Book contents
- Why Allies Rebel
- Why Allies Rebel
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Why Local Allies Defy or Comply with Requests from Intervening Allies
- 3 Methodology
- 4 The USA in Iraq
- 5 The USA in Afghanistan
- 6 The USA in Vietnam
- 7 India in Sri Lanka
- 8 The USSR in Afghanistan
- 9 When Small States Intervene
- 10 Conclusion
- Book part
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - Conclusion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2020
- Why Allies Rebel
- Why Allies Rebel
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Why Local Allies Defy or Comply with Requests from Intervening Allies
- 3 Methodology
- 4 The USA in Iraq
- 5 The USA in Afghanistan
- 6 The USA in Vietnam
- 7 India in Sri Lanka
- 8 The USSR in Afghanistan
- 9 When Small States Intervene
- 10 Conclusion
- Book part
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Summarizing, I detail the leverage sources for “weak” local COIN proxies. As postcolonial military intervention conceptualizes local partner regime success as a fundamental component of a successful foreign military intervention, local allies have much political influence over wealthy intervening patrons. Local allies that offer political inputs necessary for the COIN effort can capitalize on their indispensable role to extract concessions and assert influence over intervening wealthy patrons. Comparing the nine wars, I find consistency in local ally compliance, with one-third of requests from intervening forces resulting in compliance, one-third partial compliance, and one-third noncompliance. Interestingly, rates of local compliance had little impact on war outcome as intervening forces did not always offer great advice to local partners, and stronger local partners, such as Sri Lanka, that were more capable of combatting insurgents, could simultaneously resist the policy prescriptions of intervening patrons. These findings show the complexity of COIN by proxy, and should temper expectations about how much local reform can (and perhaps should) be coerced by intervening patrons.
- Type
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- Information
- Why Allies RebelDefiant Local Partners in Counterinsurgency Wars, pp. 258 - 273Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020