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Putting normativity in its proper place

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Tania Lombrozo  and
Kevin Uttich
Tania Lombrozo
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California–Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720. [email protected]@berkeley.eduhttp://cognition.berkeley.edu/
Kevin Uttich
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California–Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720. [email protected]@berkeley.eduhttp://cognition.berkeley.edu/
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Abstract

Knobe considers two explanations for the influence of moral considerations on “non-moral” cognitive systems: the “person as moralist” position, and the “person as [biased] scientist” position. We suggest that this dichotomy conflates questions at computational and algorithmic levels, and suggest that distinguishing the issues at these levels reveals a third, viable option, which we call the “rational scientist” position.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 344 - 345
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

Marr, D. (1982) Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and processing of visual information. Henry Holt.Google Scholar
Uttich, K. & Lombrozo, T. (2010) Norms inform mental state ascriptions: A rational explanation for the side-effect effect. Cognition 116:87–100.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed