¹ V. Edwards, EC Company Law (Oxford 1999) p. 15 ff.

² G. Hertig and J.A. McCahery, “Optional rather than Mandatory EU Company Law: Framework and Specific Proposals” (2006) 3 European Company and Financial Law Review 341.

³ The “economic freedoms” were previously contained in the EC Treaty and are now found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

⁴ See C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU – The Four Freedoms (2^nd edn, Oxford 2007).

⁵ The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the former European Court of Justice (ECJ). In what follows, both denominations will be used, depending on the context.

⁶ See e.g. W.H. Roth, “From Centros to Ueberseering: Free Movement Of Companies, Private International Law, and Community Law” (2003) 52 I.C.L.Q. 177; J. Armour, “Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition” (2005) 58 Current Legal Problems 369; M. Becht, C. Mayer and H. Wagner, “Where do firms incorporate? Deregulation and the cost of entry” (2008) 14 Journal of Corporate Finance 241.

⁷ Case C-112/05 Commission v. Germany [2007] E.C.R. I-8995, the “Volkswagen case”.

⁸ See E. Szyszczak, The Regulation of the State in Competitive Markets in the EU (Oxford 2007); C. Barnard, “Restricting Restrictions: Lessons for the EU from the US?” [2009] C.L.J. 575.

⁹ Formerly Articles 43-48 EC Treaty.

¹⁰ Case C-221/89 R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others [1991] E.C.R. I-3905.

¹¹ Case 270/83 Commission v. France [1986] E.C.R. 273.

¹² Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] E.C.R. I-1459.

¹³ Case C-210/06 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt [2008] E.C.R. I-9641.

¹⁴ As to the practical consequences, see M. Becht, C. Mayer and H. Wagner, “Where do firms incorporate? Deregulation and the cost of entry” (2008) 14 Journal of Corporate Finance 241.

¹⁵ Case C-167/01 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd [2003] E.C.R. I-10155.

¹⁶ Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty [1998] O.J. L178, 5.

¹⁷ See, in particular, case C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal [2002] E.C.R. I-4731, at [37], and case C-112/05 Commission v. Germany [2007] E.C.R. I-8995, at [18].

¹⁸ See case C-222/97 Manfred Trummer and Peter Mayer [1999] E.C.R. I-1661, at [21]; case C-483/99 Commission v. France [2002] E.C.R. I-4781 at [36] and [37]; case C-98/01 Commission v. United Kingdom [2003] E.C.R. I-4641, at [39] and [40]; joined cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v. Netherlands [2006] E.C.R. I-9141, at [19].

¹⁹ Commission v. Netherlands (above note 18), at [20].

²⁰ Case C-326/07 Commission v. Italy [2009] E.C.R. I-2291, at [34]-[35].

²¹ See above note 18.

²² Ibid., at para. [36].

²³ Ibid., at para. [39].

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ J.A. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial Services in the EC (2nd ed., Oxford 2000) pp. 22 ff.; D. Chalmers and others, European Union Law (Cambridge 2006), p. 509; L. Flynn, “Coming of Age: The Free Movement of Capital Case Law 1993-2002” (2002) 39 C.M.L. Rev. 773. This fundamental freedom is considered as directly effective, see joined cases C-163/94, C-165/94 and C-250/94 Criminal proceedings against Lucas Emilio Sanz de Lera and others [1995] E.C.R. I-4821, at [41]-[47].

²⁶ [1997] O.J. 220/15.

²⁷ Case C-302/97 Klaus Konle v. Republic of Austria [1999] E.C.R. I-3099.

²⁸ Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] E.C.R. I-4165, at [37].

²⁹ See on this E. Szyszczak, “Golden Shares and Market Governance” (2002) 29 Legal Issues of Eco-nomic Integration 255; H. Fleischer, “Case Note on the Golden Shares Cases” (2003) 20 C.M.L. Rev. 493; C.O. Putek, “Limited but not Lost – A Comment on the ECJ's Golden Share Decisions” (2004) 72 Fordham Law Review 2219; A. Looijestijn-Clearie, “All that glitters is not gold: European Court of Justice strikes down golden shares in two Dutch companies” (2007) 8 European Business Organization Law Review 429; S. Grundmann and F. Möslein, “Die Goldene Aktie – Staatskontrollrechte in Europarecht und wirtschaftspolitischer Bewertung” [2003] Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 317.

³⁰ Case C-483/99 Commission v. France [2002] E.C.R. I-4781.

³¹ Case C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal [2002] E.C.R. I-4731.

³² Case C-98/01 Commission v. United Kingdom [2003] E.C.R. I-4641.

³³ Case C-463/00 Commission v. Spain [2003] E.C.R. I-4581. More recently, see cases C-274/06 Commission v. Spain [2008] E.C.R. I-26 (summary publication) and C-207/07 Commission v. Spain [2008] E.C.R. I-111 (summary publication).

³⁴ Joined cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v. Netherlands [2006] E.C.R. I-9141.

³⁵ Case C-174/04 Commission v. Italy [2005] E.C.R. I-4933; joined cases C-463/04 and C-464/04 Federconsumatori and others v. Comune di Milano [2007] E.C.R. I-10419; case C-326/07 Commission v. Italy [2009] E.C.R. I-2291.

³⁶ Case C-503/99 Commission v. Belgium [2002] E.C.R. I-4809.

³⁷ For more details, see the literature cited in note 29 above.

³⁸ A Arnull and others, Wyatt & Dashwood's European Union Law (5th ed., London 2006), at [20-021].

³⁹ See especially Commission v. United Kingdom (above note 32).

⁴⁰ Commission v. Portugal (above note 31), at paras. [44]-[45]; Commission v. United Kingdom (above note 32), at para. [43]; see P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law – Text, Cases, and Materials (4th ed., Oxford 2007), at p. 725.

⁴¹ Case C-112/05 Commission v. Germany [2007] E.C.R. I-8995.

⁴² Gesetz über die Überführung der Anteilsrechte an der Volkswagenwerk GmbH in private Hand of 21 July 1960, [1960] Bundesgesetzblatt I, 585.

⁴³ German company law (different from the UK) employs a two-tier board structure which includes a management board (Vorstand) and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). The board's role of running the company and supervising the management is thus split into two separate bodies.

⁴⁴ European Commission, Press Release of 30 March 2004 – IP/04/400.

⁴⁵ Opinion of Advocate General Colomer of 13 February 2007, [2007] E.C.R. I-8995.

⁴⁶ See e.g. S. Rammeloo, “Past, Present (and Future?) of the German Volkswagengesetz under the EC Treaty” (2007) 4 European Company Law 118; F. Sander, “Volkswagen vor dem EuGH – der Schutzbereich der Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit am Scheideweg” [2007] Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (Eu.Z.W.) 106. Cf. already K.J. Hopt, “Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance After Enron” (2003) 3 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 221, 262 ff.

⁴⁷ In early 2009, Porsche did indeed increase its stake in Volkswagen AG to over 50 per cent., announcing that it intends to acquire even more shares to reach over 75 per cent. in the future. Cf. M. Buchenau and M.C. Schneider, “Porsche treibt gemeinsame Führung für das neue Autoreich voran” Handelsblatt (Düsseldorf 7 January 2009) 17. Ultimately, however, Porsche failed to gain control in VW; the financial turmoil 2008/09 and its high debt reversed the situation and led finally VW to victoriously merge with Porsche. See “VW trumps Porsche” Financial Times (London 8 May 2009) 16; D Schäfer, “Ousted Porsche chief receives €50m pay-off as families agree VW merger” Financial Times (London 24 July 2009) 1; J Wilson, “VW seals €3.3bn Porsche deal” Financial Times (London 14 August 2009) 13.

⁴⁸ Case C-112/05 Commission v. Germany [2007] E.C.R. I-8995. For comments on the case, see M. Schmauch, “Economic Patriotism made in Germany – The Court of Justice overturns parts of the ‘VW-Gesetz’” [2007] European Law Reporter 438; F. Sander, “Case C-112/05, European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany: The Volkswagen Case and Art. 56 EC – A Proper Result, Yet Also a Missed Opportunity?” (2008) 14 Columbia Journal of European Law 359; P.E. Partsch and G. Dennis, “The Court of Justice rules on “golden shares” held in private companies” (2008) 3 J.I.B.F.L. 157; C. Teichmann and E. Heise, “Das VW-Urteil des EuGH und seine Folgen” [2007] Betriebs-Berater 2577; G Parleani, “Après l'arrêt Volkswagen du 23 octobre 2007, quelle liberté pour les Etats actionnaires?” [2007] Revue des sociétés 874; W.G. Ringe, “Case C-112/05, Commission v. Germany (“VW law”), Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 23 October 2007” (2008) 45 C.M.L. Rev. 537; H.J. van Harten, “Zaak C-112/05, Commissie van de Europese Gemeenschappen t. Bondsrepubliek Duitsland (Volkswagenwet)” [2008] Sociaal-economische wetgeving (S.E.W.) 154.

⁴⁹ On this Ringe (above note 48).

⁵⁰ Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 8 June 2009 – II ZR 111/08. The lower instances were Landgericht Essen, judgment of 29 June 2007, (2007) 52 Die Aktiengesellschaft 797; Oberlandesgericht Hamm, decision of 31 March 2008, [2008] Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 914.

⁵¹ The maximum number of supervisory board members that can be appointed by individual shareholders is one third.

⁵² For this reason, the plaintiffs brought the case even before the German Constitutional Court, however without success.

⁵³ Germany had tried to defend the law with these arguments. See para. 32 of the case. Cf. Teichmann and Heise (above note 48) at p. 2579; Ringe (above note 48) at pp. 542 ff.; and – already long beforehand – Hopt (above note 46) at pp. 262 ff.

⁵⁴ German law on public limited companies.

⁵⁵ Aktiengesetz, s. 179(2).

⁵⁶ Institutional Shareholder Services, Sherman & Sterling LLP and European Corporate Governance Institute, Proportionality Between Ownership and Control in EU Listed Companies: Report on the Proportionality Principle in the European Union – External Study Commissioned by the European Commission (2007), at pp. 8, 20.

⁵⁷ Aktiengesetz, ss. 134(1) and 23(5).

⁵⁸ This does of course not apply to the right of the Federal State and of the Land of Lower Saxony to appoint two members of the company's supervisory board if and as long as they are shareholders of VW. This rule is a classical golden share which will not be further discussed in the following.

⁵⁹ This is the way the Court saw it, see paras. [50] ff. of the judgment.

⁶⁰ See on this the considerations at Ringe (above note 48) at p. 542 f.

⁶¹ This is what de facto happened much later, see below notes 167 f. and accompanying text.

⁶² Which is permissible under Aktiengesetz, s. 179(2).

⁶³ L. Flynn, “Coming of Age: The Free Movement of Capital Case Law 1993-2002” (2002) 39 C.M.L. Rev. 773, 786 f. More recently D. Wyatt, “Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Freedoms and the Right to Equality after Viking and Mangold, and the Implications for Community Competence” (2008) 4 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 1-48.

⁶⁴ This would be permitted by both English and by German company law. See P.L. Davies, Gower and Davies' Principles of Modern Company Law (8th ed. London 2008) at [15-25] (“up to and including unanimity”). For Germany, see Aktiengesetz, s. 179 (2), which expressly allows for an agreement on different majority requirements. On this, see C.H. Seibt, “Commentary on § 179” in K. Schmidt and M. Lutter (eds.), Aktiengesetz Kommentar (Cologne 2008), at [29] f.

⁶⁵ This is permitted under § 101(2) Aktiengesetz.

⁶⁶ This is the Court's reasoning on the corresponding rule in the VW law, see para. [52] of the judgment.

⁶⁷ For instance, joined cases 177 and 178/82 Officier van Justitie v. Van de Haar [1984] E.C.R. 1797 suggest that competition law rules are addressed to undertakings, whereas the free movement of goods seeks to eliminate measures taken by Member States. Cf. case 311/85 Vlaamse Reisbureaus [1987] E.C.R. 3801. See J. Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law (Oxford 2002), 129, 139; Fleischer (above note 29), at p. 500; Parleani (above note 48), at para. [4]; G. Spindler, “Deutsches Gesellschaftsrecht in der Zange zwischen Inspire Art und Golden Shares?” [2003] Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 850, 854.

⁶⁸ Usher (above note 25) at pp. 25-27.

⁶⁹ Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association v. Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] E.C.R. I-4921. Cf. already case 36/74 Walrave v. Union cycliste internationale [1974] E.C.R. 1405. See C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU – The Four Freedoms (2nd ed. Oxford 2007), 284 f.

⁷⁰ By joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97 Christelle Deliège [2000] E.C.R. I-2549, this approach was extended to the provisions concerning freedom to provide services (ex Article 49 EC).

⁷¹ Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund v. Kolpak [2003] E.C.R. I-4135.

⁷² Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] E.C.R. I-1577, at [120].

⁷³ C-438/05 International Transport Workers' Federation and others v. Viking Line [2007] E.C.R. I-10779, at [33] ff.

⁷⁴ A further example from recent time is the case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and others [2007] E.C.R. I-11767, at [98]. See on the problem in both cases J. Malmberg and T. Sigeman, “Industrial Actions and EU Economic Freedoms: The Autonomous Collective Bargaining Model Curtailed by the European Court of Justice” (2008) 45 C.M.L. Rev. 1115; N. Reich, “Gemeinschaftliche Verkehrsfreiheiten versus Nationales Arbeitskampfrecht” [2007] Eu.Z.W. 391, 392.

⁷⁵ Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena [1976] E.C.R. 455.

⁷⁶ Ibid., at para. [31].

⁷⁷ Ibid., at para. [35]. Cf. opinion of AG Maduro of 23 May 2007 in case C-438/05 Viking Line (above note 73), at paras. [39], [40].

⁷⁸ Viking Line (above note 73), at para. [59].

⁷⁹ Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] E.C.R. I-4139.

⁸⁰ J. Shaw and others, Economic and Social Law of the European Union (Basingstoke 2007), pp. 143, 300.

⁸¹ S. Wernicke, Die Privatwirkung im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht (Baden-Baden 2002), pp. 225 ff., 253 f.

⁸² This is the Court's approach in Angonese (above note 79).

⁸³ Similarly, Usher (above note 25), at pp. 25–27.

⁸⁴ Considering this Wyatt (above note 63), at pp. 37 ff.

⁸⁵ “Intermediäre Gewalten”, see A. Haratsch and others, Europarecht (5th ed. Tübingen 2006), at para. 695.

⁸⁶ Case C-265/95 Commission v. France [1997] E.C.R. I-6959; case C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Republic auf Austria [2003] E.C.R. I-5659. These proceedings concerned private actions that amounted to a violation of the free movement of goods; however, in para. [62] of the latter judgment, the ECJ generally considered “restrictions on the effective exercise of a fundamental freedom enshrined in the Treaty […], which result from actions taken by individuals”.

⁸⁷ Article 10 EC, now Article 4(3) TEU.

⁸⁸ Interestingly, this was also referred to in Viking Line (above note 73), at para. [62].

⁸⁹ This could theoretically support the plaintiffs' argument in Thyssen Krupp (above note 50).

⁹⁰ For instance, based on a similar reasoning, Germany abolished shares with multiple voting rights in 1998. See on this the legislative explanation for the reform act (“KonTraG”), Bundestagsdrucksache 13/9712, at p. 12.

⁹¹ Commission v. France (above note 86) at para. [65].

⁹² Wyatt (above note 63), at p. 11 f.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Opinion of AG Maduro of 23 May 2007 in case C-438/05 Viking Line (above note 73), at paras. [31] ff.

⁹⁵ Ibid., at para. [43].

⁹⁶ Ibid., at para. [48].

⁹⁷ See below part IV.C.

⁹⁸ See below part IV.C.

⁹⁹ See above part II.

¹⁰⁰ Case C-98/01 Commission v. United Kingdom [2003] E.C.R. I-4641, at [31].

¹⁰¹ Ibid., at para. [48].

¹⁰² Joined cases C-463/04 and C-464/04 Federconsumatori and others v. Comune di Milano [2007] E.C.R. I-10419.

¹⁰³ R. Ruge, “Goldene Aktien V: Flugverkehrskontrolle in Großbritannien” [2003] Eu.Z.W. 540, 541; W. Kilian, “Vom sinkenden Wert der ‘Goldenen Aktien’” [2003] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (N.J.W.) 2653; cf. in the context of administrative law R. Seerden and F. Stroink, Administrative Law of the European Union, its Member States and the United States (Mortsel 2002), 117.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. P. Craig, Administrative Law (5th ed., London 2003), p. 811; P. Leyland and G. Anthony, Textbook on Administrative Law (5th ed., Oxford 2005), pp. 253-255; S. Arrowsmith, “Judicial Review and the Contractual Powers of Public Authorities” (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 277.

¹⁰⁵ A. Arnull and others, Wyatt and Dashwood's European Union Law (5th ed., London 2006), p. 860 f.; K. Wellige, “Weg mit dem VW-Gesetz!” [2003] Eu.Z.W. 427, 430.

¹⁰⁶ Opinion of A.G. Maduro in case Commission v. Netherlands (above note 34) [2006] E.C.R. I-9143. In a similar vein: Haratsch and others (above note 85), at para. [694].

¹⁰⁷ See also, by analogy, case 152/84 Marshall [1986] E.C.R. 723, [49], and Case C-188/89 Foster v. British Gas [1990] E.C.R. I-3313, [17].

¹⁰⁸ Opinion of Advocate General Maduro (above note 106), at para. [22].

¹⁰⁹ Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi of 2 December 2009 in case Commission v. Portugal (C-171/08) not yet reported.

¹¹⁰ In more detail P. Trepte, Regulating Procurement: Understanding the Ends and Means of Public Procurement Regulation (Oxford 2004).

¹¹¹ Even if a contract falls outwith the scope of the relevant Directives, it is still subject to the general principles of EC law, most obviously the relevant Treaty provisions on free movement and the requirements of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. See e.g. case C-231/03 Coname v. Comune di Cingia de’ Botti [2005] E.C.R. I-7287; also case C-458/03 Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG [2005] E.C.R. I-8585. On this, cf. the Commission Interpretative Communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives [2006] O.J. C179/2.

¹¹² Case 40/85 Belgium v. Commission [1986] E.C.R. 2321; joined cases 296 and 318/82 The Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek BV v. Commission [1985] E.C.R. 809; joined cases C-278 to C-280/92 Spain v. Commission [1994] E.C.R. I-4103; case C-56/93 Belgium v. Commission [1996] E.C.R. I-723; case C-39/94 SFEI and others v. La Poste and others [1996] E.C.R. I-3547; Case C-342/96 Spain v. Commission [1999] E.C.R. I-2459, [41]; Case C-256/97 DM Transport [1999] E.C.R. I-3913, [22]; case T-46/97 SIC v. Commission [2000] E.C.R. II-2125, [78].

¹¹³ See in more detail C. Quigley, European State Aid Law and Policy (2nd ed., Oxford 2009), pp. 13 ff.; L. Hancher, “The General Framework” in L. Hancher, T. Ottervanger and P.J. Slot, EC State Aids (3rd ed., London 2006), [3-065] ff.

¹¹⁴ A.G. Mengozzi (above note 109) followed this approach.

¹¹⁵ Parleani (above note 48), at para. [14].

¹¹⁶ Similarly, J. van Bekkum, J. Kloosterman and J. Winter, “Golden Shares and European Company Law: the Implications of Volkswagen” (2008) 5 European Company Law 6, 9.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., at p. 9.

¹¹⁸ See below part IV.D.

¹¹⁹ See e.g. case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron GmbH [1991] E.C.R. I-1979, [20]-[22]; case C-241/94 France v. Commission (Kimberly-Clark) [1996] E.C.R. I-4551, [20] ff. Cf. E. Szyszczak (above note 8), at p. 10; G. Bitter, “Niederlassungsfreiheit für Kapitalgesellschaften in Europa: Gläubigerschutz in Gefahr?” [2004] Yearbook of Young Civil Law Scholars (Jb.J.Z.R.Wiss.) 299, 310 ff.; E.M. Kieninger, “Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht nach ‗Centros‘, ‗Überseering‘ und ‗Inspire Art‘: Antworten, Zweifel und offene Fragen” [2004] Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 685, 697.

¹²⁰ Joined cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v. Netherlands [2006] E.C.R. I-9141 [20] with further references to Commission v. France (above note 30), at para. [41]; case C-174/04 Commission v. Italy [2005] E.C.R. I-4933, [30]-[31]; case C-265/04 Margaretha Bouanich v. Skatteverket [2006] E.C.R. I-923, [34], [35].

¹²¹ See on this part IV.C. below.

¹²² See Ringe (above note 48), at p. 537.

¹²³ Joined cases C-463/04 and C-464/04 Federconsumatori and others v. Comune di Milano [2007] E.C.R. I-10419, [31].

¹²⁴ See e.g. D. Chalmers and others, European Union Law (Cambridge 2006) 511; S. Grundmann, European Company Law – Organization, Finance and Capital Markets (Antwerp-Oxford 2007), [674].

¹²⁵ See part I. above.

¹²⁶ This would correspond to what Catherine Barnard has termed “high impact approach”, but in fact comes close to a “total impact approach”, because of the wide interpretation of the free movement of capital. See C. Barnard, “Restricting Restrictions: Lessons for the EU from the US?” [2009] C.L.J. 575, 580 ff.

¹²⁷ On this specific point W. Meilicke, “Die Niederlassungsfreiheit nach ‗Überseering‘ – Rückblick und Ausblick nach Handelsrecht und Steuerrecht” [2003] GmbH-Rundschau 793, 805; F.J. Säcker, “Die Zukunft der Unternehmens-mitbe-stimmung in Deutschland” [2008] Die Aktiengesellschaft 17, 19. See on the German discussion in general S. Grundmann and F. Möslein, “State Control in Privatised Companies: Comparative Law, European Law and Policy Aspects” (2004) 4 European Banking and Financial Law Journal (EUREDIA) 623; G. Spindler, “Deutsches Gesellschaftsrecht in der Zange zwischen Inspire Art und Golden Shares?” [2003] Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 850, 853; M. Habersack, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht (3rd ed., Munich 2006) § 3 paras. [29] f.; J. Oechsler, “Erlaubte Gestaltungen im Anwendungsbereich des Art. 56 I EG – Zugleich zur Entscheidung EuGH, NZG 2006, 942 – Golden Shares VI” [2007] N.Z.G. 161, 163; C. Teichmann and E. Heise, “Das VW-Urteil des EuGH und seine Folgen” [2007] Betriebs-Berater 2577, 2581.

¹²⁸ G. Parleani, “Après l'arrêt Volkswagen du 23 octobre 2007, quelle liberté pour les Etats actionnaires?” [2007] Revue des sociétés 874.

¹²⁹ See above pp. 7 ff.

¹³⁰ Commission v. Germany (above note 48), at paras. [48] ff.

¹³¹ On this Ringe (above note 48), at p. 542.

¹³² See e.g. the wording of para. [48]: “However, … ” and the statement in para. [51].

¹³³ Para. [51].

¹³⁴ Para. [52].

¹³⁵ See on this the Commission Communication (above note 26), at p. 17.

¹³⁶ Ringe (above note 48), at pp. 537, 542 f. Equally, Van Bekkum and others (above note 116), at pp. 11 f.

¹³⁷ Explicitly in case C-367/98 Commission v. Portugal [2002] E.C.R. I-4731, [44]; ever since steady case-law, see case C-174/04 Commission v. Italy [2005] E.C.R. I-4933, [12]; lastly in joined cases C-463/04 and C-464/04 Feder-consumatori and others v. Comune di Milano [2007] E.C.R. I-10419, [19]. Cf. Teichmann and Heise (above note 127), at p. 2581; S. Grundmann and F. Möslein, “Die Goldene Aktie – Staatskontrollrechte in Europarecht und wirtschaftspolitischer Bewertung” [2003] Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht (ZGR) 317, 330 ff.; S. Grundmann and F. Möslein, “Die Goldene Aktie und der Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle im Rechtsvergleich – insbesondere Staatskontrollrechte, Höchst- und Mehrfachstimmrechte sowie Übernahmeabwehrmaßnahmen” (2003) 102 Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft (ZVglRWiss) 289, 315 ff. See also Habersack (above note 127) § 3 paras. [29] f.; J. Oechsler, “Erlaubte Gestaltungen im Anwendungsbereich des Art. 56 I EG” [2007] N.Z.G. 161, 162.

¹³⁸ Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] E.C.R. 837.

¹³⁹ This is explained in detail at Barnard (above note 69), at pp. 113 ff.

¹⁴⁰ Case 120/78 Rewe Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] E.C.R. 649.

¹⁴¹ Case C-267/91 Criminal proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] E.C.R. I-6097. It is still unclear to what extent very recent case-law differs from Keck: see case C-110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] E.C.R. I-519; case C-142/05 Åklagaren v. Percy Mickelsson and Joakim Roos [2009] All E.R. (EC) 842.

¹⁴² In tax cases such as case C-513/04 Mark Kerckhaert and Bernadette Morres v. Belgium, [2006] E.C.R. I-10967 or case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2006] E.C.R. I-11673 the Court has exempted one particular field, namely taxation, from the scope of (then) Article 56 EC. See on this below note 162 and accompanying text.

¹⁴³ M. Andenas, T. Gütt and M. Pannier, “Free Movement of Capital and National Company Law” (2005) 16 European Business Law Review 757, 770 f.

¹⁴⁴ Commission v. United Kingdom (above note 100), at paras. [45]-[47]; similarly, case C-463/00 Commission v. Spain (above note 33), at paras. [59]-[61].

¹⁴⁵ Cf. H. Altmeppen, “Europäische Niederlassungsfreiheit” in B. Kropff and J. Semler, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (2nd ed., Munich 2006), ch. 6 para. [58]. Even further going Wellige (above note 105), at p. 432, and F. Kainer, “Binnenmarktrechtliche Grenzen des Übernahmerechts” (2004) 168 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht (Z.H.R.) 542, 556: The ECJ has indirectly transposed the Keck case-law to the free movement of capital. See also Spindler (above note 127), at p. 853.

¹⁴⁶ Kainer (above note 145), at p. 558 with further references.

¹⁴⁷ Kainer ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Teichmann and Heise (above note 127), at p. 2581.

¹⁴⁹ Only exceptionally, when a considerable financial burden is at stake, e.g. in a situation “seriously undermining the financial balance of the social security system”: Case C-120/95 Nicolas Decker v. Caisse de maladie des employés privés [1998] E.C.R. I-1831, [39]; case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie [1998] E.C.R. I-1931, [41].

¹⁵⁰ Opinion of Advocate General Colomer in cases C-463/00 and C-98/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-4584, [48].

¹⁵¹ See on this joined cases C-418/93 and others Semeraro Casa Uno Srl v. Sindaco del Comune di Erbusco [1996] E.C.R. I-2975, [32]; case C-412/97 ED Srl v. Italo Fenocchio [1999] E.C.R. I-3845, [11].

¹⁵² See on this criterion already the references at note 120 above.

¹⁵³ See above notes 129 ff. and accompanying text.

¹⁵⁴ See above notes 115 ff. and accompanying text.

¹⁵⁵ Craig and de Búrca (note 40) 724.

¹⁵⁶ In this way, Bundesgerichtshof, judgment of 17 March 1997 – II ZB 3/96, BGHZ 135, 107=[1997] N.J.W. 1855; cf. also Wellige (above note 105), at p. 430.

¹⁵⁷ Joined cases T-228/99 and 233/99 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and others v. Commission [2003] E.C.R. II-435, [272].

¹⁵⁸ Naturally, there may be differences between the shareholders’ individual interests, e.g. in relation to a short term/long term investment perspective.

¹⁵⁹ As an example, see the following two state aid cases: case C-303/88 Italy v. Commission [1991] E.C.R. I-1433; case C-305/89 Italy v. Commission [1991] E.C.R. I-1603.

¹⁶⁰ See the examples given by Barnard (note 126) at p. 594.

¹⁶¹ Case C-98/01 Commission v. UK [2003] E.C.R. I-4641, [28].

¹⁶² Case C-387/01 Harald and Ingrid Weigel v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Vorarlberg [2004] E.C.R. I-4981, [55]; C-365/02 Lindfors [2004] E.C.R. I-7183, [34]; Case C-392/05 Georgios Alevizos v. Ipourgos Ikonomikon [2007] E.C.R. I-3505, [76]; case C-67/08 Margarete Block v. Finanzamt Kaufbeuren [2009] E.C.R. I-0000, [35]. See, e.g., J. Snell, “Non-discriminatory Tax Obstacles in Community Law” (2007) 56 I.C.L.Q. 339.

¹⁶³ This provision was not subject to the EU proceedings.

¹⁶⁴ See e.g. T. Käseberg and F. Möslein, “Auch die Mitbestimmungsregeln im VW-Gesetz sind fragwürdig” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) (Frankfurt 12 March 2008), 23. The German Industry Federation BDI was strictly against the new version, see K. Mrusek, “BDI mobilisiert Merkel gegen das VW-Gesetz” FAZ (Frankfurt 27 February 2008), 13.

¹⁶⁵ The Commission initiated new proceedings against Germany on 5 June 2008. See –, “Porsche and Volkswagen – See you in Court” The Economist (London 14 June 2008), at p. 86; H. Kafsack and others, “EU-Verfahren gegen neues VW-Gesetz” FAZ (Frankfurt 6 June 2008), at p. 13. After the law had passed through the German Parliament, the Commission submitted a reasoned opinion pursuant to (then) Article 228(2) EC Treaty, giving Germany two months to respond. See European Commission, Press release of 27 November 2008, “Free movement of capital: Commission calls again on Germany to apply a Court ruling on Volkswagen law” IP/08/1797.

¹⁶⁶ See above note 47.

¹⁶⁷ Section 11(1) of the new articles of association of Volkswagen AG.

¹⁶⁸ Section 25(2) of the new articles of association of Volkswagen AG.

¹⁶⁹ G Haake and M Hucko, “VW legt bei Porsche-Übernahme den Turbo ein” Financial Times Deutschland (Hamburg 3 December 2009).

¹⁷⁰ See, e.g. the discussion at the Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue meeting in Washington DC on 17 September 2009 on “The New Role of Government in Corporate Governance” and the corresponding newsletter at <http://www.ecgi.org/research/research_newsletter/vol7.pdf>.