The word ‘Republicanism’ denotes a tradition of political thought that, spanning from Greek and Roman classical antiquity up to contemporary times, encompasses a heterogeneous set of philosophical doctrines on the nature of political liberty, civic virtue and the role of active citizenship in the promotion of the common good. Over the past four decades a significant upsurge of scholarly attempts to identify intersections and breaking points between those theories has given rise to a variety of historic-philosophical reconstructions of the political category of Republicanism – more specifically, of its origins, development across the centuries and reconfiguration in contemporary political circumstances (cf. D. Weinstock and C. Nadeau [edd.], Republicanism. History, Theory, Practice [2004]; M. van Gelderen and Q. Skinner [edd.], The Values of Republicanism in Early Modern Europe [2002]). From the perspective of normative political theory, several studies on Republicanism have stressed the need to propose new definitory approaches to the idea of liberty – a need that goes hand in hand with the necessity to revitalise political participation and active citizenship in the running of political communities.
H.'s book, although mainly conceivable as a work of history of political philosophy, enters the field of normative theory by critically addressing and defending an original idea of freedom as ‘non-domination’. His view, which engages critically and fruitfully with ideas defended by authors such as Q. Skinner, P. Pettit and M. Viroli, tries to identify supposed elements of compatibility between Republicanism and modern Liberalism. Such a project presents relevant affinities with the revisionist attempt that Skinner had initiated in the 1980s with respect to his theories of Republicanism – one that aims at re-framing republican liberty as a distinctive mode of negative freedom, situating it within a legal discourse (see for instance his Liberty before Liberalism [1998]). At the same time H. endorses and preserves a positive concept of liberty in the history of Republican political thought, by stressing its aspect of freedom from restraints upon the practice of popular participation in political life (an idea notably defended by J.G.A. Pocock; see his Virtue, Commerce, and History [1985]).
H. regards Cicero's political philosophy as a valuable intellectual lens for an understanding of Republicanism as an overall unitary phenomenon, despite evidence of content-related differences among Republican doctrines across the centuries. In his view Republicanism allows the interaction between two different approaches: on the one hand, a focus on individual rights and negative liberties – a marking trait of modern and contemporary liberal theories; on the other, an interest in popular sovereignty and widespread involvement of people in political decision-making in view of the common interest.
An element of distinction between H. and neo-republicans like Pettit and Skinner, who noticeably adopt a neo-Roman perspective in their reading of political philosophy in the modern period, is his emphasis on Cicero's view of natural law as one of the most relevant philosophical underpinnings of Republicanism. This is identified by H. as the normative core of an idea of freedom as non-domination, which finds articulation (although in diversified shapes) from ancient Rome to the foundation of the American Constitutional Federal Republic. One of the leading ideas of H.'s book is that Cicero's notion of natural law represents a fertile terrain for dialogue and reciprocal integration between liberal and republican values in the modern and contemporary age. Accordingly, natural law would justify how liberal individual rights can be enjoyed within an institutional context open to ideals of responsible citizenship, equality and collective political participation. It is therefore in this respect that H.'s neo-republican notion of freedom as non-domination combines and transcends the featuring traits of two different forms of freedom: on the one hand, freedom as protection from arbitrary harm by individuals and rulers (the one that Isaiah Berlin names ‘negative liberty’ and Benjamin Constant attributes to the moderns); on the other, freedom as the capacity for self-determination and collective political participation (i.e. the freedom that Berlin names ‘positive liberty’ and Constant considers a prerogative of the ancients).
Against the backdrop of the above-mentioned dichotomies, H. contends that Cicero's doctrine of liberty not only includes elements of modernity, but also inspires modern and contemporary views of freedom (such as those advanced by John Locke and by the American Founders). His view of freedom as non-domination ought to be read not only as absence of constraint and interference from others (i.e. from individuals and/or institutions), but also and especially as a form of independence from arbitrary powers, which is structured through active participation of citizens in joint deliberative and law-making agency.
The book comprises seven chapters. After an introduction illustrating its argumentative plan, a reconstruction of Cicero's view of the res publica is provided in Chapter 2. As emerges from H.'s reading of key passages of De re publica, De legibus, De officiis and De finibus, popular sovereignty, being exercised in accordance with a law that prescribes equal reciprocal treatment and responsible civic engagement, undergirds authentic liberty for citizens not only as members of the Roman Republic, but also as virtuous and fully cooperative human beings. In Chapter 3 H. presents Machiavelli's challenge to Cicero's Republican approach by stressing that the political flourishing of a republic cannot be compatible with security and justice for citizens, i.e. values enjoined by the law of nature. In Chapter 4 H. traces two different philosophical routes to Republicanism inspired by Cicero's political thought: on the one hand, the cosmopolitan theories of international law proposed by Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; on the other, the tradition of English Republicanism in the seventeenth century. The first tradition, although emphasising the threat that Republican self-government poses to the actualisation of natural law principles, interiorises Cicero's idea that a healthy Republic should incorporate the limitations of universal moral norms and supports the idea of a government ultimately run by political elites. The second tradition, represented by authors such as Marchamont Nedham and John Milton, shares with Machiavelli a desire to enhance the political role of common people in commonwealths, but it appeals to Cicero's attempt to relate popular sovereignty (conceived as a legitimate source of authority) to the private liberty that individual citizens can enjoy through political power within the limits of the law of nature.
The conceptual continuity between Cicero, Grotius and von Pufendorf seems to find its fulfilment in Locke's theorisation of legitimate popular government as ‘limited government’. In Chapter 5 H. focuses on Locke's Republicanism, contending that, in his thought, attention to natural law is inextricably linked to political justice, respect of private property, commerce pursued by honourable means and individual freedom. More specifically, by looking at Cicero's De officiis, Locke would endorse the idea of an individual political power rooted in moral education, alongside the view of a society based on rational cooperation. In Chapter 6 H. addresses the signing of the Declaration of Independence and the ratification of the American Constitution. The American founding, as H. contends in the concluding chapter of the book, represents the culmination of a philosophical itinerary in which Cicero and Locke play a fundamental part. Classical Republicanism and its focus on natural law would undergird the appeals to the ‘unalienable’ rights to life, liberty and property made by politicians and theorists like James Wilson, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.
H.'s text deserves recognition for clarity of exposition and for originality in its reconstruction of Republican freedom as a natural law driven form of non-domination. Aspects of continuity and rupture within the itinerary he traces are accurately argued, and his critical perspective on primary texts allows readers to get a deeper understanding of the relevant themes in an engaging manner.
