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Global broadcasting and self-interpretation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

David Pereplyotchik
David Pereplyotchik
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Baruch College, City University of New York, New York, NY 10010. [email protected]
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Abstract

Carruthers claims that global workspace theory implies that sensory states, unlike propositional attitudes, are introspectible in a non-interpretative fashion. I argue that this claim is false, and defend a strong version of the “mindreading is prior” model of first-person access, according to which the self-ascription of all mental states, both propositional and sensory, is interpretative.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 156 - 157
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

Rosenthal, D. M. (2005) Consciousness and mind. Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sellars, W. (1956/1997) Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. Harvard University Press. (Original work published in 1956).Google Scholar