (HM embassy, Paris), to FO 24 Oct. 1956, and comments by Rodgers and Edden, in FO 371/122036. Enthusiasm for the free trade area without a customs union was also found among German industrialists; see Martin Liebes (Industriekreis für Auslandsbeziehungen) to Lord Hope, 23 Oct. 1956, in FO 371/122038.

81 See Hartlieb's report on the first meeting of the common market committee, 5 July 1956, AA:PA Vol. 911.

82 See comments made by Günther Harkort (Head of AA Sub-Department 40 ‘General Trade Policy’) and by the Head of the Economic Policy Department of the BMWi, Alfred Müller-Armack at inter-ministerial meeting, 30 June 56, in B 136/1312 (BuKs).

83 Adenauer's comment at cabinet meeting, 20 July 1956, in B 136/1313 (BuKa): ‘… man müsse also nun versuchen indirekt über den britischen Freihandelsplan zu einem Gemeinsamen Markt zu kommen.’

84 A translation of Macmillan's Washington statement was later printed in Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Vol. 188. Quote taken from Erhard to Brentano (copy to Adenauer), 4 Oct. 1956, in AA:MB Vol. 48.

85 See Etzel to Adenauer, 4 Oct. 1956, in AA:BStS Vol. 350. The Ministry for Economic Cooperation (BMWZ) apparently supported this interpretation of British motives, see minute on AA and Economics Ministry's cabinet memoranda, 4 Oct. 1956, in B 146/1845 (BMWZ).

86 See Brentano's comments in cabinet, 5 Oct. 1956, as reported by Karl Carstens (Assistant Head of Political Department, AA) at an inter-ministerial meeting 6 Oct. 1956, in AA:PA Vol. 913.

87 See German embassy, Luxembourg to AA, 9 Oct. 1956, Carstens' memo, 11 Oct. 1956, and Hartlieb to Wilhelm Grewe (Head of Political Department, AA) 18 Oct. 1956, all in AA:PA Vol. 907.

88 See Carstens to Hallstein, 22 Oct. 1956, in AA:PA Vol. 907.

89 See, for example, Hoyer-Millar to FO, 23 Oct. 1956, and Isaacson to FO 24 Oct. 1956, both in FO 371/122036. See also Tahourdin (HM embassy, The Hague) to FO 25 Oct. 1956, and Hoyer-Millar to FO, 27 Oct. 1956, both in FO 371/122037. The Foreign Office, however, did not share their gloomy outlook on the chances of the common market; see FO to HM representatives abroad, 30 Oct. 1956, in T 234/199.

90 Edden at ES (EI) (56) 16th meeting, 8 Nov. 1956, in CAB 134/1238.

91 This argument was based on the assumption that the customs union would discriminate against Commonwealth exports, whereas the free trade area would allow countries of the Six to determine their individual tariff policy, which was expected to be on balance more favourable to Commonwealth products. It derived additional strength from the plan of the Six to include overseas territories, see ES (EI) (56), 17th meeting, 15 Nov. 1956, in CAB 134/1238.

92 See first version of the Subcommittee's memorandum ES (EI) (56) 79, 9 Nov. 1956, in T 234/200.

93 Clarke's memorandum to Makins (now Joint Permanent Secretary, Treasury), 7 Nov. 1956, in T 234/104. See also ES (EI) (56), 17th meeting, 15 Nov. 1956, in CAB 134/1240.

94 See FO to HM representatives abroad, 23 Oct. 1956, in T 234/199.

95 See first version of the Subcommittee's memorandum ES (EI) (56) 79, 9 Nov. 1956, in T 234/200.

96 See final version of the Subcommittees memorandum ES (EI) (56) 79, discussed in its 17th meeting, 15 Nov. 1956, in CAB 134/1240.

97 See Hoyer-Millar to FO, 8 Nov. 1956, in FO 371/122038.

98 See final version of the Subcommittee's memorandum ES (EI) (56) 79, discussed in its 17th meeting, 15 Nov. 1956, in CAB 134/1240. See also text of Macmillan's speech on BBC European Services, 30 Nov. 1956, in FO 371/122040.

99 Eden to Adenauer, 13 Nov. 1956, quoted in full in Adenauer, Konrad, Erinneningen, 1955–1959 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1967), 246Google Scholar (my translation).