Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Preface
- 1 REALIST AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
- 2 METHODOLOGY
- 3 THE CRISIS STRUCTURE AND WAR
- 4 PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR
- 5 STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR, AND OUTCOMES
- 6 INFLUENCE TACTICS
- 7 INFLUENCE STRATEGIES
- 8 RECIPROCATING INFLUENCE STRATEGIES
- 9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
- EPILOGUE: THE 1990–1991 CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF
- Appendices
- Notes
- References
- Index of names
- Index of subjects
- Titles in the series
5 - STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR, AND OUTCOMES
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Preface
- 1 REALIST AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
- 2 METHODOLOGY
- 3 THE CRISIS STRUCTURE AND WAR
- 4 PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR
- 5 STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR, AND OUTCOMES
- 6 INFLUENCE TACTICS
- 7 INFLUENCE STRATEGIES
- 8 RECIPROCATING INFLUENCE STRATEGIES
- 9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
- EPILOGUE: THE 1990–1991 CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF
- Appendices
- Notes
- References
- Index of names
- Index of subjects
- Titles in the series
Summary
The findings in Chapters 3 and 4 have yielded some clues regarding the descriptive and prescriptive validity of the realist perspective on crisis behavior. The structural variables considered most salient by realists – perceived interests and comparative capabilities – are excellent predictors of war or nonwar crisis outcomes when these variables take on particularly high or low values. On the other hand, when there is a high degree of reciprocity in the interactions of the two sides, we find positive associations between high escalation and war, and between low escalation and compromise outcomes. These findings underscore the potential risks and missed opportunities associated with following the prescriptions of conflict strategists. They suggest that, while the structural variables considered most salient by classical realists are likely to be key determinants of crisis behavior, other factors may intervene to confound policy-making based solely on a rational calculation of interests and capabilities. If that is the case, it raises the issue of the relative potency of these two competing forces – a rational calculation of interests and capabilities versus the psychopolitical effects – of an escalating crisis, as well as their relationship to each other. Are the behavior patterns that we have observed dependent on variations in the crisis structure? And, if it is possible to obtain better predictions of the outcomes of crises based on variations in each of these variables, what can we learn from the combined effects of variations in the crisis structure and crisis behavior? These questions will be explored in this chapter, beginning with an examination of the relationship between the crisis structure and patterns of behavior.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816–1980 , pp. 91 - 112Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1993