1 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). Five years earlier, in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) Justice Gray explained in more detail:

Id. at 163.

2 The Declaration of Independence, para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (“When in the Course of human Events. it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bonds which have connected them with one another,... a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation.”) (emphasis added).

3 The author of the Declaration, Thomas Jefferson, heralded the law of nations as “an integral p a r t . . . of the laws of the land.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, to M. Genet, French Minister (June 5, 1793), quoted in 1 John Bassett, Moore, Digest of International Law 10 (1906)Google Scholar. In John Jay’s words, “the United States had, by taking a place among die nations of the earth, become amenable to the law of nations.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793); see Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson J.) (“When the United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive die law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement.”); see also 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 26 (1792) (opinion of Attorney General Randolph) (“The law of nations, although not specially adopted by the constitution, or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land.”).

4 Witness, for example, the first acts of East Timor’s newly elected eighty-eight-member Parliament: signing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and applying to join the United Nations. East Timor Becomes 191st UN. Member Today, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 2002, at A11 Google Scholar. See also President Xanana Gusmao, Address to the United Nations General Assembly on East Timor’s New Membership, UN Doc. A/57/P.V.20, at 10, 11–12 (2002), stating:

5 See Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States §111 introductory note (1987) (“From the beginning, the law of nations, later referred to as international law, was considered to be incorporated into the law of the United States without die need for any action by Congress or the President, and the courts, State and federal, have applied it and given it effect as the courts of England had done.’) (emphasis added); Henkin, Louis, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 868 (1987)Google Scholar (“ [E]arly United States courts and legislators regarded customary international law and treaty obligations as part of the domestic legal system. International law was domestic law.”) (emphasis in original). For a fuller discussion of the judicial branch as a channel of internalization of international norms into U.S. law, see generally Harold Hongju, Koh, Is International Law Really State Law 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1824 (1998).Google Scholar

6 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 163 (emphasis added).

7 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

8 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).

9 The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815); see also The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (declaring international rule of absolute foreign sovereign immunity as U.S. law).

10 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-07 (1819) (emphasis added).

11 See Berman, Harold & Kaufman, Colin, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 Harv. Int’l L.J. 221, 224–29 (1978)Google Scholar (law merchant was transnational private law based not on any single national law but on mercantile customs generally accepted by trading nations); Edwin, D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States (pt. 1), 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 26, 26–27 (1952).Google Scholar

12 See, e.g., Roger, P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AJIL 57 (2004)Google Scholar [hereinafter Alford, Misusing Sources]; Roger, P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 675 (2003)Google Scholar [hereinafter Alford, Federal Courts]; Michael, D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AJIL 69 (2004).Google Scholar

15 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (pointing out that”[p]olygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe”). 14 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42 (1977) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949)); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 488 n.59, 521-22 (1966) (quoting from a 1954 decision by the lord justice general of India and citing the experiences in other countries); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (delimiting the notion of privacy in the home by looking to “common understanding throughout the English-speaking world”); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 167 (1955) (finding a practice “supported by long-standing tradition here and in other English-speaking nations”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (writing that the Due Process Clause obliges courts to ascertain whether a given law or practice offends “those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples”); Rastv. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 366 (1916) (observing that the Constitution embodies “only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities”). Happily, over time, the Court has relaxed its “Anglophonia” and spoken more broadly about “civilized societies,” without regard to the particular language they may speak. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986) (noting “the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity”) (emphasis added).

15 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

16 521 U.S. 898, 921 n . l l , 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

17 As Justice Blackmun noted, “If the substance of the Eighth Amendment is to turn on the ‘evolving standards of decency’ of the civilized world, there can be no justification for limiting judicial inquiry to the opinions of the United States.” Harry, A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 Yale L.J. 39, 48 (1994)Google Scholar; cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (observing that the Eighth Amendment’s bar against cruel and unusual punishments embodies broad evolving “concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency”) (emphasis added). For a review of this history, see Harold Hongju, Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1085, 1118–27 (2002)Google Scholar, from which some of the discussion in the text derives.

18 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).

19 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977).

20 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982).

21 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988).

22 Justice Stevens noted the views of “other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, a n d . . . the leading members of the Western European community.” Id. at 829–30, 829 n.30.

23 Id. at 831 n.34; id. at 851 (O’Connor J., concurring in thejudgment) (citing American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, Art. 4(5), 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, Art. 6(5), 999 UNTS 171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 68, 6 UST 3516, 3560, 75 UNTS 287, 330 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950)) Justice O’Connor’s concurrence invoked the U.S. ratification of the Geneva Convention “to undercut any assumption that [recent congressional legislation has intended] to authorize the death penalty for some 15-year-old felons.” Id. at 852.

24 Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

25 Cf. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 413–14 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing: “The safe guards of ‘due process of law’ and ‘the equal protection of the laws’ summarize the history of freedom of English-speaking peoples running back to Magna Carta and reflected in the constitutional development of our people.”).

26 Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis J . , dissenting) (noting that states of the United States can “serve as . . . laboratories]” for “social and economic experiments”).

27 See, e.g., Mclntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 381 (1995) (Scalia J., dissenting) (observing that Australian, Canadian, and English statutes banning anonymous campaign speech suggest that such bans need not impair democracy); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 820 (1993) (Scalia J., dissenting) (opposing the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by Congress over antitrust defendants’ foreign activity on the ground that “this and other courts have frequently recognized t h a t . . . statutes should not be interpreted to regulate foreign persons or conduct if that regulation would conflict with principles of international law”).

28 492 U.S. 361 (1989).

29 Id. at 369 n. 1. Although Justice O’Connor joined part I of Justice Scalia’s Stanford opinion, which included his dismissive footnote, her concurrence made no mention of it. Instead, her separate opinion explicitly applied the Thompson standard and concluded that no national consensus yet forbade the imposition of capital punishment on sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders. Id. at 382.

30 Id. at 389–90 & n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Amnesty International brief).

31 See cases cited supra notes 15, 22, 23, 27; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (finding the Court’s First Amendment juris prudence consistent with decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the Canadian Supreme Court); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.811, 828(1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (examining Dutch constitutional practice on physician-assisted suicide); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 906n.l4 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (mentioning voting systems of Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon. New Zealand, West Germany, and Zimbabwe in assessing race consciousness in the American voting system); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 n. 1 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (likening the government’s racial classifications in minority-owned broadcasting enhancement scheme to practices of Nazi Germany and South Africa); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on Nuremberg Military Tribunals in arguing against medical experimentation on humans without their consent).

32 William, H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks(1989), reprinted in Germanyand its Basic Law: Past, Present and Future—A German-American Symposium 411, 412 (Kirchhof, Paul & Donald, P. Kommers eds., 1993)Google Scholar (emphasis added); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, 718 n.16, 785-87 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (declaring that “[i]n almost every State—indeed, in almost every western democracy—it is a crime to assist a suicide,” noting that “other countries are embroiled in similar debates” concerning physician-assisted suicide, and citing the Supreme Court of Canada, the British House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, New Zealand’s Parliament, the Australian Senate, and Colombia’s Constitutional Court); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 828 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (noting European law on legislative standing but declining to find it in our constitutional regime); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 945 n. 1 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing abortion decisions by the West German Constitutional Court and the Canadian Supreme Court).

33 Justice Breyer in particular has cogently argued in favor of reviving the use of foreign and international law precedent to inform U.S. constitutional interpretation in all three kinds of cases: those involving parallel rules, empirical lessons, and an evolving community standard. See, e.g., Breyer, Stephen, Keynote Address, 97 ASIL Proc 265 (2003)Google Scholar; Ruth Bader, Ginsburg & Deborah, Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, Fifty-first Cardozo Memorial Lecture (Feb. 11, 1999), in 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 253, 282 (1999)Google Scholar; Sandra Day, O’Connor, Keynote Address, 96 ASIL Proc. 348, 350 (2002)Google Scholar (stating that “[although international law and the law of other nations are rarely binding upon our decisions in U.S. courts, conclusions reached by other countries and by the international community should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts,” and that “there is much to learn from other distinguished jurists who have given thought to the same difficult issues that we face here”).

34 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (Stevens, J.). Even this modest truism evoked remarkably harsh rejoinders from the dissenters, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, who again insisted that “the viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant” to an assessment of U.S. constitutional standards. Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

35 Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 984 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

36 In re Stanford, 123 S. Ct. 472, 472–73 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In June 2003, the governor of Kentucky announced that he would commute Stanford’s death sentence. At that point, Stanford had been on death row for two decades for a crime he had committed when he was seventeen. See Wolfson, Andrew, Patton Pardons 4 in Election Case and Will Commute Death Sentence; Stanford’s Family Celebrates; Victim’s Sister Is Repulsed, Courier-J., June 19, 2003, at 1A.Google Scholar

37 Foster v. Florida, 123 S.Ct. 470, 471–72 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

38 Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 782.

39 Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411 (2003) (No. 02–516), available in 2003 U.S. Trans Lexis 27.

40 Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 309, 342 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring), with Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 33, at 282 (“In my view, comparative analysis emphatically is relevant to the task of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights. We are the losers if we neglect what others can tell us about endeavors to eradicate bias against women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups.”).

41 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (citation omitted).

42 123 S.Ct. 2472(2003).

43 478 U.S. 186(1986).

44 123 S.Ct. at 2484.

45 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) para. 41 (1981). The Court found the asserted state interests insufficient to justify the “detrimental effects which the very existence of the legislative provisions in question can have on the life of a person of homosexual orientation.” Id., para. 60.

46 The only brief in Bowers to cite European precedent had cited the European Commission of Human Rights report and pleadings in Dudgeon, but never cited or referred to the Court’s judgment. See Brief of Amici Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund at 15 nn.10, 24, Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 01-102). Thus, as Lord Lester of Heme Hill has noted, although Bowers turned on a single vote, “ [n] o one drew the [U.S.] Supreme Court’s attention to the importance oi Dudgeon as a recent decision by the strongest international court of human rights, dealing with a closely analogous problem, and having potential persuasive value.” Lester, Anthony, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 537, 560 (1988)Google Scholar; see also Richard, B. Lillich, The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AJIL 851 (1989).Google Scholar

47 Norrisv. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) (1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) (1993).

48 Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2483.

49 Gerald, L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AJIL 82, 89–90 & n.40 (2004)Google Scholar (noting Human Rights Committee’s interpretation in Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, UN Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994)).

50 Justice Scalia’s dissent looked to Canadian law to invoke the specter of “judicial imposition of homosexual marriage, as has recently occurred in Canada.” Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2497 (citing Halpern v. Toronto, 2003 WL 34950 (Ont. Ct. App. June 10, 2003)).

51 Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 361 (2001).

52 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).

53 United States v. Sampson, Memorandum and Order, CR No. 01-10384-MLW, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14050, at *97 (D. Mass. Aug. 11, 2003) (observing that the fact that the death penalty has been widely abolished abroad “is cognizable evidence of contemporary standards of decency”); see Liptak, Adam, Signs Grow of Innocent People Being Executed, Judge Says, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 2003, at A10.Google Scholar

54 International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong. 55 (1979)Google Scholar (response by the Department of State to the “Critique of Reservations to the International Human Rights Covenants” by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights).

55 Reported Executions of Child Offenders Since 1990, tbl., in Amnesty International, the Exclusion of Child Offenders from the Death Penalty under General International Law §5 (AI Index No. ACT 50/004/ 2003, 2003) [hereinafter amnesty report], available at <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engact500042003>.

56 As the Death Penalty Information Center has chronicled, steps have recently been taken to abolish or impose a moratorium on the death penalty in such countries as Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and the former Yugoslavia.

57 Amnesty Report, supra note 55.

58 Id. §5.

59 See State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (2003).

60 Roperv. Simmons (No. 03-633), cert, granted (U.S. Jan. 26, 2004), available at <http://supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/012604pzr.pdf> (reviewing State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 411, 413 (2003) (finding “of note that the views of the international community have consistently grown in opposition to die death penalty for juveniles” en route to holding that “the execution of persons for crimes committed when they were under 18 years of age violates ‘ the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,’” and is thus barred by Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments)).

61 This analysis builds on earlier discussions in Harold Hongju, Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1479, 1513–15 (2003)Google Scholar; Harold Hongju, Koh, International Business Transactions in United States Courts, 261 Recueil Descours 13, 226–34 (1996).Google Scholar

62 Despite his occasional extrajudicial writings, see, e.g., supra note 32, in his Court opinions Chief justice Rehnquist remains firmly in die nationalist camp.

63 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (rejecting international comity as a bar against the exercise of Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign reinsurance claims).

64 See Harold Hongju, Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm “ in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 Yale L. J. 2391, 2413–23 (1994)Google Scholar (collecting cases).

65 See generally Harold Hongju, Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair 117–49 (1990)Google Scholar (reviewing cases).

66 See, e.g., Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“[T]his Court[] . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”).

67 Justices Stevens and Souter are also regular members of this camp. Through their extrajudicial statements and opinions of the past Terms, the two “swing Justices,” Anthony Kennedy and Sandra Day O’Connor, have also increasingly demonstrated transnationalist leanings.

68 Blackmun, supra note 17, at 49.

69 See supra note 1.

70 Breyer, supra note 33, at 265.

71 Harold Hongju, Koh, The Liberal Constitutional Internationalism of Justice Douglas, in “He Shall not Pass This Way Again”: The Legacy of Justice William O. douglas 297 (Stephen, L. Wasby ed., 1990).Google Scholar

72 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964) (White, J., dissenting), discussed in Harold Hongju, Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L.J. 2347, 2362-63 (1991).Google Scholar

73 See Blackmun, supra note 17, at 49. For elaboration of this theme, see Harold Hongju, Koh, Justice Blackmun and the World Out There, 104 Yale L.J. 23, 28-31 (1994)Google Scholar (collecting cases).

74 Compare Harold Hongju, Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 Yale L. Int’l L. 305, 306 (2001)Google Scholar (arguing that “as international legal academics, we must start treating transnational law as its own category. Domestic and international will soon become so integrated that we will no longer know whether to characterize certain concepts as local or global in nature.”). See also id. (noting that the metric system, Greenwich Mean Time, and the term “dot.com” have “ [a]ll . . . become, over time, genuinely transnational concepts in which a global standard has become fully recognized, integrated, and internalized into the domestic system of nearly every nation of the world”).

75 O’Connor, supra note 33, at 350.

76 Breyer, supra note 33, at 267 (emphasis added).

77 Id. at 266.

78 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555, 567 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).

79 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n. 11 (1997); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (foreign law and practice may be relevant to legislative drafting).

80 Lester, supra note 46, at 541.

81 Breyer, supra note 33, at 266.

82 Thus, Professor Ramsey concedes that courts worldwide are engaged in a common exercise of interpreting common legal texts such as the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the Warsaw Convention on air transport liability, while curiously insisting that courts construing various human rights instruments that share a common heritage in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are interpreting “different documents, written in different times and different countries (and sometimes different languages).” Ramsey, supra note 12, at 73.

83 Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2494 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original).

84 Id. at 2492.

85 Id. at 2492 n.3.

86 Michael, H. Reggio, History of the Death Penalty, in society’s Final Solution: A History and Discussion of the Death Penalty 1, 3 (Randa, Laura ed., 1997).Google Scholar

87 Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2483.

88 As Justice Kennedy noted in Lawrence:

123 S.Ct. at 2481 (emphasis added).

89 Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 12, at 785–86. In fact, the very label “international majoritarian” is misleading. For U.S. courts are not deferring to the will of the majority of the world’s peoples instead of deferring to American will; rather, our courts are looking to foreign practice for additional evidence of modern standards of decency in a civilized society. See, e.g., State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (2003). Significantly, neither Professors Alford nor Ramsey takes the hard-edged position espoused by nationalist Justices Scalia and Thomas in some recent opinions: namely, that international and foreign law precedents are never relevant to U.S. constitutional interpretation, a view that those Justices have sometimes ignored in practice. See cases cited supra notes 27, 31.

90 Justice Kennedy made the point eloquently in Lawrence:

Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2484.

91 Breyer, supra note 33, at 268 (emphasis added).

92 For elaboration of this point, see Harold Hongju, Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced? 74 Ind. L. J. 1397 (1999)Google Scholar; and Harold Hongju, Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 623 (1998)Google Scholar; Harold Hongju, Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 06 Yale L.J. 2599 (1997).Google Scholar

93 For a discussion of the appropriate relationship between domestic and international tribunal rulings, see Harold Hongju, Koh, Paying Decent Respect to International Tribunal Rulings, 96 ASIL Proc. 45 (2002).Google Scholar

94 Chayes, Abram & Antonia Handler, Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 27 (1995).Google Scholar

95 Ramsey, supra note 12, at 76-77.

96 Alford, Misusing Sources, supra note 12, at 67.

97 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).

98 Breyer, supra note 33, at 267.

99 Michael, James, Homosexuals and Privacy, 138 New L.J. 831, 831 (1988).Google Scholar