¹ Cited in Roy, Naresh Chandra, Federalism and Linguistic States (Calcutta, 1962), p. 158.Google Scholar

² Poles immigrated in large numbers into the Polish corridor and Germans left the same region; in 1923, the Turkish minority of Thrace and the Greeks of Western Asia Minor were exchanged. For other examples see Dauzat, Albert, L'Europe linguistique (Paris, 1953), pp. 108 ff.Google Scholar

³ Ibid.

⁴ See, for example, his sarcastic reference to stateless people speaking “some kind of integrated Esperanto or Volapük”. Statement of May 15, 1962, cited in Macridis, Roy C. (ed.), De Gaulle: Implacable Ally (New York, 1966).Google Scholar

⁵ This definition is derived from the work of David Easton. See A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York, 1965).Google Scholar

⁶ For a discussion of “social mobilization” as we will use the term, see Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, 1959)Google Scholar. Cf. Deutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and Social Communication (New York, 1953).Google Scholar

⁷ The Belgian case seems to reflect this tendency.

⁸ The union of the two Canadas was attempted in 1840 with very little success. The French clung more firmly than ever to their language, religion and outlook on life, and suspected that the British – having conquered and forcibly ruled them – were trying to destroy their identity.

⁹ See Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa, 1965), pp. 73–83.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 78.

¹¹ See Trudeau, Pierre Elliot, “Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXIV (1955), pp. 297–314Google Scholar; Malheux, Arthur, “Democracy and the French Canadian,” in Douglas, Grant (ed.), Quebec Today (Toronto, 1958), pp. 341–362; and Pierre R. Amyot, “Factors Leading to Integrative or Non-integrative Attitudes Towards Canada among French Canadians of Quebec”, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1966.Google Scholar

¹² Geyl, Pieter, Debates with Historians (Cleveland, World Publishing Co., 1958), p. 216. At that time, a variety of dialects of Dutch were spoken in Northern Belgium, some of them mutually incomprehensible. The dialects were known as Flemish.Google Scholar

¹³ Flemish families in the Brussels region still have a tendency to learn French and “pass” as Walloons. See “Debat in Belgische Kamer Over Taalgemeenschappen’, Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, Jan. 27, 1966. Over a period of many years, this has contributed to making Brussels – once part of the Flemish region – a largely French speaking city.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Geyl, , op. cit., p. 213.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Roy, , op. cit., p. 121.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Rajagopalachari, Chakravarti, Our Democracy (Madras, 1957), p. 45.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Within Austria, the most outstanding example was his creation of Illyria. See Herman Wendel, Aus dem siidslavischen Risorgimento (Gotha, 1921)Google Scholar; and Kohn, Hans, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton, 1965), pp. 47 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Watson, R. W. Seton, Racial Problems in Hungary (London, 1908), pp. 38Google Scholar ff.; and Jaszi, Oscar, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1961).Google Scholar

¹⁹ XWatson, Seton, op. cit., p. 137.Google Scholar

²⁰ While nationality was not supposed to be an obstacle to the holding of office, in 11 counties where Rumanians and 7 counties where Slovaks formed a majority of 66 to 96 per cent, no Rumanians or Slovaks were appointed High Sheriff for the succeeding generation. In 1891, in areas where 60 per cent of the population was Rumanian, only 5.8 per cent of the officials were of that nationality.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 150–155.

²² Ibid.; see also Jaszi, , op. cit., pp. 279 ff.; 304 ff.Google Scholar

²³ Kann, Robert, The Multinational Empire (New York, 1950), I, p. 239.Google Scholar

²⁴ Ibid., p. 241.

²⁵ Kann, , op. cit., p. 199.Google Scholar

²⁶ See May, Arthur, The Habsburg Monarchy (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 325 ff.Google Scholar

²⁷ Quoted by Kann, , op. cit., p. 211.Google Scholar

²⁸ Each economic class of the minority linguistic groups turned to language as a rallying symbol against the central government, even though the basic interests of some of these classes (such as peasants versus nobles) were diametrically opposed. For a discussion of this point see Jaszi, , op. cit., pp. 284–86.Google Scholar

²⁹ Language conflicts remain a potential problem in the former Austrian lands. In March, 1967, President Tito of Yugoslavia “angrily warned” Croatians and Serbs to stop stirring up linguistic disputes. See The New York Times (March 27, 1967), p. 1.

³⁰ Out of 28.6 million people in 1950, there were 5 million Catalans – a force to be reckoned with. An equally discontented group are the Basques, but as of 1950 they only numbered a half million people. (Dauzat, , op. cit., p. 155.)Google Scholar

³¹ Brenan, Gerald, The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 26–28.Google Scholar

³² In the Basque country conservative nationalism also failed, but the people were too religious and concerned with tradition to turn to the left. Instead, extremists urged Basques to learn English or French instead of Spanish. See Carr, Raymond, Spain, 1808–1939 (Oxford, 1966), p. 556.Google Scholar

³³ Brenan, , op. cit., pp. 29–34Google Scholar; 63–67; 83; see also Thomas, Hugh, The Spanish Civil War (New York, 1963), p. 29Google Scholar. The bibliography on Catalanism is quite extensive. One of the most useful works is Punal, Jaime Carrera, Historia politico de Catalonia (Barcelona, 1958), especially vols. VI, VII.Google Scholar

³⁴ Dauzat, , op. cit., p. 177. In 1800, 4 million Irishmen spoke Gaelic, yet by 1921 there were only 300,000.Google Scholar

³⁵ Watson, Seton, op. cit., p. 38.Google Scholar

³⁶ See Leites, Nathan, The “Europe” of the French (Rand research memorandum) (Santa Monica, 1965).Google Scholar

³⁷ See Ronald Inglehart, “An End to European Integration?”, American Political Science Review, March 1967. Cf. Rabier, Jacques-René, L'Opinion Publique et l'Europe (Brussels, 1966). Support for European nation building is most pronounced among those groups which have attained the greatest measure of prosperity.Google Scholar

³⁸ By “extensive”, we refer to a polity which goes beyond the scale of a city-state or tribe: where political activity can no longer be based on face to face communication.

³⁸ Latin, Mandarin, French, German or English, as the case may be in states with a multiplicity of parochial vernaculars.

⁴⁰ Ongoing research by Ronald Inglehart, Douglas Scott and Arthur Stevens, using data from Arthur Banks, S. and Textor, Robert, A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge, Mass., 1963)Google Scholar; Russett, Bruce R. et al. , World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven, 1964)Google Scholar; and data coded by the investigators. Another aspect of this curvilinear relationship is stressed by William McNeill: “Pervasive uncertainty arising from the breakdown of immemorial rural routines – in large measure a by-product of the spread of industrialism – lent special emotional intensity to late nineteenth-century nationalism … Incandescent nationalists of eastern Europe were in effect attempting to project their idealized memories of tight-knit village life upon an entire nation. The total failure of national self-determination to achieve any such idyll after World War I, and the passing of the acute phase of initial adjustment to an industrializing world, may account for the remarkable fading of linguistic nationalism as a live issue in European politics since World War II. The virulent and sometimes politically disruptive nationalisms of Africa and Asia since 1945 seem, in this respect, to recapitulate the earlier European experience.” The Rise of the West (New York, 1965), note on p. 819.Google Scholar

⁴¹ The absence of a Western colonial experience is important because of its tendency to produce native modernizing elites, educated in the colonizing country and/or trained in the colonial army or administrative bureaucracy.

⁴² A small number of intermediate cases exist, in which no one group makes up at least 85 per cent of the population, but which lack any minority group of substantial size; these were excluded from analysis, as ambiguous for our purposes.

⁴³ Cited in Sondages, 1963, number 1, p. 41.Google Scholar