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From the “coding metaphor” to a theory of representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2019

Jonathan Birch Open the ORCID record for Jonathan Birch [Opens in a new window]  and
Joulia Smortchkova
Jonathan Birch
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, LondonWC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. [email protected]://personal.lse.ac.uk/birchj1
Joulia Smortchkova
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, Radcliffe Humanities, Radcliffe Observatory Quarter, University of Oxford, OxfordOX2 6GG, United Kingdom. [email protected]://jouliasmortchkova.wordpress.com
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Abstract

Brette highlights a conceptual problem in contemporary neuroscience: Loose talk of “coding” sometimes leads to a conflation of the distinction between representing and merely detecting a property. The solution is to replace casual talk of “coding” with an explicit, demanding set of conditions for neural representation. Various theories of this general type can be found in the philosophical literature.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e220
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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References

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