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10 - Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2020

Barbara Elias
Affiliation:
Bowdoin College, Maine
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Summary

Summarizing, I detail the leverage sources for “weak” local COIN proxies. As postcolonial military intervention conceptualizes local partner regime success as a fundamental component of a successful foreign military intervention, local allies have much political influence over wealthy intervening patrons. Local allies that offer political inputs necessary for the COIN effort can capitalize on their indispensable role to extract concessions and assert influence over intervening wealthy patrons. Comparing the nine wars, I find consistency in local ally compliance, with one-third of requests from intervening forces resulting in compliance, one-third partial compliance, and one-third noncompliance. Interestingly, rates of local compliance had little impact on war outcome as intervening forces did not always offer great advice to local partners, and stronger local partners, such as Sri Lanka, that were more capable of combatting insurgents, could simultaneously resist the policy prescriptions of intervening patrons. These findings show the complexity of COIN by proxy, and should temper expectations about how much local reform can (and perhaps should) be coerced by intervening patrons.

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Why Allies Rebel
Defiant Local Partners in Counterinsurgency Wars
, pp. 258 - 273
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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  • Conclusion
  • Barbara Elias, Bowdoin College, Maine
  • Book: Why Allies Rebel
  • Online publication: 05 June 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108784979.010
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  • Conclusion
  • Barbara Elias, Bowdoin College, Maine
  • Book: Why Allies Rebel
  • Online publication: 05 June 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108784979.010
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • Barbara Elias, Bowdoin College, Maine
  • Book: Why Allies Rebel
  • Online publication: 05 June 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108784979.010
Available formats
×