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Expectations and morality: A dilemma

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Eric Mandelbaum  and
David Ripley
Eric Mandelbaum
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, The Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 1PT, United [email protected]://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/our_staff/research/eric_mandelbaum
David Ripley
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, DEC-ENS, 75005 Paris, France. [email protected]://sites.google.com/site/davewripley
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Abstract

We propose Knobe's explanation of his cases encounters a dilemma: Either his explanation works and, counterintuitively, morality is not at the heart of these effects; or morality is at the heart of the effects and Knobe's explanation does not succeed. This dilemma is then used to temper the use of the Knobe paradigm for discovering moral norms.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 346
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

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