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Are emotions perceptions of value?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jérôme Dokic  and
Stéphane Lemaire
Jérôme Dokic*
Affiliation:
aEHESS-IJN
Stéphane Lemaire
Affiliation:
bUniversité de Rennes1
*
E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then deal with the only two views that can make sense of the perceptual thesis. On the response–dependence view, emotional experiences present evaluative response-dependent properties (being fearsome, being disgusting, etc.) in the way visual experiences present response-dependent properties such as colors. On the response–independence view, emotional experiences present evaluative response-independent properties (being dangerous, being indigestible, etc.), conceived as ‘Gestalten’ independent of emotional feelings themselves. We show that neither view can make plausible the idea that emotions present values as such, i.e., in an open and transparent way. If emotions have apparent evaluative contents, this is in fact due to evaluative enrichments of the non-evaluative presentational contents of emotions.

Keywords

emotionvalueperceptionperceptual presentationperceptual representationresponse-dependenceresponse-independence
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 2 , 2013 , pp. 227 - 247
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013

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