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How many beliefs can dance in the head of the self-deceived?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Jeffrey E. Foss
Jeffrey E. Foss
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC V8W 2Y2, [email protected]@uvic.ca
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Abstract

Mele desires to believe that the self-deceived have consistent beliefs. Beliefs are not observable, but are instead ascribed within an explanatory framework. Because explanatory cogency is the only criterion for belief attribution, Mele should carefully attend to the logic of belief-desire explanation. He does not, and the consistency of his own account as well as that of the self-deceived, are the victims.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 111 - 112
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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