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Special Mexican Claims
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 April 2017
Extract
The Special Mexican Claims Commission has just completed its task of deciding 2,833 claims of American citizens against Mexico arising out of the revolutionary disturbances in Mexico during the period from 1910 to 1920. The Commission commenced its work in September, 1935. The decision of this large number of claims marks an important chapter in the development of international reclamation, not only because of the disposition of such a large number of cases in a comparatively short period of time, but also because of new departures made in the case of this commission in procedure and rules of decision.
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- Copyright © by the American Society of International Law 1938
References
1 See footnote 1 on page 458.
1 The jurisdictional definition of Special Mexican Claims according to the Convention of Sept. 10, 1923, is as follows:
“Article III. The claims which the Commission shall examine and decide are those which arose during the revolutions and disturbed conditions which existed in Mexico covering the period from November 20, 1910, to May 31, 1920, inclusive, and were due to any act by the following forces:
“(1) By forces of a Government de jure or de facto.
“(2) By revolutionary forces as a result of the triumph of whose cause governments de facto or de jure have been established, or by revolutionary forces opposed to them.
“(3) By forces arising from the disjunction of the forces mentioned in the next preceding paragraph up to the time when the government de jure established itself as a result of a particular revolution.
“(4) By federal forces that were disbanded; and
“(5) By mutinies or mobs, or insurrectionary forces other than those referred to under subdivisions (2), (3), and (4) above, or by bandits, provided in any case it be established that the appropriate authorities omitted to take reasonable measures to suppress insurrectionists, mobs, or bandits, or treated them with lenity or were in fault in other particulars.”
The word “forces,” used seven times in Article III, has been construed by the Commission to mean bodies of men in military units and bodies of men participating in mutinies, mob action, or banditry. It was considered broad enough to embrace isolated individuals belonging to military units or to bandit groups, provided that such individuals were acting in the course of operations of their units or groups. (Decision No. 1, page 4, Decisions of Special Mexican Claims Commission, 1938.)
2 Decision printed in this Journal, Vol. 26 (1932), p. 172.
3 This Journal, Supp., Vol. 30 (1936), p. 106. The Convention of Sept. 10, 1923, was printed, ibid., Vol. 18 (1924), p. 143.
4 The Act of Congress approved April 10,1935 (49 Stat. 149) as amended by Joint Resolution approved Aug. 25, 1937 (Public Resolution No. 70, 75th Congress), are printed in Supplement to this Journal, pp. 107, 111.
5 This sort of procedure on affidavits, depositions and documentary evidence, and the submission of briefs without oral testimony or oral argument, has been considered due process of law under the Federal Constitution in the case of both courts and quasi-judicial commissions. Cf. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. et al. v. National Labor Relations Board, 22 P.U.R. (N.S.) 478, 484.
6 The Act approved April 10,1935 (49 Stat. 149) did, it is true, give the Commission power to subpoena witnesses and require the production of such documentary evidence as might be required from any place in the United States at any designated place of hearing. To compel obedience to such subpoena, the Commission was empowered to invoke the aid of any district or territorial court of the United States and of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and any failure to obey a subpoena was made punishable by such court as contempt of court. There was no provision for taking the testimony of witnesses in Mexico, or elsewhere outside the United States, and limitations of time and pressure for completion of the work of the Commission prevented general application of this interesting provision for the taking of testimony in the United States. This power to take testimony was vested only in the Commission and could be exercised only on the Commission’s own motion. It was not a procedural remedy available to claimants which could be invoked by them. Nor was it available to the former American Agency which prepared the records in the claims’ as the Agency had ceased to exist before the Act of April 10, 1935, was enacted. The remedy was of doubtful practical value, even if availed of by the Commission, as it would involve examining witnesses as to events which happened from fifteen to twenty-seven years previously.
7 “All decisions by the Commission… shall constitute a full and final disposition of the cases decided.” Act approved, April 10, 1935 (49 Stat. 149). In view of this provision making the Commission’s decisions final, and in view of the further fact that the action of Congress in making provision for the payment of claimants is ex gratia and not a matter of right so far as the claimants are concerned, the decisions of the Commission are probably not subject to attack on allegations of denial of due process. Cf. Matter of Cummings v. Deutsche Bank, 300 U. S. 115; this Journal, Vol. 31 (1937), p. 532.