¹ For an overview of the debate in antiquity, see Sorabji, R., Animal Minds and Human Morals (Ithaca, NY, 1993)Google Scholar, and the classic study by Dierauer, U., Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike (Amsterdam, 1977)Google Scholar. For a useful collection of ancient texts in translation, see Newmyer, S., Animals in Greek and Roman Thought (London, 2011)Google Scholar.

² Much of the content of Proclus’ commentary on the Phaedo is preserved in the notes from Phaedo courses held by Olympiodorus and Damascius. See Westerink, L.G., The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo. Vols. I–II (Amsterdam, 1976–1977)Google Scholar for an edition of these lecture courses, and Gertz, S.R.P., Death and Immortality in Late Neoplatonism (Leiden, 2011), 7–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar for their relation to Proclus.

³ Cf. Elias, In Isag. 2.2–6.

⁴ Cf. Hom. Od. 17.290–327.

⁵ For this etymology, inspired by Pl. Cra. 437a, see also Olympiodorus, In Phd. 11.3.6 Westerink.

⁶ Cf. Hom. Od. 17.290–327.

⁷ [αὐτά] delevi.

⁸ Reading φυλάξαντα in place of φυλάξας, as recommended by Busse.

⁹ Reading λαβόντα in place of λαβών, as suggested by Busse.

¹⁰ Reading αὐτῆς for αὐτούς, as suggested by Busse.

¹¹ Damascius, in his lecture courses on the Phaedo (1.272; 2.22 Westerink), makes the same point as Proclus in the Elias passage, which can be taken as corroboration of Elias’ testimony, since Damascius himself uses Proclus’ lost Phaedo commentary (see n. 2 above).

¹² For this etymology, inspired by Pl. Cra. 437a, see, for example, Elias, In Isag. 2.9; Olympiodorus, In Phd. 11.3.6 Westerink.

¹³ On the possible Stoic origin of much of the Neoplatonic terminology for self-awareness, including τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι, see now Sorabji, R., ‘Epictetus on proairesis and self’, in Scaltsas, T. and Mason, A. (edd.), The Philosophy of Epictetus (Cambridge, 2007), 87–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For some complexities in Neoplatonic uses of συναίσθησις, not pertinent to this discussion, see Lautner, P., ‘Rival theories of self-awareness’, BICS 29 (2004), 107–16Google Scholar.

¹⁴ On some of the varieties of self-awareness that can usefully be distinguished, see DeGrazia, D., ‘Self-awareness in animals’, in Lurz, R. (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds (Cambridge, 2009), 201–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ See ET 15; 16; 83. Cf. Porphyry, Sent. 40.29–32 and 41; Boethius, De cons. phil. 2.5.85–9; Damascius, In Phd. 1.272.

¹⁶ On the place of self-reversion and self-constitution in Proclus’ system, see Chlup, R., Proclus: An Introduction (Cambridge, 2012), 69–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Steel, C., ‘Proklos über Selbstreflexion und Selbstbegründung’, in Perkams, M. and Piccione, R.M. (edd.), Proklos: Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik (Leiden, 2006), 230–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ Gallup, G.G. Jr's well-known study (‘Chimpanzees: self-recognition’, Science 167 [1970]: No. 3914, 86–7)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for example, shows that chimpanzees have the ability to recognize themselves in a mirror. Whether this self-recognition implies the kind of self-awareness that Proclus has in mind is of course another matter. The cognitive abilities of some primates such as chimpanzees are in any case well researched, and cumulatively undermine the plausibility of a blanket denial of introspective self-awareness in animals. Cf. the studies collected in Parker, S. Taylor, Mitchell, R.W. and Boccia, M.L. (edd.), Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans: Developmental Perspectives (Cambridge, 2006)Google Scholar. Since the relevant literature on the subject is vast, I refrain from listing further references here; interested readers may consult the bibliography for the entry ‘Animal Consciousness’ (by C. Allen and M. Trestman) in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (winter 2016 edition), E.N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/consciousness-animal.