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The Law of Angary

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 May 2017

Extract

The origin of the right of angary is traceable to early Roman times, and a study of its origin and development throws much light on the right as it is understood today. Several writers on international law refer to the first chapter, 41st verse, of Saint Matthew’s Gospel, as showing a possible origin of the term angary. This verse reads:

Quicumque te angariaverit mille passus, vade cum illo et alia duo. (And whosoever shall compel thee to go one mile, go with him two.)

The Greek word for compel or force is also cited, and it is clear that the idea of compelling some service was linked up with the early notion of angary.

The following passage from the Justinian Code (529 A.D.) shows the word angary in its noun form, and shows that all classes alike were subject to the law:

Nullus penitus cuius libet ordinis seu dignitatis, vel sacrosancta ecclesia, vel domus regia tempore expeditionis excusationem angariarum seu parangarium habeat.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1919 

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References

1 Corpus Juris Civilis, Lib. XII, Tit. LI, art. 21, p. 772 Hermanni ster. edit. Leipzig, 1843.

2 De lure Civitatis (1752), p. 203.

3 Iure Maritimo et Navali, Cap. V. Lib. III, p. 927 Heinnecius ed. Magdeburg. 1740.

4 Ius Maritimwn Hanseaticum, p. 887, Heinnecius ed. Magdeburg, 1740.

5 Moetjens et Van Bulderen,—Recueil des Traités de Paid, Vol. IV, p. 775 (1700).

6 Ibid.

7 Jenkinson, C. “Collection of Treaties between Great Britain and Other Powers” (1785), p. 72.

8 Dumont, VI, 329.

9 Clercq, Recueil des Traités de la France, p. 54.

10 Malloy, II, 1236.

11 United States Statutes at Large, VIII, 384.

12 Gesetzsammlung für die preussisohen Staaten (quoted by Albrecht, p. 39).

13 De Martens, Nouveau Recueil de Traités, XXXV, 270.

14 De Clercq, Recueil des Traités, VII, 588.

15 Speeches, III, 327.

16 Das Internationale offentliche Seerecht der Gegenwart, p. 236.

17 International Law, p. 813 (7th edition).

18 “Requisitionem von neutralem Privateigenthum,” Zeitsehrift für Völkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht (1912), Beiheft I, p. 44.

19 “La Réquisition des Navires Allemands,” Revue de Droit International, XXIII (1916), 278.

20 De Iure Belli ac Paris, Book III, Ch. 17.

21 “Requisitionem,” etc., p. 61.

22 Das moderne Völkerrecht, Art. 795.

23 Le Droit International, Art. 1277.

24 Phases et Causes Célèbres, Vol. I, p. 121.

25 Cours de Droit International Public, 530.

26 Le Droit International de l’Europe (Bergson trans.), ftn. p. 356.

27 War and the Private Citizen, 104–5.

28 Commentary on International Law (Abdy ed.), 299.

29 International Law, III, 84–85.

30 International Maritime Recht, p. 413.

31 Lois et Usages de la Neutralité, II, 72.

32 Principles of International Law, pp. 627–628 (Boston, 1910).

33 Annuaire de Droit International, XVII, 284.

34 Droit International Public, V, 710.

35 International Law, I, 519.

36 Ibid., 515.

37 Ibid. (Wheaton ed.), p. 313.

38 Ibid., 320.

39 Treatise on International Law, 812.

40 Lois et Usages de la Neutrality, II, p. 68.

41 Manual of International Law, II, 438–440.

42 Ius Maritimum, p. 608.

43 Iure Maritimo et Navali, p. 927 (Heinnecius ed.).

44 Droit maritime de l’Europe (1797), p. 78.

45 Histoire des origines, etc., p. 258.

46 Manual of International Law, p. 438.

47 Le droit international, III, Art. 1277.

48 Basdevant, “La Requisition des navirea allemands,” Revue de droit international public, XXIII, 270: taken from German declaration of war against Portugal.

49 Robinson’s Admiralty Reports, IV, 256–62.

50 Boucher, P. B., Institution au droit maritime, p. 396 fol.

51 This treaty was not the model, as there were at least four treaties of like tenor already in force.

52 Admiralty Court (1916) pp. 99–106.

Editor’s Note: It seems of interest to add the following extract from the opinion of Lord Parker of Waddington in the above case:

“The power in question was asserted by the United States of America in the Civil War which broke out in 1861. In the Memphis ([1862] Blatchford P. C. 202) in the Ella Warley ( [1862] Blatchford P. C. 204) and in the Stephen Hart ([1862] Blatchford P. C. 379, 387) Betts, J., allowed the War Department to requisition goods in the custody of the prize court and required for purposes in connection with the prosecution of the war. In the case of the Peterhoff ([1862] Blatchford P. C. 381) he allowed the vessel itself to be similarly requisitioned by the Navy Department. The reasons of Betts, J., as reported are not very satisfactory, for they leave it in doubt whether he considered the right he was enforcing to be a right overriding the international law or to be a right according to the international law. But his decisions were not appealed nor does it appear that they led to any diplomatic protest.

On March 3, 1863, after the decision above referred to, the United States Legislature passed an act (Congress, Sess. III, c, 86 of 1863) whereby it was enacted (s. 2) that the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of War should be, and they or either of them were thereby, authorized to take any captured vessel, any arms or munitions of war or other material for the use of the government, and when the same should have been taken before being sent in for adjudication or afterward, the Department for whose use it had been taken should deposit the value of the same in the Treasury of the United States, subject to the order of the court in which prize proceedings might be taken, or if no proceedings in prize should be taken, to be credited to the Navy Department and dealt with according to law.”

His Lordship adds:

“It is impossible to suppose that the United States Legislature in passing this act intended to alter or modify the principles of international law in its own interest or against the interest of neutrals. On the contrary, the act must be regarded as embodying the considered opinion of the United States authorities as to the right possessed by a belligerent to requisition vessels or goods seized as prize before adjudication.”

Their Lordships, however, were of the opinion that this act went beyond what was justified by international usage, and the protest of the British Government and the opinion of the Attorney-General of the United States are cited in support of such criticism.

C. N. G.

53 Correspondence de Napoleon, IV (Plon edition).

54 Correspondence de Napoleon, IV, p. 492.

55 British State Papers, 1870, 1871, p. 575 fol.

56 British State Papers, Miscellaneous (1918), No. II.

57 British State Papers, Miscellaneous (1918), No. 5.

58 New York Times Current History Magazine, May, 1918, pp. 303–304.

59 New York Tribune, March 26, 1918.

60 Gazzetta Ufficiale, quoted by Revue de Droit International Public, XXIV, p. 166.

61 Revue de Droit International Public, XXIII, p. 192.

62 Basdevant, Revue de Droit Int. Public, XXIII, p. 271.

63 Basdevant, Revue de Droit Int. Public, XXIII, p. 270.

64 Basdevant, Revue de Droit Int. Public, XXIII, pp. 270–71.

65 Ibid., p. 274.

66 Le Droit International Maritime, pp. 218–19.

67 New York Times Current History Magasine, October, 1918, p. 115.

68 Ibid.

69 Editor’s Note: The act of the Spanish Government may perhaps be better understood as in the nature of reprisal than as an exercise of the right of Angary.—C. N. G.