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Conceptual atomism rethought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

Susan Schneider
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Institute for Research in Cognitive Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6304. [email protected]

Abstract

Focusing on Machery's claim that concepts play entirely different roles in philosophy and psychology, I explain how one well-known philosophical theory of concepts, Conceptual Atomism (CA), when properly understood, takes into account both kinds of roles.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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