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Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure. By Bruce D. Jones. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 200p. $49.95.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2002

Barbara F. Walter
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego

Extract

By almost all indicators, Rwanda's civil war should have ended in a successful negotiated settlement. Both the Tutsi rebels and the Rwandan government had agreed to participate in negotiations brokered by a team of Tanzanian mediators whom most people considered highly skilled. The two parties to the negotiations were able to reach and sign a detailed peace settlement that guaranteed both parties representation in the legislature and a set percentage of slots in the military. And the United Nations offered to “guarantee” the security of the two sides during the implementation period. Almost all factors purported to lead to a peaceful solution were present at the time the Arusha accords were signed in 1994. Rwanda's civil war, however, did not end peacefully. Instead, a peace process that seemingly had all the elements of success ended in one of the most rapid genocides in recorded history.

Type
Book Review
Copyright
© 2002 by the American Political Science Association

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