No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 February 2017
How adequate is functionalism as a comprehensive theory of international politics and law? In its classic version, functionalism posits that, as economic and technological interdependence grows, diplomacy and the elaboration of international legal rules will be shaped increasingly by functional concerns and less and less by ideology and “high politics.” While such a trend is evident in some areas of international relations, such as the European Community, it is less so in others. In many negotiations and disputes around the globe, even though the issues may be amenable to a functional approach and resolution, states continue to give great weight to ideological and political considerations in their diplomacy and legal stances. Proponents of functionalism have assumed that the growing tide of functional links and relationships eventually will dominate international relations and render political and ideological conflicts less significant, if not mostly irrelevant. But in many cases, the reverse has happened. International organizations set up for functional purposes have been inundated by political and ideological rivalries, and international legal issues of a functional character have been seized upon by states to advance their ideological and political objectives. Cuba’s policy towards the law of the sea serves as a case study of this problem.
1 For presentations of the case for functionalism, see Mitrany, D. , The Functional Theory of Politics (1975)Google Scholar; Mitrany, D. , A Working Peace System (1966)Google Scholar; Haas, E. , The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950–1957 (2d ed. 1968)Google Scholar. For critiques, see Claude, I. Swords into Plowshares (3d ed. 1971)Google Scholar; Thompson, K. Ethics, Functionalism and Power (1980)Google Scholar.
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted in United Nations, The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN Pub. Sales No. E.83.V.5) [hereinafter cited as Convention]. The Convention will come into force when 60 countries ratify it. For the number of ratifications as of July 1, 1985, see Caminos, & Molitor, Progressive Development of International Law and the Package Deal, at p. 872 n.7 supra. On July 9, 1982 Google Scholar, President Reagan announced his intention not to submit the Convention to the Senate for advice and consent as to ratification. 18 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 887 (July 12, 1982); Dep’t St. Bull., No. 2065, Aug. 1982, at 71.
3 McDougal, Law and Power, 46 AJIL 102 (1952); Dillard, Some Aspects of Law and Diplomacy, 91 Recueil des Cours 447 (1957 I)Google Scholar; Moore, Law and National Security, 51 Foreign Aff. 408 (1973)Google Scholar; Franck, Duke et Decorum Est: The Strategic Role of Legal Principles in the Falklands War, 77 AJIL 109 (1983)Google Scholar.
4 UNCLOS III began in December 1973, and after eleven sessions ended in December 1982. For successive analyses of the negotiations, see Stevenson, & Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AJIL 1 (1974)Google Scholar; Stevenson, & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AJIL 1 (1975)Google Scholar; Stevenson, & Oxman, — The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AJIL 763 (1975)Google Scholar; and all by Oxman,—The 1976 New York Sessions, 71 AJIL 247 (1977);—The 1977 New York Session, 72 AJIL 57 (1978);—The Seventh Session (1978), 73 AJIL 1 (1979);—The Eighth Session (1979), 74 AJIL 1 (1980);—The Ninth Session (1980), 75 AJIL 211 (1981);—The Tenth Session (1981), 76 AJIL 1 (1982). For a comprehensive history of the law of the sea and many of its difficult issues, see D. O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea (2 vols. 1984).
5 The straits are as follows:
(1) Yucatán: borders Mexico; 2000-meter depth; 117 miles wide.
(2) Florida: borders U.S.; 1500-meter depth; 90 miles wide.
(3) Nicholas Channel: borders Bahamas; 500-meter depth; 24 miles wide.
(4) Old Bahama Channel: borders Bahamas; 200-1000-meter depth; 86 miles wide.
(5) Windward Passage: borders Haiti; 2000-meter depth; 43 miles wide.
(6) Cayman: borders Jamaica; 6000-meter depth; 78 miles wide.
Bravo, & Setién, El Mar: Principios, legislación, y posiciones internacionales, 2 Revista Cubana de Derecho 69, 85 (1973)Google Scholar.
6 Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Current Policy No. 600, Cuba as a Model and a Challenge (1984) (text of address by Kenneth, N. Skoug, Jr. Director of the Office of Cuban Affairs, New York, July 25, 1984)Google Scholar. See also Domínguez, Cuban Foreign Policy, 57 Foreign aff. 83 (1978)Google Scholar; Cuba in the World (C Blasier & C. Mesa-Lago eds. 1979); Cuban Communism (I. Horowitz ed. 1981); P. Falk, Cuban Foreign .Policy (1985).
7 Domínguez; Cuba in the World; Cuban Communism; P. Falk, all supra note 6.
8 Menéndez, La Marina mercante cubana, Granma, Aug. 28, 1981 Google Scholar, at 1; Menéndez, Cuenta la fiota mercante cubana con un peso muerto 17 veces mayor que el existente en 1958, Granma, Mar. 19, 1979 Google Scholar, at 2; Menéndez, The Cuban Merchant Marine: A Fleet that Sails around the World, Granma Weekly Rev., July 17, 1983 Google Scholar, at 15; Morales, 44 Naciones por el mismo camino, Mar Y Pesca, No. 189, 1981 Google Scholar, at 9; Ubeda, Colaboracion cubano-soviética en la esfera de la pesca, Mar Y Pesca, No. 204, 1982 Google Scholar, at 18; Morales, Las Capturas de langostas en Cuba en el período 1959–1980, Mar Y Pesca, No. 199, 1982 Google Scholar, at 25. Granma is the official newspaper of Cuba’s ruling Communist Party and performs a role similar to that of Pravda in the Soviet Union; it serves as the official voice of the Cuban Government and its policies. Mar y Pesca is the Cuban journal on marine and fishing issues; it, too, is owned and controlled by the Cuban Government.
9 Domínguez; Cuba in the World; Cuban Communism; P. Falk, all supra note 6.
10 P. Falk, supra note 6.
11 Cuba as a Model and a Challenge, supra note 6, at 2.
12 Falcoff, Thinking about Cuba: Unscrambling Cuban Messages, 6 Wash. Q. 101 (1983)Google Scholar; Cuban Report is Candid on Economic Burdens, N. Y. Times, June 5, 1985, at D1, col. 1.
13 Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Special Report No. 103, Cuban Armed Forces and the Soviet Military Presence 5 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Cuban Armed Forces].
14 Communist Nations’ Military Assistance 140–42 (Copper & Papp eds. 1983).
15 1982–1983 International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance; Dupuy, T. The Almanac of World Military Power (1980)Google Scholar. See also Cuban Armed Forces, supra note 13, at 2.
16 Cuban Armed Forces, supra note 13, at 1, 3.
17 Id. at 5.
18 Valenta, The USSR, Cuba and the Crisis in Central America, 25 Orbis 715, 720 (1981)Google Scholar. In 1975, for example, Fidel Castro made proof of overseas “international solidarity” a criterion for membership in the Cuban Communist Party, and, in his main report to the First Party Congress in December 1975, he stated that “the starting point of Cuba’s foreign policy, according to our Programmatic Platform, is the subordination of Cuban positions to the international needs of the struggle for socialism and for the national liberation of peoples.” Granma Weekly Rev., Jan. 11, 1976, at 2 – 3 ; id., Jan. 4, 1976, at 10; Granma, Dec. 25, 1975, at 1.
19 See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Analysis Report: Cuba’s Posture on Revolution in Central America (1983), which discusses the important role played by the Cuban Government, and by Fidel Castro personally, in helping the various guerrilla factions in El Salvador to form a united insurgency. For the subject of Cuba’s extensive involvement in El Salvador’s guerrilla war, see generally Cuban Defector Says Castro Finances Salvadoran Rebels’ Arms Purchases, Wash. Post, Nov. 19, 1984, at A10, col. 4; Report of the Bi-Partisan Commission on Central America (1984); U.S. Dep’t of State & Dep’t of Defense, News Briefing on Intelligence Information on External Support of the Guerrillas in El Salvador, Aug. 8, 1984; U.S. Dep’t of State & Dep’t of Defense, Background Paper: Nicaragua’s Military Build-Up and Support for Central American Subversion (1984); Defector: Salvadoran Rebels Closely Tied to Sandinistas, Wash. Post, June 19, 1983, at A15, col. 1; U.S. Dep’t of State & Dep’t of Defense, Background Paper: Central America (1983); H.R. Rep. No. 122, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Current Policy No. 476, Nicaragua: Threat to Peace in Central America (1983) (Statement by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, before the Senate Foreign Relations Coram., Apr. 12, 1984); Staff of the Subcomm. on Oversight and Evaluation of the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Intelligence Performance on Central America: Achievements and Selected Instances of Concern (Comm. Print 1982); Falcoff, The El Salvador White Paper and its Critics, 4 am. Enterprise Inst. Foreign Pol’y & Def. Rev., No. 2, 1982 Google Scholar, at 18; Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Special Rep. No. 80, Communist Interference in El Salvador (1981).
20 The official name of the conference was the First Conference of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America (OSPAAL). Claire Sterling, a renowned expert on international terrorism, has called the conference an “unmistakable call for a Guerrilla International.” Sterling, Terrorism: Tracing the International Network, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1981 Google Scholar, §6 (Magazine), at 6. She also notes that 10 months after the conference, over a dozen camps for training guerrillas from various parts of the world opened in Cuba under the general direction of Col. Vadim Kotchergine of the KGB, the Soviet secret police, and that “Cuban instructors have taught in Middle East fedayeen camps since the early seventies.” C. Sterling, The Terror Network 15 (1981).
21 See generally D. Kopilow, Castro, Israel and the PLO (1984); Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, International Report: P.L.O. Activities in Latin America (1980). Cuba was one of only three non-Arab states that cosponsored the “Zionism is racism” resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1975, and in May 1977 it was the only non-Arab country in the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to demand that the resolution be included on the agenda of a United Nations-sponsored world conference on racism. Cuba’s support for the PLO’s participation in UNCLOS III was detailed in Interviene OLP en la III Conferencia del Mar, Granma, July 23, 1974, at 6.
22 UNCTAD I, which was approved by ECOSOC and the General Assembly in 1962, met in Geneva for a 12-week period in 1964. Although 120 countries participated, the conference was dominated by a majority coalition of 77 developing states, which sought a new international economic order better suited to the needs and interests of the developing states of the Third World. The Group of 77, through resolutions approved at the conference, made a series of demands, which included the following: (1) stabilization of prices for primary commodities through international arrangements; (2) lowering of tariffs and other trade barriers on primary commodities; (3) provision of long-term, low-interest loans repayable in local currencies or in goods; and (4) a net flow of aid from developed states equal to 1 percent of their national income. The term “Group of 77” continues as a label, even though the number of states that support these objectives has grown to over a hundred. See Bennett, A. , International Organizations (3d ed. 1984)Google ScholarPubMed. At UNCLOS III, the Group of 77 “included some 120 states.” Lee, The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States, 77 AJIL 541, 547 (1983)Google Scholar.
23 See Cviic, The Non-Aligned Summit in Havana, 35 World Today 387, 388 (1979)Google Scholar; Carrasco, & López, Unidad y capacidad de actión, Verde Olivo, No. 23, 1982 Google Scholar, at 5.
24 The Declaration of Montevideo on the Law of the Sea was signed on May 8, 1970 by the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama, Peru, Nicaragua and Uruguay; it is reprinted in 9 ILM 1081 (1970). On August 4-8 of the same year, the states participating in the Latin American Meeting on Aspects of the Law of the Sea drafted the Lima Declaration and Resolutions, UN Doc. A/AC138/28 (Aug. 14, 1970), reprinted in 10 ILM 207 (1971). The Santo Domingo declaration was the most important because it represented the widest consensus achieved among Latin American states up to that time on specific law of the sea issues. For its text, see Declaration of Santo Domingo, Specialized Conference of the Caribbean Countries on Problems of the Sea, June 7, 1972, UN Doc. A/AC.138/80, 27 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at 70, UN Doc. A/8721 (1972), reprinted in 11 ILM 892 (1972).
25 Summary records [hereinafter cited as SR] of the General Comm., 43d mtg. (1978), 9 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records 116 [hereinafter cited as Off. Rec.].
26 See the detailed lists and records provided by 1983 Fairplay World Shipping Y.B. 77– 78; 1981 Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 156–57; 1982 The Bulk-Carrier Register 77; 1983 The Tanker Register 157.
27 Las 25 Flotas pesqueras más importantes del mundo, Mar Y Pesca, No. 207, 1982, at 44.
28 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Cuba Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United States, Apr. 27, 1977, 28 UST 6769, TIAS No. 8689. The text can be found in 9 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 251 (M. Nordquist, S. H. Lay & K. Simmonds eds. 1980).
29 See Cuban Armed Forces, supra note 13. See also 1983–84 Jane’s Fighting Ships 113–16.
The Navy is the smallest of the three services, but with an adequate budget and Soviet assistance in training, must be assessed as having a reasonable level of tactical and material efficiency. The addition of a submarine branch, a frigate, hydrofoils and the first effective MCM forces is taking this fleet into a new league.
Id. at 113.
30 Ashby, Grenada: Threat to America’s Caribbean Oil Routes, 65 Nat’l Def. , No. 65, 1981 Google Scholar, at 52.
31 Cuba in the World, supra note 6, at 80.
32 Soviet Ships Came Close by, Navy Says, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1983, at A3, col. 1.
33 Soviet, Cuban Ships Come Unusually Close to the U.S. Gulf Coast During Maneuvers, Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
34 Jane’s Fighting Ships, supra note 29, at 113. With regard to the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo, see generally Bender, Guantánamo: Its Political, Military, and Legal Status, 19 Caribbean Q. 80 (1973)Google Scholar; Scheina, The U.S. Presence in Guantánamo, 4 Soc. Research 81 (1976)Google Scholar.
35 Bravo & Setién, supra note 5, at 90.
36 The Cuban Government repeatedly drew attention to the link between Cuba’s changed position and that of Latin American states. See, e.g., Continua sus sesiones la Tercera Conferencia sobre el Derecho del Mar, Granma, Apr. 23, 1975, at 6; Comienza hoy, en las NN.UU., importante reunion sobre derecho marítimo, Granma, Mar. 15, 1976, at 7. For the perspectives and policies of Latin American states towards the law of the sea, see generally Tobar, A. Luna , La Doctrina Marítima Latinoamericana (1972)Google Scholar; Vargas-Carreno, E. , America Latina Y Los Problemas Contemporaneos Del Derecho Del Mar (1973)Google Scholar; Zacklin, R. The Changing Law of the Sea: Western Hemisphere Perspectives (1974)Google Scholar; Silenzi, A. de Stagni, El Nuevo Derecho del mar: Controversia Entre las Potencias Navales Y El Tercer Mundo (1976)Google Scholar; Galindo, Pohl Latin America’s Influence and its Role in the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, 7 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 65 (1979)Google Scholar; Morris, & Simoes, Ferreira Latin America, Africa, and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Annotated Bibliography, 9 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 101 (1981)Google Scholar.
37 SR 29th plen. mtg. (1974), 1 Off. Rec. at 115 (Torras de la Luz); 2 id. at 192 (Rabaza).
38 SR Comm.2, 4th mtg. (1974), 2 id. at 104 (emphasis added).
39 Act of Feb. 24, 1977 Concerning the Breadth of the Territorial Sea of the Republic of Cuba, Decree No. 1, Gaceta Oficial (Cuba), No. 6, Feb. 26, 1977, at 15, reprinted in 7 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 23 (M. Nordquist, S. H. Lay & K. Simmonds eds. 1980) (trans. UN Secretariat).
40 Bravo & Setien, supra note 5, at 70–71; Stevenson & Oxman, Preparations, supra note 4, at 3–4. See also Declaration of the Organization of African Unity on the Issues of the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/33 (1974), 2 Off. Rec. at 63.
41 Sweeney, J. Oliver, C. &Leech, N. the International Legal System 183 (2d ed. 1981)Google Scholar.
42 Pirtle, Transit Rights and U.S. Security Interests in International Straits: The “Straits Debate” Revisited, 5 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 477 (1978)Google Scholar.
43 Fija Cuba su posición sobre los archipiélagos en la Conferentia de la ONU sobre Derecho del Mar, Granma, Aug. 14, 1974, at 5.
44 Pirtle, supra note 42; Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 AJIL 77 (1980)Google Scholar.
45 SR 29th plen. mtg. (1974), 1 Off. Rec. at 116. See also Reanudó sus labores la III Conferentia del Mar después del receso par la muerte de Perón, Granma, July 3, 1974, at 8; Expone Pelegrin Torras ante la III Conferentia del Mar, en Caracas, temas de Cuba en cuanto al paso por los estrechos marítimos, Granma, July 24, 1974, at 7.
46 SR 29th plen. mtg. (1974), 1 Off. Rec. at 116.
47 SR Comm.2, 12th mtg. (1974), 2 Off. Rec. at 127.
48 SR 29th plen. mtg. (1974), 1 id. at 116; SR Comm.2, 37th mtg. (1974), 2 id. at 268–69.
49 For a comprehensive history of the development of the concept of the exclusive economic zone, see Extavour, W. , The Exclusive Economic Zone (2d ed. 1978)Google Scholar; Coquia, Development and Significance of the 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone, 54 Phil. L.J. 440 (1979)Google Scholar; Krueger, & Nordquist, The Evolution of the 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone: State Practice in the Pacific Basin, 19 Va. J. Int’l L. 321 (1979)Google Scholar; Okidi, The Role of the OAU Member States in the Evolution of the Concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone in the Law of the Sea: The First Phase, 7 Dalhousie L.J. 39 (1982)Google Scholar.
50 See supra note 24.
51 Organization of African Unity: Declaration on the Issues of the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/AC.138/89, 28 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 21, vol. 2) at 4, UN Doc. A/9021, vol. 2 (1973), reprinted in 12 ILM 1200 (1973).
52 Alexander, & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone on the Law of the Sea, 12 San Diego L. Rev. 569, 570 (1975)Google Scholar.
53 SR Comm.2, 24th mtg. (1974), 2 Off. Rec. at 192; Initio Conferentia sobre Derecho del Mar el debate de los temas defondo, Granma, July 17, 1974, at 8. See also statement by Cuban delegate Torras de la Luz, SR 135th plen. mtg. (1980), 14 Off. Rec at 29.
54 See generally Marcella, Cuba and the Regional Balance of Power, Parameters, No. 2, 1977 Google Scholar, at 11; Cuban Armed Forces, supra note 13, at 5.
55 SR 29th plen. mtg. (1974), 1 Off. Rec. at 116.
56 Id.; SR Comm.2, 32d mtg. (1974), 2 id. at 242.
57 Symonides, Geographically Disadvantaged States and the New Law of the Sea, 8 Polish Y.B. Int’l L. 55, 57 (1976)Google Scholar.
58 Morales, Las Capturas de langostas en Cuba en el período 1959-1980, Mar Y Pesca, No. 199, 1982 Google Scholar, at 25; Bravo & Setién, supra note 5, at 71.
59 SR 135th plen. mtg. (1980), 14 Off. Rec. at 29.
60 Id.; SR 61st plen. mtg. (1976), 5 id. at 34–35. Cuban delegate D’Stefano Pissani explained that
[m]any of the reasons advanced for rejecting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice were still valid; it was a fact that some countries still believed that the function of international law was to protect certain interests—in other words, the status quo. In addition, the advocates of an optional clause with regard to acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction ignored the fact that not only had very few States accepted Article 36 of the Court’s Statute, but those which had had made such reservations . . . as to render the article almost meaningless.
Id. at 35. See also Adede, Basic Structure of the Disputes Settlement Part of the Law of the Sea Convention, 11 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 125, 129 (1982)Google Scholar.
61 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.42/Rev.1 (1974), 3 Off. Rec. at 220.
62 SR Comm.2, 39th mtg. (1974), 2 id. at 279–80.
63 Act of Feb. 24, 1977 Concerning the Establishment of an Economic Zone, Decree No. 2, Gaceta Oficial (Cuba), No. 6, Feb. 26, 1977, at 18, reprinted in 7 New Directions, supra note 39, at 385 (trans. UN Secretariat).
64 Id.
65 Agreement, supra note 28.
66 Nweihed, EZ (Uneasy) Delimitation in the Semi-enclosed Caribbean Sea: Recent Agreements between Venezuela and her Neighbors, 8 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 3 (1980)Google Scholar.
67 See generally Law of the Sea: U.S. Policy Dilemma (B. Oxman, D. Caron & C. Buderi eds. 1983); Friedman, & Williams, The Group of 77 at the United Nations: An Emergent Force in the Law of the Sea, 16 San Diego L. Rev. 555 (1979)Google Scholar; Adede, The Group of 77 and the Establishment of the International Seabed Authority, 7 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 31 (1979)Google Scholar.
68 See statement by Cuban delegate Torras de la Luz, SR 135th plen. mtg. (1980), 14 Off. Rec. at 29.
69 Id.
70 Adede, supra note 67, at 31.
71 SR 29th plen. mtg. (1974), 1 Off. Rec. at 115; SR Comm.1, 4th mtg. (1974), 2 id. at 13–14.
72 SR 130th plen. mtg. (1980), 14 id. at 6.
73 Dudan que EE. UU. apruebe Conventión actual sobre derecho del mar, Granma, Aug. 29, 1981, at 7; Culpan a EE.UU. por el fracaso de conversaciones en la Conferencia de la ONU sobre Derecho del Mar, Granma, Aug. 27, 1981, at 6; Acusan a EE.UU. de bloquear la Conferencia sobre el Mar, Granma, Aug. 19, 1981, at 6; Torpedea EE.UU. la Conferencia sobre Derecho del Mar, Granma, Aug. 11, 1981, at 5; Denuncia el Canciller de Venezuela presiones para frustrar reunión del mar, Granma, Apr. 10, 1978, at 6; Prepárase ya, EE.UU., para explotar unilateralmente las riquezas del fondo marino sin esperar acuerdo international, Granma, Mar. 29, 1978, at 6.
74 SR 130th plen. mtg. (1980), supra note 72; SR 135th plen. mtg. (1980), supra note 68.
76 Bravo & Setién, supra note 5, at 99.
76 See generally Miles, Changes in the Law of the Sea: Impact on International Fisheries Organizations, 4 Ocean Dev. & Int’l L. 411, 421, 428 (1977)Google Scholar; Taitt, The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Caribbean Community Perspective, 7 W. Indian L.J. 36 (1983)Google Scholar.
77 SR 29th plen. mtg. (1974), 1 Off. Rec. at 115 (emphasis added); La III Conferencia de la ONU sobre el Derecho del Mar, Granma, Aug. 14, 1974, at 5.
78 SR Comm.3, 35th mtg. (1978), 9 Off. Rec. at 148 (1978 plan for vessel-source pollution). For other Cuban statements on marine environmental issues, see SR 29th plen. mtg. (1974), 1 id. at 115; SR Comm.3, 33d mtg. (1976), 6 id. at 111; SR Comm.3, 40th mtg. (1979), 11 id. at 71; Herrera-Moreno, La Contaminación del mar, Mar Y Pesca, No. 203, 1982 Google Scholar, at 36; Comenzó en Ginebra la Conferencia sobre Derecho del Mar, Granma, Mar. 18, 1975, at 6.
79 SR Comm.3, 30th mtg. (1976), 6 Off. Rec. at 98.
80 Franck, supra note 3, at 109.