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La Société Honda France

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Jeffrey I. Zuckerman*
Affiliation:
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle

Abstract

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Type
International Decisions
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1992

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References

1 E.g., Regulation No. 4087/88 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Franchise Agreements, 1988 O.J. (L 359) 46; Regulation No. 123/85 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Motor Vehicle Distribution and Servicing Agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 15) 16; Regulation No. 1984/83 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Purchasing Agreements, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 5, corrected at id. (L 281) 24; Regulation 1983/83 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Distribution Agreements, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1, corrected at id. (L 281) 24; Regulation No. 67/67 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Exclusive Dealing Agreements, 1967 O.J. (57) 849; Commission Notice Concerning Regulation No. 123/85 on Application of Article 85(3) to Categories of Motor Vehicle Distribution and Servicing Agreements, 1985 O.J. (C 17) 4; Commission Notice on Application of Article 85(3) to Categories of Exclusive Distribution and Exclusive Purchasing Agreements, 1983 O.J. (C 355) 7, revised, 1984 O.J. (C 101) 2.

2 For a general discussion of the evolution of French competition policy during the postwar period, see Frédéric Jenny, French Competition Policy in Perspective, in Competition Policy in Europe and North America 146 (William S. Comanor et al. eds., 1990). Mr. Jenny is the Rapporteur Général of the French Competition Council.

3 Ordonnance No. 86-1243 relative à la liberté des prix et de la concurrence, 1986 J.O. 14,773.

4 The principal draftsman of the 1986 ordinance has written that, while the Council is a unique institution, among its “near parents” are “les illustres autorites antitrusts des pays anglosaxons,” i.e., the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission. Jean Donnedieu de Vabres, Le Conseil de la Concurrence, 37 Revue de la Concurrence et de la Consommation 10 (1987).

5 Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies, §1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1 (1988)).

6 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).

7 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).

8 Chicago Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.

9 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).

10 220 U.S. 373 (1911).

11 Id. at 409.

12 Id. at 408.

13 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).

14 362 U.S. 29 (1960).

15 Id. at 44.

16 Id. at 57 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

17 E.g., ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 2, Vertical Restrictions Limiting Intrabrand Competition 73 (1977); Robert Pitofsky, Is the Colgate Doctrine Dead?, 37 Antitrust L.J. 772 (1968).

18 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (in which the Court held that horizontal agreements to fix maximum prices are per se illegal)).

19 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).

20 321 U.S. 707 (1944). In Bausch &” Lomb, the Court held that vertical territorial restrictions were per se unlawful where they were an integral part of a vertical price-fixing arrangement.

21 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).

22 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967).

23 Id. at 379.

24 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 328 (1961).

25 Brown Shoe Co., 62 F.T.C. 679 (1963), rev’d sub rum. Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1964), rev’d, 384 U.S. 316 (1966).

26 Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade’?, 3 J. L. & Econ. 86 (1960).

27 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 297 (1978).

28 433 U.S. 36 (1977).

29 Id. at 59.

30 Id. at 51–52, 54.

31 Id. at 58–59 (emphasis added).

32 See [Current Comment—1969–1983] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶50,442 (June 18, 1982) (letter from Baxter to Rep. Robert McClory).

33 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. (No. 82-914).

34 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 n.7 (1984).

35 Id. at 761.

36 Id. at 764.

37 Id.

38 485 U.S. 717(1988).

39 Id. at 721.

40 Id. at 724.

41 Id. at 726.

42 Id. at 735–36.

43 110 S.Ct. 1884 (1990).

44 Id. at 1889 n.5.

45 Id. at 1891–92.

46 100 F.T.C. 68, 204 (1982).

47 But see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 60 U.S.L.W. 4465 (U.S. June 8, 1992).