¹ For example, Hadas, Moses, A History of Latin Literature (New York, 1952) 238Google Scholar, declared ‘Valerius himself has nothing to say worth hearing’, and Carter, C.J., ‘Valerius Maximus’, in T.A. Dorey (ed.), Empire and Aftermath: Silver Latin II (London 1975) 30Google Scholar, commented that Valerius is distinguished chiefly by his ‘supreme mediocrity of talent’.

² Bloomer, Martin W., Valerius Maximus and the Rhetoric of the New Nobility (Chapel Hill NC 1992)Google Scholar; Skidmore, Clive, Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen (Exeter 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wardle, David, Valerius Maximus: Memorable Deeds and Sayings Book I (Oxford 1998)Google Scholar; and Mueller, Hans, Roman Religion in Valerius Maximus (London 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Langlands, Rebecca, Sexual Morality in Ancient Rome (Cambridge 2006) 191CrossRefGoogle Scholar and 125.

⁴ Mueller, Roman Religion (n. 2) 3, summarises the general feeling when he comments on Valerius’ lack of philosophical insight.

⁵ Langlands, , ‘Roman Exempla and Situation Ethics: Valerius Maximus and Cicero de Officiis’, JRS 101 (2011) 100-122Google Scholar.

⁶ Langlands, ‘Roman Exempla’ (n. 5) 102. Morgan, Teresa, Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire (Cambridge 2007) 122-159CrossRefGoogle Scholar, also explores Valerius Maximus as a source for Roman ethics outside formal philosophy. Long, A.A., From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (Oxford 2006) 390CrossRefGoogle Scholar, underlines the potential for exploration in this area when he comments on the ‘exemplary’ nature of Epictetus’ teachings, where students are deliberately shown a constant progression of potential real-life experiences. This could be argued to accord with the series of historical exempla with which Valerius builds the philosophical themes of his chapters.

⁷ Langlands, ‘Roman Exempla’ (n. 5) 121-2.

⁸ Langlands, Sexual Morality (n. 3) 125.

⁹ Römer, Franz, ‘Zum Aufbau der Exemplasammlung des Valerius Maximus’, WS 103 (1990) 99-107Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Lawrence, S.J., Inside Out: The Depiction of Externality in Valerius Maximus, PhD diss., University of Sydney, 2006Google Scholar.

¹¹ Wardle, Valerius Maximus (n. 2) 7.

¹² Römer, ‘Zum Aufbau’ (n. 9) 104.

¹³ Cf. Bellemore, Jane, ‘When did Valerius Maximus Write the Dicta et Facta Memorabilia?’, Antichthon 23 (1989) 67-80CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 77-9. Bellemore suggests that the passage could refer to M. Scribonius Libo Drusus.

¹⁴ Römer, ‘Zum Aufbau’ (n. 9) 106.

¹⁵ Sellars, John, Stoicism (Berkeley 2006) 109Google Scholar. This idea, as has been forcefully argued, becomes increasingly politicised under the conditions of the civil war between Pompey and Caesar and the changed political landscape that followed; Cato the Younger provides the locus classicus: Griffin, Miriam, ‘Philosophy, Cato and Roman Suicide: II’ G&R 33 (1986) 192-202, at 196-197Google Scholar; Plass, Paul, The Game of Death in Ancient Rome (Madison WI 1995) 105Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Briscoe, J. (ed.), Valerius Maximus Vol. II (Stuttgart and Leipzig 1998) 627-630Google Scholar, and Shackleton Bailey, D.R. (trans.), Valerius Maximus: Memorable Doings and Sayings Vol. II (Cambridge MA 2000) 382-384Google Scholar.

¹⁷ The text of Valerius Maximus used throughout is that of John Briscoe (n. 16). Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated

¹⁸ One may see the close connection between bravery and recklessness in the Roman mind in Vell. 2.68.3 where Milo is described as ultra fortem temerarius.

¹⁹ These accounts, as has been observed by K. Morrell, Pompey, Cato, and the Governance of the Roman Empire, PhD diss., University of Sydney, 2014, 252, tend to form part of a discourse around the reputation of Roman provincial government and foreign policy, rather than focus on Aquillius’ personal attitude towards death.

²⁰ Hill, Timothy, Ambitiosa Mors: Suicide and Self in Roman Thought and Literature (New York 2004) 19Google Scholar, also makes the point that tactical decisions to die well are not necessarily philosophical decisions. The wider societal preference is also addressed by Miriam Griffin, ‘Roman Suicide: II’ (n. 15) 192-202, at 194.

²¹ This translation is that of Richard Mott Grummere, Seneca the Younger: Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium Vol. 2 (Cambridge MA 1920) ad loc.

²² Seneca’s judgment of this oath, together with the language in which he chooses to convey it, echoes that of Valerius. He calls it turpis . . . et erubescenda. Seneca here uses turpis, picking up Valerius’ use of turpiter at 9.13.1, and the noun rubor, which links back to erubescenda in the same exemplum.The contrast Seneca draws between brave and shameful deaths also recalls the beginning of the preface to 9.13 where Valerius introduces his series of shamefully prolonged lives as a point of contrast with the previous chapter, which presents deaths of very different characters: uiriles and temerarii (9.13.pr.).

²³ Sharples, R.W., Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (London 1996) 106CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rist, J.M., Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge 1969) 249Google Scholar. Seneca, of course, explicitly rejects the idea of lust for death at Ep. 24.

²⁴ With Inwood, Brad, Reading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy at Rome (Oxford 2005) 1Google Scholar, I take Seneca as voicing an overwhelmingly Stoic position in his writings. See also Griffin, Miriam, Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford 1976) 175Google Scholar; Long, A.A. ‘Roman Philosophy’, in David Sedley (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy (Cambridge 2003) 203-206Google Scholar.

²⁵ For this idea in other Stoics of the Roman world, see Epict. Diss. 1.1.22, 1.17.25-28, 2.1.38-9, 4.1.160-5, and Muson. 3.42; for the idea in the pre-Roman Stoa: Diog. Laert. 7.1.28-31, 7.1.102.

²⁶ Diog. Laert. 7.1.130.

²⁷ Rist, Stoic Philosophy (n. 23) 239. For further discussion, see Griffin, Miriam, ‘Philosophy and Roman Suicide: I’, G&R 33 (1986) 64-77Google Scholar, at 73-4.

²⁸ Rist, Stoic Philosophy (n. 22) 248.

²⁹ This idea is also clearly articulated by Musonius Rufus, frag. 28 and 35.

³⁰ Helm, Rudolf, ‘Valerius Maximus, Seneca und die ‘Exemplassamlung’’ Hermes 74 (1939) 130-154Google Scholar, at 152, argues against the notion of a common source for Valerius and Seneca on the basis of close examination of a range of passages, but does suggest the possibility that Seneca read and used Valerius’ work. This is, incidentally, a potential example of the flaws in Seneca’s research process as hypothesised by Mayer, Ronald, ‘Roman Historical Exempla in Seneca’, in P. Grimal (ed.), Seneque et la prose latine: Entretiens Fondation Hardt 36 (Geneva 1991) 151Google Scholar, but it still seems like a stretch to suggest that Seneca adopted from Valerius ideas which are so dominant in his (i.e. Seneca’s) works.

³¹ As Gill, C., ‘The School in the Roman Imperial Period’, in Brad Inwood (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge 2003) 33-58CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 33, points out, the boundaries of Stoicism are not precise in the Roman world and there is significant overlap between the cultural and the philosophical. Thorsteinsson, Runar M., Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism: A Comparative Study of Ancient Morality (Oxford 2010) 15CrossRefGoogle Scholar, comments on this overlap in the specific context of ethics and morality.

³² The translation of Diogenes Laertius used throughout is that of Drew Hicks, Robert (trans.), Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers (London 1925)Google Scholar.

³³ Morgan, Popular Morality (n. 6) 145-6, notes the central role of self-control in the Facta et Dicta.

³⁴ For example, his characterisation of Greeks in 4.7.4; though see S.J. Lawrence, Inside Out (n. 10) on Valerius’ consistently ironic use of racial stereotypes.

³⁵ Seneca lays considerable stress on the expertise of this anonymous figure, commenting: homo egregius et, ut uerbis illum, quibus laudari dignus est, laudem, uir fortis ac strenuus, uidetur mihi optime illum cohortatus (77.6).

³⁶ This recalls the (rather challenging) advice offered by Epictetus on dealing with the mortality of one’s family members (Ench. 11, 14.1, 16). A.A. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus (n. 6) 382, comments that the Stoic position on grief is one of the more unappealing aspects of the philosophy for modern readers.

³⁷ Graver, Margaret, Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago 2007) 12CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ Also Stobaeus, 2.88.8-90,6, in Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N., The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volume 1 Translations of the Principle Sources, with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge 1987)Google Scholar 65A, and Andronicus, On Passions 1 (Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, 65B). Posidonius did not share this view: Galen, On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s Doctrines, 4.3.2-5 (Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, 65K).

³⁹ Galen quotes Chrysippus on the dangerous descent into illness that potentially follows a love of money: On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s Doctrines, 4.5.21-5 (Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, 65L).

⁴⁰ It is worth noting, however, that there was once again disagreement within the School regarding the positioning of elements as good, bad or indifferent (Diog. Laert. 7.1.103).

⁴¹ Or an individual, who is trained in Stoic philosophy, even if he or she is not yet a sapiens: Sorabji, Richard, ‘Is Stoic Philosophy Helpful as Psychotherapy?’ BICS 41 (1997) 197-209Google Scholar, at 199. Bobzien, Susanne, ‘Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and their Relation to Ethics’, BICS 41 (1997) 71-89Google Scholar, at 76, sets out the connection between assent to impressions and freedom with great clarity.

⁴² Seneca does allow for an individual to experience a first, unthinking, reaction without attracting the charge of falling prey to one’s passions (De Ira 2.3.1).

⁴³ Lutz, Cora, Musonius Rufus: The Roman Socrates (New Haven 1947) 28Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Epict. Diss. 1.12.33-4. The translations of Epictetus used throughout are those of Robert Dobbin (trans.), Epictetus: Discourses and Selected Writings (London 2008). Thorsteinsson, Roman Christianity (n. 30) 60 notes the particular emphasis on the question of self-control in Epictetus’ teachings, and Bobzien, ‘Stoic Conceptions of Freedom’ (n. 41) 81, underlines the radical autonomy that this imparts: because freedom is defined by self-control, there is no external circumstance that can stop one exercising one’s freedom.

⁴⁵ Strange, Steven K., ‘The Stoics on the Voluntariness of the Passions’, in Steven K. Strange and Jack Zupko (eds) Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations (Cambridge 2004) 32-51CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 35.

⁴⁶ Epict. Diss. 1.12.32-5, 1.1.24, 2.13.9-10, 3.22.30, 4.1.1.

⁴⁷ It is notable that all of Valerius’ external exempla in 9.13 document the miseries of kings and tyrants; this is, of course, partially a function of needing figures who have a reason to be afraid of external threats (although not so in the case of Xerxes at 9.13.ext.1), but this in itself aligns neatly with another point made by Epictetus on the tendency of people to misjudge what is really of value in life: ‘. . . remember, tragedies take place among the rich – among kings, and potentates. . . Kings start off well enough: “Deck the palace halls.” But then around the third or fourth act, we get, “O Cithaeron, why did you receive me?” Fool, where are your crowns, your diadem? Even your guards can’t help you now.’ (Diss. 1.24.15-7).

⁴⁸ Versions of the story that focus simply on Thebe’s role in her husband’s death also appear in Ov. Ib. 321-8 and Diod. Sic. 16.14.1.

⁴⁹ Helm, , ‘Valerius Maximus’ (n. 29) 43-53Google Scholar, points to Valerius’ use of De Officiis elsewhere in the work. Langlands, ‘Roman Exempla’ (n. 5) 103, also argues that Valerius engages with the work.

⁵⁰ Cicero also gives the bare details of the story at De Inv. 2.144, focusing once again on the murder of Alexander by his wife. Xenophon’s version lacks any discussion of Alexander’s fear or precautions and posits his murder as a fair recompense for his thefts ‘by land and by sea’ and cruelty towards the Thebans and Athenians (Hell. 6.4.35-7).

⁵¹ The detail of the barbarian’s tattoos underlines his distance from ‘civilised’ society: Jones, C.P., ‘Stigma: Tattooing and Branding in Graeco-Roman Antiquity’, JRS 77 (1987) 139-155Google Scholar, at 141. The depiction of Alexander’s eventual death as a result of another breach of trust (pelicatus) further underlines the violation of the proper order between husband and wife. Dyck, Andrew R., A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis (Ann Arbor 1996) 398Google Scholar, comments that Cicero’s explanation of Thebe’s motivation differs from other accounts of the story, putting an emphasis on lust, while other sources suggest a response to the perceived infertility of his wife.

⁵² Strange, ‘The Stoics on the Voluntariness of the Passions’ (n. 45) 38; Sorabji, ‘Stoic Philosophy’ (n. 44) 197-8. See Margaret Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (n. 37) 30, on the development of fear and desire as key movements of the spirit in Cicero.

⁵³ hoc rege infelicior Alexander, cuius praecordia hinc amor hinc metus torserunt: nam cum infinito ardore coniugis Thebes teneretur . . . In contrast to Cicero’s comments on the validity of Alexander’s fear in De Officiis, Valerius does not condone either of Alexander’s judgments, stating instead simply that the same woman was the causa et finis of his fear, thus allowing Alexander’s death perhaps even to be seen as a release – an end to fear – rather than the great evil he went to such lengths to avoid.

⁵⁴ Musonius Rufus warns against sexual indulgence, even within marriage, purely in the service of pleasure (12.86).

⁵⁵ Sorabji, ‘Stoic Philosophy’ (n. 41) 197, underlines the precision of the two separate judgements that determine an emotional reaction in Chrysippus’ theory.

⁵⁶ cuius timoris eadem et causa et finis fuit: Alexandrum enim Thebe paelicatus ira mota interemit.

⁵⁷ Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers (n. 38) 419, see this vision of the importance of self-control as one of the defining features in the ancient perception of Stoicism.

⁵⁸ Dyck, De Officiis (n. 51) 397. Plutarch’s version of the story includes markedly different details and proofs of Dionysius’ paranoia (Dion. 9).

⁵⁹ Bobzien, ‘Stoic Conceptions of Freedom’ (n. 41) 85.

⁶⁰ The similarities in language and phrasing are marked; for instance, Valerius writes et a familiis locupletium electos praeualidos seruos . . . substituit and Cicero: ex familiis locupletium seruos delegerat; similarly,Valerius: tonsorum quoque metu tondere filias suas docuit, and Cicero: quin etiam ne tonsori collum committeret, tondere filias suas docuit.

⁶¹ As previously mentioned, at 4.8 ‘A’ struggles to believe that even a sapiens can be immune to the effects of strong emotion.

⁶² For example, 4.8, 4.11, 4.35 (metus), 4.36 (libido).

⁶³ Cicero refers to those who cannot control their cupiditas and suffer the pangs of these perturbationes as stulti (4.12, 4.14, 4.39), recalling Valerius’ dismissive characterisation of Xerxes as opum magnitudine quam altiore animi sensu felicior and lacking in prudentia (9.13.ext.1).

⁶⁴ Langlands, ‘Roman Exempla’ (n. 5) 103.

⁶⁵ Particularly as Cicero did not himself subscribe to a Stoic framework: Reydams-Schils, G., ‘Philosophy and Education in Stoicism of the Roman Imperial Era’, Oxford Review of Education 36 (2010) 561-574CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 562.

⁶⁶ Römer, ‘Zum Aufbau’ (n. 9).

⁶⁷ Brunschwig, J. and Sedley, D., ‘Hellenistic Philosophy’, in Sedley, Greek and Roman Philosophy (n. 23) 165Google Scholar.