Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 An Analytical Approach: Intelligence, Accountability, and Oversight
- 2 Organizing Secrecy: The CIA and Institutional Control
- 3 External Accountability: The Development of Congressional Oversight
- 4 Congress and Oppositional Oversight
- 5 An Independent Judiciary? The Domestic Implications of Intelligence and the Politics of Secret Oversight
- 6 Conclusions and Adapting Oversight Mechanisms for the Future
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - Conclusions and Adapting Oversight Mechanisms for the Future
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2015
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 An Analytical Approach: Intelligence, Accountability, and Oversight
- 2 Organizing Secrecy: The CIA and Institutional Control
- 3 External Accountability: The Development of Congressional Oversight
- 4 Congress and Oppositional Oversight
- 5 An Independent Judiciary? The Domestic Implications of Intelligence and the Politics of Secret Oversight
- 6 Conclusions and Adapting Oversight Mechanisms for the Future
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The analytical framework of accountability has driven this book, providing core criteria to be used across the branches of government in the assessment of intelligence and accountability. The categories used illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of the mechanisms in all three branches of government. The core of intelligence and accountability is the problem of asymmetric information. Information is key to the process of intelligence programs, and thus it is highly guarded within the executive branch. This careful marshaling of intelligence information through these mechanisms has also led to the creation of a system of secrecy that hinders the expansion of transparency of these types of activities. This was clearly highlighted by the December 2014 release of the executive summary of the Senate Committee's Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program. The details contained within the four hundred-page executive summary have shocked many because of the torture methods described as well as what seems to be clear misrepresentation of their effectiveness on the part of the CIA. Beyond this, the problem of asymmetry has been intensified by what has been described as incomplete information on the programs by senior CIA officials provided to external oversight mechanisms in Congress and the Department of Justice, as well as challenges to internal mechanisms, for example, to the inspector general within the CIA. Issues with the redaction and release of the report also led to extreme political stress between the Senate oversight committee and the CIA, as well as between Congress and the White House. These issues concerned how to redact enough of the information in the report to protect the identities of CIA officers who had taken part in the program and how to avoid divulging too many details, such as locations and foreign involvement, of the programs themselves.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- When Should State Secrets Stay Secret?Accountability, Democratic Governance, and Intelligence, pp. 205 - 214Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015