G. has identified an interesting area for examination: the many different ways in which soldiers and their leaders prepare for battle and the effect – intended and unintended – on the enemy (or the enemy's effect on them). He includes many examples of the planned and the unexpected.

However, readers who expect a discussion of the title's ‘war cry’, beginning, perhaps, with an analysis of the Iliad, will discover that G. declares the term inadequate and invents one of his own. Readers will have to decide on the felicity of G.'s suggested replacement, ‘battle expression’. Justifying this term is one of the recurrent themes of the book. G. points out that ‘war cry’ varies according to circumstances and cultures and is only one part of the clash of armies, while the term ‘battle expression’ includes speeches, taunts, victory songs, dance, clapping, stamping, raising arms, clashing weapons, in short, all the actions, verbal and non-verbal, between the decision to engage in battle and the meeting of the battle lines. As further proof of the case against ‘war cry’, G. cites (oddly) the many different English translations of the Greek alalazein and its derivatives.

After Chapter 1 (an explanation of the issue) the book proceeds in an orderly fashion through an analysis of the sources (2); the ‘atmosphere’ of the battlefield (3); two chapters (4 and 5) on the motives behind the expression (group cohesion and enemy intimidation), followed by a discussion of religion and battle (6), identity (7), oaths (8) and a conclusion (9).

While G. has presented an interesting subject, there are many flaws, not least of which is the basic concept that Romans and Greeks are one entity, a dubious proposition especially as applied to the way in which they waged war. Moreover, the title's term, ‘Graeco-Roman World’, would seem to include all the societies and cultures therein – Celts, Germans, Numidians, Persians, Parthians et al. –, but to G. the cultures that are not Greek or Roman are ‘other’. In his analysis of the sources – in translation – he greatly underestimates the number of Greek men in the audience who would have experienced battle. His tendency to stretch the meaning of his term leads to some odd statements, such as, ‘Macedonian armies professed their admiration and loyalty to Philip II through their incorporation of the sarissa into their battlefield customs’ – as though they had chosen this weapon (p. 23). In Chapter 3, ‘Battlefield Atmosphere’, and throughout, G. makes a ludicrous comparison of ancient battle to a football match. Football players are not engaged to kill or be killed. G. uncritically accepts the ancient sources, as Plutarch's statement about the Ambrones – ‘The noise … would have included the ground shaking due to the leaping of hundreds of thousands of men’ (p. 30). And he tends to lump sources together, regardless of how far apart they are in time or space. In Chapter 4, ‘Group Cohesion’, he accepts Herodotus’ rendering (7.9B.1) of Mardonius’ account of Greek warfare as fact (p. 39): ‘Greek phalanx warfare was by an agreement whereby opposing Greek military forces would arrange to meet face-to-face on a given day’. In a lengthy treatment (pp. 101–6) he discusses the role of the songs of the Spartan Tyrtaeus before and after a campaign, but he omits the Castoria, the song sung by the Spartan king to initiate the Spartan advance. In Chapter 8, ‘Battlefield Oaths’, he cites the oath of Plataea (questionable) and the oath of the sworn bands (obscure), but not the well-established oath that the 300 men of the bodyguard swore to the Spartan king.

While this book presents an interesting topic, it has critical flaws.