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  3. Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency
  • Cited by 1
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
February 2015
Print publication year:
2015
Online ISBN:
9781107707573
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107707573
Subjects:
Law: General Interest, Law, Legal Philosophy, Philosophy
Information

Book description

This collection of new essays explores in depth how and why we act when we follow practical standards, particularly in connection with the authority of legal texts and lawmakers. The essays focus on the interplay of intentions and practical reasons, engaging incisive arguments to demonstrate both the close connection between them, and the inadequacy of accounts that downplay this important link. Their wide-ranging discussion includes topics such as legal interpretation, the paradox of intention, the relation between moral and legal obligation, and legal realism. The volume will appeal to scholars and students of legal philosophy, moral philosophy, law, social science, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of action.

Reviews

‘This sophisticated book is essential reading for anyone with an interest in law and practical reasoning.'

Dennis Patterson - European University Institute

'The essays in the book are rich and topical. They cover a variety of different issues, but with many interesting connections between them. This is a book that repays close study. I recommend it to anyone who has an interest in these areas.'

Jonathan Crowe Source: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

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Contents

Contents
References

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