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Truth and intra-personal concept stability
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 1999
Abstract
I criticize three claims concerning simulators: (1) That a simulator provides the best-fitting simulation of the perceptual impression one has of an object does not guarantee, pace Barsalou, that the object belongs to the simulator's category. (2) The people described by Barsalou do not acquire a concept of truth because they are not sensitive about the potential inadequacy of their sense impressions. (3) Simulator update prevents Barsalou's way of individuating concepts (i.e., identifying them with simulators) from solving the problem of intra-personal concept stability because to update a simulator is to change its content, and concepts with different contents are distinct.
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- © 1999 Cambridge University Press
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