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Can irrationality be discussed accurately?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

L. Jonathan Cohen
L. Jonathan Cohen
Affiliation:
The Queen's College, Oxford University, Oxford 0X1 4AW, England
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , December 1984 , pp. 736 - 738
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1984

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