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Conceptual Problems in Theorizing About International Conflict

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

James D. Morrow ,
Barry L. Price  and
Roslyn Simowitz
James D. Morrow
Affiliation:
Hoover Institution Stanford University
Barry L. Price
Affiliation:
Tarleton State University
Roslyn Simowitz
Affiliation:
University of Texas, Arlington
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Abstract

Axiomatic and deductive theorizing about international political conflict has precipitated lively debate. Much of the disputation of recent years has derived from an expected utility theory of conflict advocated by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. In the June 1990 issue of this Review, Roslyn Simowitz and Barry L. Price dissected crucial parts of Bueno de Mesquita's formulation of the theory, arguing that it suffers from errors of logic and clarity. In this controversy, James D. Morrow challenges the claims of Simowitz and Price that the reviewed theory is logically and conceptually flawed. In turn, Price and Simowitz join issue.

Type
Controversies
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 85 , Issue 3 , September 1991 , pp. 923 - 940
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1991

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References

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