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Reason is normative, and should be studied accordingly

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 October 2011

David Spurrett
David Spurrett
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041, South Africa. [email protected]
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Abstract

Reason aims at truth, so normative considerations are a proper part of the study of reasoning. Excluding them means neglecting some of what we know or can discover about reasoning. Also, the normativist position we are asked to reject by Elqayam & Evans (E&E) is defined in attenuated and self-contradictory ways.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 5 , October 2011 , pp. 267 - 268
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

Bierce, A. (1971) The Enlarged Devil's dictionary. Penguin.Google Scholar
Kuhn, D. (1991) The skills of argument. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar