1. Graml, Hermann analyzed the concepts of Resistance groups on the basis of sources then available: “Die aussenpolitischen Vorstellungen des deutschen Widerstandes,” in Schmit-thenner, Walter and Buchheim, Hans, eds., Der deutsche Widerstand gegen Hitler: Vier historisch-kritische Studien (Cologne, Berlin, 1966), 15–72Google Scholar (Engl. ed. The German Resistance to Hitler, London, 1970)Google Scholar. Kettenacker, Lothar, ed., The “Other Germany” in the Second World War: Emigration and Resistance in International Perspective (Stuttgart, 1977), 49–76Google Scholar, published a survey of British reactions to the German Resistance. Klemens von Klemperer and Henry O. Malone are preparing comprehensive studies on the foreign contacts of the German Resistance. See von Klemperer, Klemens, “Adam von Trott zu Solz and Resistance Foreign Policy,” Central European History 14 (1981): 351–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Malone, Henry O. Jr., “Adam von Trott zu Solz: The Road to Conspiracy against Hitler” (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Texas at Austin, 1980)Google Scholar. (The first volume has now been published: Adam von Trott zu Solz: Werdegang eines Verschwörers, 1990–1938 [Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1986]Google Scholar; a second volume will follow). Some studies deal with the related subject of peace feelers and official, semiofficial, and unofficial contacts between governments and belligerents during the Second World War: Mastny, Vojtech, “Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War II,” American Historical Review 77 (1972): 1365–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Martin, Bernd, Friedensinitiativen und Machtpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1942 (Düsseldorf, 1974, 2d ed., 1976)Google Scholar; Martin, Bernd, “Verhandlungen über separate Friedensschlüsse 1942–1945,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1976, no. 2: 95–113.Google Scholar

2. Kosthorst, Erich, Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler zwischen Polen- und Frankreichfeldzug, 3d. ed. (Bonn, 1957), 62–63.Google Scholar

3. von Dohnanyi, Christine, “Aufzeichnungen,” typescript [1945], Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich, ZS603.Google Scholar

4. See Hoffmann, Peter, The History of the German Resistance 1933–1945 (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1977), 20–23, 30–31, 34, 363, 644–45 (n. 106)Google Scholar.

5. See below, pp. 26–29, 32–33; van Roon, Ger, Neuordnungim Widerstand: Der Kreisauer Kreis innerhalb der deutschen Widerstandsbewegung (Munich, 1967), 452Google Scholar; von Moltke, Freya, Balfour, Michael, Frisby, Julian, Helmuth James von Moltke 1907–1945 (Stuttgart, 1975), 245–46Google Scholar; von Hassell, Ulrich, Vom andern Deutschland: Aus den nachgelassenen Tagebüchern 1938–1944 (Zurich, 1946), passimGoogle Scholar; Hoffmann, History, 240, 374; Ritter, Gerhard, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung, 3d ed. (Stuttgart, 1956), passimGoogle Scholar; John, Otto, Zweimal kam ich heim: Vom Verschwörer zum Schützer der Verfassung (Düsseldorf, Vienna, 1969).Google Scholar

6. German law and judicial practice had as a criterion for treason against the country an intention to harm the integrity of the nation and its military capabilities–this condition was not fulfilled here; cf. Kohlrausch, E., ed., Strafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich mit Nebengesetzen (Berlin and Leipzig, 1930), § § 87–91Google Scholar; Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen, 65 (Berlin and Leipzig, 1931): 422–33.Google Scholar

7. Martin, Bernd, “Das aussenpolitische Versagen des Widerstandes 1943/44,” in Schmädeke, Jürgen and Steinbach, Peter, eds., Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus: Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler (Munich, Zurich, 1985), 1037–38Google Scholar postulated a similarity and partial identity of the Resistance's aims with Hitler's; but it was precisely the evil and limitlessness in Hitler's aims that brought into being the Resistance against his rule.

8. Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics providing for Joint Action in the War against Germany (with Protocol), Moscow, July 12, 1941, Cmd. 6304 (London, 1941)Google Scholar; Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers (henceforth FRUS), 1 (Washington, 1958): 367–69Google Scholar; Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York, 1975), 186, 234.Google Scholar

9. See Churchill to Roosevelt 5 Aug. 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill, 153; Roosevelt's statements in January and April 1944 in FRUS, 1944, 1 (Washington, 1966): 493–94, 501–2Google Scholar.

10. See the exposé inspired by Moltke's mission to Istanbul in December 1943 in Roon, Neuordnung, 582–86; Dr. Ivar Anderson, diary, Royal Library, Stockholm, Ivar Anderson papper L 91:3; Lindgren, Henrik, “Adam von Trotts Reisen nach Schweden 1942–1944,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 18 (1970): 274–91.Google Scholar

11. Goerdeler put on paper a “plan” in Stockholm, during the night of 19/20 May 1943 whose original is in the papers of Jacob Wallenberg in Stockholm, a copy is in the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nl. Goerdeler 23; cf. J. Wallenberg's summary of his contacts with Goerdeler in Welsh Dulles, Allen, Germany's Underground (New York, 1947), 144Google Scholar; Goerdeler, “Unsere Idee,” Nov. 1944, typescript, Bundesarchiv Nl. Goerdeler 26; Jacob Wallenberg, interview with the author 16 Sept. 1977; Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung: Die Kaltenbrunner-Berichte an Bormann und Hitler über das Attentat vom 20. Juli 1944 (Stuttgart, 1961), 410–12Google Scholar; Ritter, 333–38, 363–65. Cf. below, pp. 23–25. In his “plan” of May 1943 Goerdeler's terms were more modest than what he told Kluge as possible in August; in May 1944 Goerdeler appears to have produced another list of terms which suggests an inflation of demands designed to persuade military men into anti-Hitler action; see Hoffmann, History, 608–9 n. 11. For the following see Rothfels, Hans, “Trott und die Aussenpolitik des Widerstandes,” Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 12 (1964): 300–23Google Scholar; Lindgren, passim; Hassell, 290, 316, 327, 342, 344.

12. Captain (Res.) Kaiser, Hermann, diary 20 Feb. 1943 in “Generäle: Neue Mitteilungen zur Vorgeschichte des 20. Juli,” Die Wandlung, 1 (1945/1946): 531.Google Scholar

13. Halifax to Sir Francis D'Arcy Osborne 17 Feb. 1940 in Ludlow, Peter, “Papst Pius XII., die britische Regierung und die deutsche Opposition im Winter 1939/40,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 22 (1974): 336–37.Google Scholar

14. Osborne to Halifax 12 Jan., 7 Feb., 23 Feb. 1940, Ludlow, 330, 334, 338.

15. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, 3d ser., vol. 4 (London, 1951), no. 582 (31 03 1939)Google Scholar; Hassell, 140, for 16 Mar. 1940 listed only decentralization and plebiscite in Austria.

16. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Polish Government Regarding Mutual Assistance, London, August 25, 1939, Cmd. 6144 (London, 1939)Google Scholar; published in The Times (Royal Ed.) 26 Aug. 1939, 9; publ. again with secret protocol as Cmd. 6616 (London, 1945)Google Scholar; Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945, ser. D (1937–1945), vol. 7 (Baden-Baden, 1956), nos. 228, 229.Google Scholar

17. The door was left open for territorial revisions in favor of Germany, as Britain had not been inflexible in this matter, but there is no indication that British government authorities were aware, before the Red Army occupied eastern Poland, of the territorial arrangements in favor of the Soviet Union contained in the Secret Protocol of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Cf. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan O.M. 1939–1945, ed. Dilks, David (London, 1971), 200–201, 217–19Google Scholar; on 23 September 1939 Cadogan noted that he replied to Halifax's question about Britain's war aims that he saw “awful difficulties. We can no longer say ‘evacuate Poland’ without going to war with Russia, which we don't want to do!” On the Resistance's awareness of atrocities: Osborne to Halifax 7 Feb. 1940, Ludlow, 334; Hassell, 142.

18. Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 352 (Commons), 12 10 1939, cols. 563–65Google Scholar.

19. Roosevelt and Churchill, 186.

20. Cf. Martin, Friedensinitiativen, 24.

21. Agreement … July 12, 1941 (n. 8); published in The Times (Late London Ed.) 14 July 1941, 4; Société des Nations, Recueil des Traités, vol. 204 (1941–1943), no. 4808.Google Scholar

22. FRUS 1942, 1 (Washington, 1960): 1–38 (esp. 25–26)Google Scholar; FRUS: The Conference at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943 (Washington, 1968), 362–76Google Scholar.

23. FRUS 1941, 1: 367–69Google Scholar.

24. The Times (Late London Ed.) 15 Aug. 1941, 4.

25. Churchill and Roosevelt, 186 (Churchill's letter of 7 Mar. 1942); Churchill's, radio broadcast “The Atlantic Charter” of 24 08 1941 in Winston S. Churchill, His Complete Speeches 1897–1963, 6, 1935–42 (New York and London, 1974): 6473–76Google Scholar; Parliamentary Debates, 5th ser., vol. 374 (Commons), 9 09 1941, cols. 67–68Google Scholar; Parliamentary Debates, vol. 376, 18 11 1941, cols. 187–88Google Scholar; Parliamentary Debates, vol. 398, 22 03 1944, cols. 853–54Google Scholar; War Cabinet 84 (41), Conclusions, 19 Aug. 1941, 223, Public Record Office, Cab. 65/19.

26. Brandes, Detlef, Grossbritannien und die Exilregienmgen Polens, der Tschechoslowakei und Jugoslawiens vom Kriegsbeginn bis zur Konferenz von Teheran (Habilitationsschrift, Freie Universität Berlin, 1984), 352–59Google Scholar cites, inter alia, Public Record Office files FO 371/32880, N 2182/5/38, and Cab. 66/26, W. P. 280; cf. de Zayas, Alfred M., Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans: Background, Execution, Consequences (London, Henley, and Boston, 1977), 7Google Scholar; see also FRUS 1943, 1 (Washington, 1963): 542 (for 5 10 1943)Google Scholar; FRUS: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945 (Washington, 1955), 159–63 (for 10 1944), 612–16 (for Yalta, 02 1945)Google Scholar.

27. This and the following quotations from Public Record Office, London, FO 371/26542/ [C 610], FO 371/26543/C10855, PREMIER 4/100/8; the first two items were printed partially in Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1st ser., 1, ed. Blasius, Rainer A. (Frankfurt a.M., 1984): 269Google Scholar; see also Kettenacker, 59. Frank Roberts in the Foreign Office Central Department may have been representative when he remarked, in September 1940, upon the news that General Halder was dissatisfied with the Nazi regime and was looking for peace: “General Halder, the Chief of the General Staff, was reputed to be in favour of peace before the outbreak of war, but all the peace-feelers alleged to have been made on his behalf through Dr. Goerdeler and Dr. Wirth turned out to be worth very little. No doubt there are prominent military circles in Germany who would like a compromise peace, if they have failed to achieve absolute victory soon, but we have no indication (1) that they are able or prepared to get rid of Hitler etc. or (2) that they would be much better in the long run than the present gang who rule Germany.” Kettenacker, p. 57 n. 36, cites for this FO 371/24408/010416. The Free Reconstruction Movement may be the group that became known as the Kreisau Circle.

28. FRUS 1943, 1: 680, 687, 737, 752–54Google Scholar.

29. See below, pp. 34–36; Hassell, 346–47 made the connection with the Resistance contacts immediately; on German-Soviet peace feelers see FRUS 1943, 3 (Washington, 1963): 698–99, 708–9Google Scholar. The “substance” of a memorandum concerning Moltke's approach from the Deputy Director of Intelligence Service in the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, Brigadier General John Magruder, of 17 May 1944 to the Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State had been transmitted on 14 May 1944 to the British and Soviet Embassies in Washington—apparently months after the approach had been made; FRUS 1944, 1: 510–13Google Scholar; Martin, “Verhandlungen,” 102–3. Martin, “Verhandlungen,” 101, appears to accept at face value a Soviet-Russian peace offer alleged by a German Foreign Office and Ostministerium operative, Peter Kleist, to have been transmitted by an obscure businessman named Edgar Clauss, in December 1942, not for the benefit of the Resistance but the Hitler government. Cf. Kleist, Peter, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin 1939–1945: Aufzeichnungen (Bonn, 1950), 241Google Scholar; Mastny, 1371–72. The basis was to be the frontiers of 1939 meaning presumably those reached by both powers after the German-Polish war, since Stalin could not be expected to relinquish his gains from his pact with Hitler. Martin, “Verhandlungen,” 103, records what he believes to have been another Russian peace offer, dated September 1943 and based on the frontiers of 1914. In view of its circumstances, and in view of what has emerged about Russian and British plans for territorial changes and population transfers at the end of the war, neither offer can have been seriously intended, if they were made at all. The strategic situation of 1943 could hardly have suggested to the Soviet Union a modification of her postwar plans. During the night of 30/31 October 1943 at the Moscow Conference, speaking with the American Ambassador, Stalin ridiculed rumors that Russia and Germany might agree on peace terms; FRUS 1943, 1: 687Google Scholar. If the “offers” were made, they may have to be seen as a means to apply pressure on the Western Allies to agree to Russian aims (as the Western Allies did, during the Moscow and Teheran conferences), and to establish the second front in northern France. The second “offer,” if it was made, should be considered also in the context of the Italian change of sides.

30. Cf. Hassell, 218; [Clarita von Trott zu Solz], “Adam von Trott zu Solz: Eine erste Materialsammlung, Sichtung und Zusammenstellung,” mimeogr. typescript, n.p. [1958], 244–45; H. O. Malone, letter to the author 13 Dec. 1978;Lindgren, 281–82, 289–91; Herschel V.Johnson (American Minister in Stockholm) to Secretary of State 26 June and 14 Sept. 1944, FRUS 1944, 1: 523–53Google Scholar; Rothfels, “Trott,” 309–10.

31. Cf. Die Weizsäcker Papiere 1933–1950, ed. Hill, Leonidas E. (Frankfurt a.M., Berlin, Vienna [1974])Google Scholar, and Blasius, Rainer A., Für Grossdeutschland—gegen den grossen Krieg: Staatssekretär Ernst Frhr. von Weizsäcker in den Krisen um die Tschechoslowakei und Polen 1938/39 (Cologne, Vienna, 1981)Google Scholar. A close analysis of Weizsäcker's role is impeded by a certain amount of incongruence between the papers and their printed edition, and by controversies surrounding Weizsäcker.

32. Conwell-Evans, T. P., None So Blind: A Study of the Crisis Years, 1930–1939 (London, 1947) 91–92Google Scholar; Reynolds, Nicholas, Treason Was No Crime: Ludwig Beck, Chief of the German General Staff (London, 1976), 111–14.Google Scholar

33. See sources cited in Hoffmann, History, 547–48, nn. 35–55.

34. Colvin, Ian, Vansittart in Office (London, 1965), 223Google Scholar; Colvin, Ian, Chief of Intelligence (London, 1951), 67.Google Scholar

35. von Herwarth, Hans, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin: Erlebte Zeitgeschichte 1931 bis 1945 (Frankfurt a.M., 1982), 133–34Google Scholar; Herwarth, letter to the author 18 Dec. 1983; for a more comprehensive assessment of Beck's efforts see Hoffmann, History, 54–80; Hoffmann, Peter, “Ludwig Beck: Loyalty and Resistance,” Central European History 14 (1981): 332–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hoffmann, Peter, “Generaloberst Ludwig Becks militärpolitisches Denken,” Historische Zeitschrift 234 (1982): 101–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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37. See Ritter, 157–71; for Apr. 1938 see Hoffmann, History, 57, and 59–96 for the following two paragraphs.

38. Akten 7, nos. 228, 229.

39. See Hoffmann, History, 99–110 for a summary; intelligence report on a conversation between Goerdeler and Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, dated 29 Aug. 1939, Public Record Office, C12878/15/18, FO 371/22981.

40. Hoffmann, History, 128–37, and 158–63 for the following; see also Müller, Josef, Bis zur letzten Konsequenz: Ein Leben für Frieden und Freiheit (Munich [1975]), 80–129.Google Scholar

41. Payne Best, S., The Venlo Incident (London, 1950), 7–46Google Scholar; Wheeler-Bennett, John W., The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918–1945 (London, New York, 1953), 476–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sendtner, Kurt, “Die deutsche Militäropposition im ersten Kriegsjahr,” in Vollmacht des Gwissens, 1 (Frankfurt a.M., Berlin, 1960): 456–57, n. 76Google Scholar; Ludlow, 331; de Beus, J. G., Tomorrow at Dawn! (New York, London, [1980]).Google Scholar

42. Dohnanyi, “Aufzeichnungen.”

43. Halifax to Osborne 17 Feb. 1940, Ludlow, 337.

44. See the correspondence in Ludlow, 325–41; for developments on the German side see Hoffmann, History, 158–69; cf. Müller, Konsequenz, 130–37.

45. Dohnanyi, “Aufzeichnungen”; John, Otto, Twice Through the Lines (London, 1972), 63–64.Google Scholar

46. Major (General Staff) Helmuth Groscurth, head of Abwehr Liaison Group in the General Staff of the Army and a key figure in the conspiracy during its activities in 1939/40, noted in his diary for 10 November 1939 that Halder had given Major-General Thomas (Chief, Wehrmacht Economic and Armaments Office) the following reasons against overthrowing Hitler: “1. It violates tradition. 2. There is no successor. 3. The young officer corps is not reliable. 4. The mood in the interior is not ripe. 5. ‘It really cannot be tolerated that Germany is permanently a “people of the helots” for England.’ 6. Concerning offensive: Ludendorff, too, in 1918 had led the offensive against the advice of everyone, and the historical judgement was not against him. He, Halder, therefore did not fear the later judgement of history either.” Groscurth, Helmuth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938/1940, ed. Krausnick, Helmut and Deutsch, Harold C. (Stuttgart, 1970), 236Google Scholar; Hassell, 105–6, recorded most of these same points as having been made by Halder at the time. On 13 January 1940 Halder told Groscurth that the struggle against England was necessary, it had been forced on Germany and it was inevitable; there were a number of good prospects for success and then the Army would be strong enough to impose its will internally; he saw no basis for a revolt, the troops still believed in the Führer; he criticized the people who were thinking of a putsch but were at odds with each other and in any case mostly reactionaries who wanted to turn back the wheel of history; England's peaceful assurances were all bluff, none of them serious; Groscurth, 241. Osborne to Halifax 19 February 1940, Ludlow, 337. There was another contact through Dr. Joseph Wirth, a former chancellor of Germany, in Bern: Ritter, 258–60. This is said to have yielded a promise from Prime Minister Chamberlain that a coup d'état inside Germany would not be exploited for military action against Germany but if it was desired by the German Resistance, a military diversion might be provided. Peter W. Ludlow, “The Unwinding of Appeasement,” in Kettenacker, 37–39, 41–42, describes this contact on the basis of British sources, but without reference to Ritter's version or to the list of “conditions” reprinted by Ritter. A British Foreign Office “Summary of Principal Peace Feelers, September 1939-March 1941,” printed in Kettenacker, 164–87, mentions only a later Wirth contact (September 1940), although Ludlow in Kettenacker, 42, seems to consider the Wirth intervention on a level comparable to that of the Pope. There seem to be still enough unanswered questions to cause one to treat the Wirth contact with some caution; Wirth's connection with and backing by the conspiracy are unclear. Some other contacts are included in lists of peace feelers prepared by the British Foreign Office's Central Department: Kettenacker, 164–200; but the list is strangely incomplete.

47. Dohnanyi, “Aufzeichnungen”; Moltke, Balfour, Frisby, 220; Freya von Moltke, interview with the author 16 January 1985.

48. Hoffmann, History, 280–83.

49. Dohnanyi, “Aufzeichnungen.”

50. Hans-AdolfJacobsen, , Fall Gelb: Der Kampfum den deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffensive 1940 (Wiesbaden, 1957), 49–51.Google Scholar

51. Deutsch, Harold C., The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War (Minneapolis, London, 1968), 74–77, 96–97, 143–45, 319–23Google Scholar; Beus, 119–37 and passim; Sendtner, 510–11; Graml, Hermann, “Der Fall Oster,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 14 (1966): 36Google Scholar; for some other warnings from German sources see Hoffmann, History, 169–72.

52. For a discussion of these points see Sendtner, 511–17; Graml, “Fall,” 37–39; von Thun-Hohenstein, Romedio Galeazzo Graf, Der Verschwörer: General Oster und die Militäropposition (Berlin, 1982), 152–57, 169, 182–83, 190–93Google Scholar.

53. Graml. “Fall,” 39.

54. Cf. Thun-Hohenstein, 153.

55. Sendtner, 511–15; Graml, “Fall,” 37–39. Deutsch, 326, assumes without evidence that Beck was not told of Oster's contacts with Sas.

56. Graml, “Fall,” 39; Winkelman succeeded General Reynders in this post in February 1940; Kwiet, Konrad, Reichskommissariat Niederlande (Stuttgart, [1968]), 19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

57. See sources in Hoffmann, History, 594–95 for 205–10; cf. Hassell, 207.

58. Hassell, 217, 221–22, 241, 253, 203, 215, 226–29, 231; see further sources in Hoffmann, History, 595, nn. 7–9.

59. Hassell, 217, 221–22.

60. Ibid., 222, 241.

61. Ibid., 253.

62. Lochner, Louis P., Stets das Unerwartete: Erinnerungen aus Deutschland 1921–1953 (Darmstadt, 1955), 355–57 (not in the English original ed.)Google Scholar; John, Twice, 69–74; Rothfels, Hans, The German Opposition to Hitler (London, 1961), 133–34Google Scholar; Alice Gallin, Mother Mary, Ethical and Religious Factors in the German Resistance to Hitler (Washington, 1955), 124, 145–47Google Scholar; Lochner to Lauchlin Currie 19 June 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., 198-a; FRUS: Malta and Yalta, 361–84, 389–400, 593–94, 698, 759, 768–69, 836, 894–97.

63. Ritter, 318–20; Dulles, 142–46.

64. Jacob Wallenberg, interview 16 Sept. 1977.

65. Jacob Wallenberg, interview 16 Sept. 1977; in his statement for Allen Dulles (Dulles, 142), Wallenberg said “very early, probably in 1940.”

66. Dulles, 143; Ritter, 333–34.

67. Ritter, 320, 334.

68. Dulles, 143–44.

69. Ritter, 334.

70. Dulles, 144.

71. Dulles, 144; Ritter, 334–36.

72. Goerdeler, plan, 19/20 May 1943, Bundesarchiv Nl. Goerdeler 23.

73. Ritter, 336; Dulles, 144–45.

74. Goerdeler, plan; Goerdeler, “Unsere Idee,” typescript, Nov. 1944, Bundesarchiv Nl. Goerdeler 26.

75. Ritter, 337.

76. Bethge, Eberhard, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologe, Christ, Zeitgenosse, 3d ed. (Munich, 1970), 824–35.Google Scholar

77. Bethge, Eberhard, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (London, 1970), 648Google Scholar; Bethge, Bonhoeffer (German ed.), 834; Hooft, Willem Visser't, Die Welt war meine Gemeinde (Munich, 1972), 185–86Google Scholar; cf. below at n. 86.

78. R[othfels], H[ans], ed., “Zwei aussenpolitische Memoranden der deutschen Opposition (Frühjahr 1942),” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 5 (1957): 388–95Google Scholar; Visser't Hooft, 182–200; Gerstenmaier, Eugen, “Der Kreisauer Kreis: Zu dem Buch Gerrit van Roons ‘Neuordnung im Widerstand,’” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 15 (1967): 236–37Google Scholar; Bell, George K. A., “Die Ökumene und die innerdeutsche Opposition,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 5 (1957): 362–78Google Scholar; Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, Gesammelte Schriften (hereafter GS), 1 (Munich, 1958): 372–89Google Scholar; cf. Kettenacker, 188–93; background on Trott in Malone, “Adam von Trott zu Solz.”

79. Rothfels, “Zwei,” 393–95.

80. Ibid., 388.

81. The Times (Late London ed.) 9 May 1942, 5; Kettenacker, 189.

82. Boyens, Armin, Kirchenkampf und Ökumene 1939–1945 (Munich, [1973]), 213.Google Scholar

83. Bielenberg, Christabel, The Past is Myself (London, 1968), 141–42.Google Scholar

84. Bielenberg, 175, 142.

85. Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, No Rusty Swords: Letters, Lectures and Notes 1928–1936 (London, 1965), 46–47.Google Scholar

86. Bonhoeffer, , GS, 1: 320Google Scholar; Bethge, Bonhoeffer (German ed.), 732–37.

87. Bethge, Bonhoeffer (German ed.), 844–48; Moltke, 182–84; Roon, 139, 325–27; Brodersen, Arvid, Fra et nomadeliv: Erindringer (Oslo, 1982), 176–77Google Scholar; Arvid Brodersen, interview with the author 13 Jan. 1985.

88. Bethge, Eberhard, “Dietrich Bonhoeffer und die Juden,” in Feil, Ernst und Tödt, Ilse, eds., Konsequenzen: Dietrich Bonhoeffers Kirchenverständnis heute (Munich, 1980), 199–200.Google Scholar

89. Bethge, Bonhoeffer (German ed.), 846.

90. Roon, p. 327, has Bishop Berggrav present; Brodersen, Fra, 177 and interview 13 Jan. 1985 does not confirm this; Bethge, Bonhoeffer (German ed.), 846, says Bonhoeffer and Moltke did not meet Bishop Berggrav then; Balfour, Michael and Frisby, Julian, Helmuth von Moltke (London and Basingstoke, [1972]), 183 and 374, n. 4CrossRefGoogle Scholar, say that Roon's inclusion of Bishop Berggrav “has been established to rest on a confusion with later visits,” but they give no source.

91. Roon, 327, only says “it was believed that the time was not ripe”; this must have been primarily the Norwegians' position since the Germans were seeking the contact.

92. Brodersen, interview 13 Jan. 1985.

93. Brodersen, interview 13 Jan. 1985. When Brodersen was pressed by the military-intelligence wing of the Norwegian Home Front (Resistance) to tap Steltzer for military information, he called a gathering of the leaders of the Home Front and it was agreed not to press Steltzer for military information with regard to his honor “which we respected” and to his future in Germany; but Steltzer confirmed an estimate of German troop strength in Norway offered by Brodersen which he had arrived at through calculations involving German requisitions of toilet paper: Brodersen, interview 13 Jan. 1985. The Home Front military intelligence also learned a great deal through official contacts between the Norwegian and German administrative authorities, as when matters of rail transport had to be dealt with.

94. Roon, 327; Bethge, Bonhoeffer (German ed.), 847; see also Bonhoeffer's consideration, in 1929, of the necessity of murder in some circumstances: “no acts are evil in themselves, even murder may be sanctioned”; “Grundfragen einer christlichen Ethik,” Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, GS, 5 (Munich, 1972): 166.Google Scholar

95. Balfour, Frisby, 184–85; Moltke, 183–86.

96. Bethge, Bonhoeffer (German ed.), 850–55.

97. Schönfeld's memorandum in Rothfels, “Zwei,” 388–97; see further documents in Bonhoeffer, , GS, 1: 372–89, 488–503Google Scholar; Roon, 308–14.

98. Rothfels, “Zwei,” 396.

99. Rothfels, “Zwei,” 389; Bethge, Bonhoeffer (German ed.), 855–58.

100. Bethge, Bonhoeffer (German ed.), 852–53; Bonhoeffer, , GS, 1: 372–89Google Scholar; George Cicestr [sic] [Bell], “The Background of the Hitler Plot,” The Contemporary Review, Oct. 1945, 203–8; Kettenacker, 193–94.

101. See also Dohnanyi, “Aufzeichnungen.”

102. Cicestr, 206; Bishop Bell's memorandum, point B ₄, in Bonhoeffer, GS, 1: 373.

103. Cicestr, 207.

104. Cicestr, 208. Bethge, Bonhoeffer (German ed.), 811–12 comments on certain simplifications in Bell's reproduction of Bonhoeffer's words and declares highly unlikely Bonhoeffer's use of the term Anti-Christ for Hitler, adding that Bonhoeffer had once told him: “‘No, he is not the Anti-Christ, for this Hitler is not great enough; the Anti-Christ uses him, but he [the Anti-Christ] is not as stupid as he [Hitler].’”

105. Fieldmarshal Wilhelm Keitel to Oster 16 Dec. 1943; Bethge, Bonhoeffer (German ed.), 884.

106. See details in Hoffmann, History, 225–48.

107. Hassell, 222.

108. The exposé which resulted from Moltke's visit in Istanbul in December 1943 is printed in Roon, 582–86; Balfour, Frisby, 273–77 print the English translation that was transmitted to America; see also Balfour, Frisby, 271–72; Moltke, 219, 262–64, 2X5; OSS report DOGWOOD 234 of 30 Dec. 1943 and related correspondence in the possession of Freya von Moltke; cf. Hoffmann, History, 735–37 nn. 66–68c, and Hoffmann, , Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler, 4th rev. ed. (Munich, 1985), 278–79.Google Scholar

109. The exposé is confirmed to have contained the views of Moltke and his “Kreisau” friends by Moltke's letter to Freya von Moltke of 7 Jan. 1944 and by what Steltzer and Gerstenmaier had told Dr. Ivar Anderson, the Editor of Svenska Dagbladet, on 6 Oct. 1943; Moltke, 285; Anderson diary 17 Sept., 6 Oct., and 30 Oct. 1943; the views are reflected as well in William J. Donovan's memorandum of 29 July 1944 for President Roosevelt, FDR Library PSF OSS file.

110. Cf. Paret, Peter, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform 1807–1815 (Princeton, 1966), 191–96.Google Scholar

111. Donovan to Roosevelt 29 July 1944, FDR Library PSF OSS file; Moltke was arrested on I9 Jan. 1944: Moltke, 285.

112. FRUS 1944, 1: 510–13. This report, dated 16 May 1944, states that the OSS representative in Bern [A. W. Dulles] had been “approached periodically by two emissaries of a German group proposing to attempt an overthrow of the Nazi Regime“; the two emissaries are identified as Gisevius and Waetjen. They are reported further as having carried to Dulles essentially the same offer as Moltke's Istanbul proposal: that military commanders in the west would “cease resistance and aid Allied landings, once the Nazis had been ousted. […] The condition on which the group expressed willingness to act was that they would deal directly with the Western Allies alone after overthrowing the Nazi regime.”

113. See n. 109 above, and below at nn. 118 and 119; Dulles, A. in FRUS 1944, 1: 510–13Google Scholar; Hassell, 338 (for December 1943); Gisevius, Hans Bernd, Bis zum bittern Ende, one-vol. ed. (Zurich, [1954]), 524Google Scholar; Herschel Johnson to Secretary of State Hull 26 June and 14 Sept. 1944, FRUS 1944, 1: 523–53; cf. also Hildebrand, Klaus, “Die ostpolitischen Vorstellungen im deutschen Widerstand,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 29 (1978): 213–41Google Scholar. See also below, at n. 121.

114. Roon, 582–86.

115. Roon, 317; Rothfels, “Trott,” 309; Steltzer, Theodor, Sechzig Jahre Zeitgenosse (Munich, 1966), 158Google Scholar; Johnson to Hull (n. 113 above).

116. See above, p. 4.

117. See sources cited in Hoffmann, Widerstand, 743–46, nn. 132–44.

118. Anderson, diary; Lindgren, 274–91.

119. Anderson, diary; cf. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 284.

120. Anderson, diary 14 and 18 Mar. 1944; Hoffmann, History, 236–37, 246–47.

121. FRUS 1944, 1: 493–94, 501–2, 513–14, 517–18. For the following, see The Times, 23 July 1943 (for Stalin's proclamation of 12 July 1943); FRUS 1944, 4 (Washington, 1966): 805, 872, n. 62Google Scholar. On 14 August 1943, six days after a proclamation by Fieldmarshal Paulus, Molotov told the British Ambassador in Moscow that the “National Committee ‘Free Germany’” was being used “entirely for propaganda purposes”; on 13 January 1944 the American Ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, reported to the Secretary of State: “At the Moscow Conference the Soviet Government stated that its support of Free German Committee in Russia had been from its inception a propaganda move designed to weaken German resistance and that the statements of Free German Committee were not expressions of policy of [the] Soviet Government.” Harriman pointed out at the end of this report “that [the] Soviet Government at the Moscow Conference expressly asked that its attitude toward the Free Germany [sic] Committee be kept secret.” Whether or not it will ever be possible to penetrate the levels of deceit and duplicity visible here, there can be no doubt that much cause existed for distrust between the Western Allied Powers and the Soviet Union.

122. Dulles, 137–38; Dulles's reports to OSS in FRUS 1944, 1: 505–7, 510–13Google Scholar; Kessel, Albrecht von, “Verborgene Saat: Das ‘Andere’ Deutschland,” typescript, Vatican City 1944/1945, 255–59Google Scholar.

123. Trott, 244–45; H. O. Malone, letter to author 13 Dec. 1978; Lindgren, 281–82, 289–91; Johnson to Hull 26 June and 14 Sept. 1944, FRUS, 1944, 1: 523–53; Rothfels, “Trott,” 309–10; Roon, 316–17.

124. Rothfels, “Trott,” 309; Steltzer, 158; FRUS 1944, 1: 510–11; Lindgren, 282.

125. Osborne to Halifax 19 Feb. 1940, Ludlow, 337; cf. Harrison, G. W., “German Dissident Groups,” memorandum 8 06 1944, Kettenacker, 200–3; see above, pp. 16–18Google Scholar.

126. Martin, “Versagen,” 1053–54, besides criticizing the Resistance in this regard, maintains the Resistance should have pursued a separate peace with the Soviet Union because it was a more promising prospect. In view of Anglo-Russian agreements on annexations of German territory and expulsion of German populations (see at n. 26 above), the prospect can hardly be considered promising. Allied intentions were known to the Resistance better than merely vaguely. General Beck was entirely clear at all times what sort of peace awaited Germany after a lost war; see Beck's Memorandum for the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Colonel-General von Brauchitsch, of 15 July 5938, in Müller, Klaus-Jürgen, General Ludwig Beck: Studien und Dokumente zur politisch-militärischen Vorstellungswelt und Tätigkeit des Generalstabschefs des deutschen Heeres 1933–1938, Schriften des Bundesarchjvs, vol. 30 (Boppard am Rhein, 1980), no. 48.Google Scholar

127. Balfour, Frisby, 186. The following quotation is from Dulles to Donovan 29 Jan. 1944, IN 1891, OSS Archive, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.

128. Eden had done this in his Edinburgh speech on 8 May 1942; cf. at n. 81 above; Hassell, 218; n. 124 above.

129. Cf. Nawratil, Heinz, Die Vertreibungsverbrechen an Deutschen: Tatbestand, Motive, Bewältigung (Munich, 1982).Google Scholar

130. See Hoffmann, History, chap. 36.

131. Martin, “Versagen,” 1048.

132. Spiegelbild, III.

133. Cf. Gisevius, Hans Bernd, Bis zum bittern Ende (Zurich, 1946) 2: 322Google Scholar; Leber, Annedore, Das Gewissen steht auf, 9th ed. (Berlin and Frankfurt a. M., 1960), 126Google Scholar; von Schlabrendorff, Fabian, Revolt Against Hitler (London, 1948), 145Google Scholar; cf. Hoffmann, History, 373–76.

134. Haeften: Film of the trial, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, film no. 3179–1; Bonhoeffer: Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, Widerstand und Ergebung: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus der Haft, new ed. (Munich, 1970), 16.Google Scholar

135. Leber, 222; Rothfels, “Trott,” 300.

136. Schlabrendorff, 131.