Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Plato
- 3 Hobbes
- 4 Locke
- 5 Human motivation
- 6 Human value
- 7 Hohfeld's analysis
- 8 Hohfeld's analysis analysed
- 9 Change
- 10 Inconsistency
- 11 Understanding rights
- 12 The rights-based approach
- 13 Duty and justice
- Conclusion
- Appendix 1 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Appendix 2 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11 Rome, 4.XI.1950
- Bibliography
- Index
3 - Hobbes
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Plato
- 3 Hobbes
- 4 Locke
- 5 Human motivation
- 6 Human value
- 7 Hohfeld's analysis
- 8 Hohfeld's analysis analysed
- 9 Change
- 10 Inconsistency
- 11 Understanding rights
- 12 The rights-based approach
- 13 Duty and justice
- Conclusion
- Appendix 1 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- Appendix 2 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11 Rome, 4.XI.1950
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
As earlier observed in our discussion of Plato's Republic, in response to Socrates a powerful presentation was made by Thrasymachus of the view that “justice consists in the interests of the strong”. This was developed by Glaucon, reporting what he describes as the “common opinion” that justice is unpleasant in itself but is pursued for the rewards it might bring and in the hope of a good reputation. “What they say is”, he continued:
that it is according to nature a good thing to inflict wrong or injury, and a bad thing to suffer it, but that the disadvantages of suffering it exceed the advantages of inflicting it; so, after a taste of both, men decide that, as they can't evade the one and achieve the other, it will pay to make a compact with each other by which they forgo both. They accordingly proceed to make laws and mutual agreements, and what the law lays down they call lawful and right.
“Taste of both” here implies that the ultimate measure of goodness is our own “taste” or, in other words, what satisfies our desires. “According to nature a good thing” amounts to the claim that, against Plato's later position, desire as a measure of “goodness” is not merely a motivational feature of the class of tradespeople but is a feature of human nature in general. It is “natural” to all of us to understand “goodness” or “justice” in this way; in other words, we will find that this is what we all “really mean” by it if we are trying to discover its nature through a kind of dialogue.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Rights and ReasonAn Introduction to the Philosophy of Rights, pp. 39 - 54Publisher: Acumen PublishingPrint publication year: 2003