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Greek and Bulgarian Peasants: Aspects of Their Sociopolitical Situation During the Interwar Period
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 June 2009
Extract
One of the most interesting features of Balkan politics during the interwar period has been the spectacular rise of peasant movements and parties which have had a profound influence on the social structure of these societies. The only Balkan country which did not experience a strong peasant movement was Greece. As I will try to argue below, the development of Balkan peasantism can be seen to a large extent as a political reaction to the strains and disruptions created by the increasing penetration of Western capitalism into this underdeveloped part of the world. Since this penetration was as strong in Greece as in the other Balkan countries during the interwar period, the failure of Greek peasants to organise themselves politically poses an interesting problem for anyone concerned with the past and present development of modern Greek society.
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- Peasants and Political Mobilization Part II: The Balkans
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- Copyright © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 1976
References
I would like to thank Dr. R. J. Crampton, Professor K. Hopkins and Mrs. M. Serafetinidi for reading this paper and making helpful and encouraging comments. I would also like to thank Ian White for his help in translating Bulgarian material.
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62 Of course following Michel's ‘Law of oligarchy’, one can argue that, taking into account the bourgeois origins of some of the peasant leaders and the unavoidable ‘corruption’ which followed their taking of power, the Agrarian Union was not very different from other bourgeois parties. But this position does not take into account the radical policies which the Agrarian Union did in fact pursue both on the international and the national levels. For instance, as far as foreign policy is concerned, Stamboliiski reversed completely the militaristic and ‘irredentist’ policies of his predecessors and promoted a policy of peaceful cooperation among all Balkan nations. On the national level, he tried to discourage large scale industrialisation and sought a path to development which could profit the peasants and safeguard their village communities. Of course, one could argue that a policy which tries to achieve economic growth without the painful disruption of peasant life is Utopian (cf. Moore, B., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (London, 1967)).Google Scholar But the important point is that such policies were attempted and they did pose a real challenge to the traditional Bulgarian establishment.
63 Cf. for instance Stewart, A. ‘Populism: The Social Roots’, in Gellner, E. and Ionescu, G. (eds.), Populism (London, 1969).Google Scholar
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65 Of course, it must be pointed out that being ‘drawn in’, i.e., greater integration to the centre, by no means implies a more balanced, less painful adaptation to the strains of rapid change. There is no indication that Greek peasants were better off than the Bulgarians during the interwar years. If anything, the opposite could be the case. For instance, just before the Second World War, Greece together with Portugal and Albania had the lowest calorie consumption rate in Europe: 2,300 to 2,500 calories daily per inhabitant (cf. Stavrianos, , op. cit., p. 683).Google Scholar
66 Concerning peasant studies, E. Wolf, for example, in examining the revolutionary potential of the peasantry in Russia, Mexico, Cuba, Algeria, China and Vietnam emphasises geographical and social isolation as factors conducive to peasant mobilisation (Peasant Revolutions, op. cit., pp. 276–302).Google Scholar Interestingly enough, similar generalisations seem relevant insofar as non-peasant working-class organisation is concerned. For instance, C. Kerr and A. Siegel in an article examining the propensity to strike in various industries explain the high degree of trade union organisation and militancy among miners, longshoremen and of those working in the maritime industry in terms of homogeneity of economic position and of their relative isolation from the larger community (cf. ‘The Interindustry propensity to strike’, op. cit., pp. 189–212).Google Scholar Similar points about isolation and its relevance to militancy in trade unions have been made by Sayles, and Strauss, , op. cit., pp. 148–9, 197–202,Google Scholar and Lipset, et al. , op. cit., pp. 106–40.Google Scholar
67 For an attempt to produce this type of generalisations about peasants, cf. Rogers, E. M., Modernisation among Peasants: The Impact of Communication (New York, 1969).Google Scholar
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69 More concretely, to take the Stamboliiski argument for instance, although his charisma helped tremendously the revival of the Agrarian Union after a temporary decline in 1909, it is quite certain that a Greek Stamboliiski could have not found a similarly favourable field for developing his potentialities. Moreover, I do not think that it is accidental that Venizelos, the Greek statesman who compares with Stamboliiski in terms of charisma, did not become the champion of the peasants but of the rising Greek bourgeoisie. As far as the ‘defeat at wars’ argument, this does not explain why the Agrarian Union became the major opposition party in Bulgaria before the Balkan wars.
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